Can Robots Ever Have Life and Consciousness

And then he says also, at the same time, the neurochemical happening is sometimes present when love is absent.

Welcome to the Mohammed he gap show I'm taking over we are talking about the genealogy of God when did him. So you did you get any jazz on this issue. So please talk to us about the genealogy.

Hello. And welcome to another very important show with someone who's actually come back on the show, by popular demand.

Lego briquette, after we done the previous show with Hamza, obviously a lot of people actually saying, messaging me privately and saying that they want to see more of Hamza, and they want to see more of this kind of, let's say academic discussion, also going into the nitty gritty of things, and discussing things for more or less an academic perspective, to try and bridge the gap between the academic world and mercy. The popular discourse, yes.

And what we're going to talk about today, if you don't mind me saying, you've done a good job in

kind of highlighting, you've done a whole chapter on this in your book, isn't there consciousness? Yes, I mean, my reading has slightly changed in my studies as a result of completing the post grad, but yet just roughly the same. So this is the thing I mean, guys, it was a book just for people that

is in Divine reality, one reality is available on on various channels, various channels, like I'm gonna put this on the description, guys. So you can check this book, there is a a chapter that is actually kind of dedicated to this idea today of consciousness, which we're gonna talk about. But the idea is this. I mean, first and foremost, I personally believe in the Dow, and this is not something which has been spoken about too much. Consciousness. Yeah. And this is not to say that people give doubt unconsciously.

No, I mean, well, I mean, to say that most of your job is

what we mean here is that really this is, this is where I believe, like people who have been educated, let's say, from a Western perspective, can provide multiple the cutting edge in the Tao of discourse, because it is a cutting edge. I haven't seen for a long time I've done obviously, some readings in this. I haven't seen Muslim academics and Muslim speakers Muslim days, use these kinds of arguments back I think this is kind of climate show. Not that it's kind of groundbreaking. From the philosophical perspective, these discussions are always had in the philosophical circle. But from a value perspective and photopic Dini, if you will, this goes to religious discourse is not

something which we have been exposed to. So consciousness, first and foremost, can you define consciousness? What is consciousness? Why is it important? Okay? consciousness is important because it makes us human being Okay, so consciousness relates to some really easy things like our ability to have to think and to have rational insights and to be aware, and the fact that we have, you know, cognitive processes going on that we can think about things. Yeah, those are the kind of easy aspects of consciousness. There is another aspect of consciousness, which is very difficult. It's actually been called the hard problem of consciousness. What is the hard problem? The hard problem

of consciousness is really based upon two things. Number one, what is it like for a human being to have an inner subjective conscious experience? And number two, why do they have that inner subjective conscious experience arising from physical processes? Yeah, for example, what's your favorite sweet?

Oh, you like strawberries? I like sugar.

Religious to me like

okay, so give me another free like Joanna Brown, okay. So you're having a banana see a hummingbird on the right in front of me right okay. You are now having an inner subjective conscious experience on what it is like for you to have a banana, right? Right. So that's the inner subjective conscious states also known as phenomenal state a phenomenal state right. So, you have this phenomenal experience this inner subjective conscious experience of eating a banana

and not in a subjective conscious experience arises from neuro biological processes and arises from physical stuff. So the question is and the problem of the heart problem is essentially, what is it like for Mohammed he gap to have a banana? I always like for you, what is the inner subjective subjective conscious experience for you? And why do you have the inner subjective conscious experience arising from physical processes?

Since these two questions make up what is well known in philosophy now as the hard problem of consciousness, you know, look into the work so of Monza tea or Dorado Neagle, charmers, Alta, many, many others write an interesting book that I think you recommended to me some time ago was by Raymond tennis Freeman tennis, which is called AP mankind AP mankind, he also made a book called why we're not computers or something of that nature.

I guess the question I want to ask you is this I mean, let me give you a scenario has resources, let's say a percent, I'll make a robot, I get a robot that's five foot 10, you know, five foot 10 and a half, okay, with 18 inch biceps, no no.

Exact robot. And in fact, we program it will give the algorithms

so that the robot acts in exactly the same way as you act. Yeah. So in all, you know, in all intents and purposes, this robot is actually Hamza, sorceress. In terms of aesthetics, how it looks, how it acts. If I go ahead and put a knife through this little robot or break the robot using a bat, whatever it is, have I killed hamsters, horses? 2.0, or have I damaged property?

You've damaged property. And probably the main reason you've damaged properties because I am not a robot. And if even if you were to try and claim that the physical makeup of that robot was somehow identical to my physical makeup, you still haven't cured a human being you just could a robot. Because the inner structure of that robot, if you use such a language does not produce in a subjective conscious experience. There is a there is an A What is it? Like for the robot, you know, to wake up on a Sunday morning, enjoy gourmet coffee. Right? So you're saying that if we just depend upon materialistic definitions, well, I would even argue that's not the best example to use. But I

know what you're trying to go here. Yeah. And what would say here in the case of the robot is the robot essentially, is based on algorithms. And as William hasker said that a robot as a computational thing is basically just a an extension of human rationality and consciousness. Right? It doesn't have it, it's an extension of human rationals. It needs an impulse. It needs an input. Absolutely. Not just that. One would also argue if you follow for SSL and others, that the robot itself, all it can do is just manipulate symbols. Right? Right. Right, right. syntax, right? Right. It can't, sorry, it can just manipulate symbols, right? It can't manipulate meaning syntax. So

there's a difference between symbols and syntax, right? It comes into play essentially zeros and ones, which is the base of all binary code, your binary code, and you have more complexity after that, but you could just manipulate that. But it cannot attach meaning to those symbols. Because you can even train a computer to believe Yes, is no one knows. Yes. From that point of view here. So one would argue that point yeah, just repeat that point again. Well, you could you could you could train a computer. You could input into computer that yes means no, no means yes. Right. Right. Right. But you could do that with a human being to one would argue, yeah, but the point I'm trying to make here

is no meaning that they cannot attach meaning to the symbols. It's just a manipulation of symbols, right? And I wouldn't be an invalid inference to suggest that potentially this robot has the same first person subjective experience as you do that has consciousness. Of course you can because look, maybe this is not a great example to use. Let's use the example of

maybe even a zombie Yeah, because zombies biological right, the zombies like soulless isn't it? Kill things right? Same way the zombie version of you right does that zombie version of you have Phoenix

zombies supposed to be these things I don't feel they just attack and eat and kill right now have no intercept different kinds of states just like almost this in between this realm of consciousness and unconsciousness. They're like ghosts like but they you that they got your biological makeup. They have an intact brain or heart the physicality that so from a zombie point of view. Does that zombie have inner subjective conscious experiences? No. Well, probably not. Right. So what would say is here's why are we saying this because there is something fundamentally different about inner subjective conscious states and just physical stuff. Yeah, there is something fundamentally

different. This is not about an epistemic gap. It's not about a knowledge gap at all, we just don't know. You know, we don't know how the physical stuff works in order for us to have

in a subjective conscious states. It's not just about knowledge. Yes, there is an epistemic gap that we don't know we could discuss that later. But fundamentally, what's more crucial here is there is something ontologically different What does that mean? That the nature and source of these two things are different? Okay, let me break it down. Please. Do you have a brain?

anatomy? Yeah, you have a brain. So we take your brain and our neurochemical pathways

As a neuroscientist, for example, I'm looking at these neurochemical pathways and I'm currently in them because neuroscience is basically what? He was a neurologist or something like that was an MRI. He knew if I, if I'm correct, he knew the neuroscience and he's also a philosopher as an atheist, by the way, yeah. But he doesn't believe this physicalist understanding.

He finds it quite disappointing actually. So from that point of view, say you have a brain and we map out all the neurochemical pathways in your brain and we correlate it because neuroscience the size of correlations, mainly, yeah. And we correlate the neurochemical pathways to for example, eating a banana on a Sunday morning. Yeah, watching the sunrise or something. Yeah. And you have innocent different kinds of state and you describe that state as wonderful spiritual, mystical, tasty, sweet, nice. Yeah, you got all those descriptions? And what they say is that neurochemical stuff that's happening that those neurochemical happenings is, is his subjective conscious state.

They are making it identical to his subjective conscious state. Now that what neuroscience does, and you may hear lots of things in the popular media online world that, you know, they found this new kind of neurochemical pathway or happenings, and they're correlating it to this innocent little conscious state, the thing that now that neurochemical happening is identical to the subjective experience. That is a big problem, right? Because neuroscience hasn't proven that what they've done, they just did is bringing this the assumption into play rather than saying is right, they're saying, right, right, right. It's identical. But that term itself, that statement is identical to Yeah, they

will have to prove it, because that's exposing your philosophical assumption, right? Because neuroscience because you think neuroscience is philosophically free. There is no philosophy free science does, like Dan Dennett said, Yeah, there's no philosophy, philosophy, science, you're always gonna have certain assumptions, right? If you say the philosophy of science, right, which you have to use, and adopt in order to have your science. So in the case of neuroscience, a key assumption of neuroscience is physicalism, which is physicalism is the philosophical approach to the mind or to consciousness that basically says that inner subjective conscious experience can be reduced in some

way to physical stuff. That is a philosophical assumption, materialism. In other words, they use materialism as well, in the literature, physicalism. And materialism are used, interchangeable, but they do have historical and meanings are slightly different. materialism used to mean that you could reduce things to physical stuff. Physical is a means that it doesn't necessarily have to be reduced to physical stuff, but it could be reduced to physical processes. But that's neither here nor there. They're using it interchangeably now. Yeah. So physicalism, what they say now, physicalism is a philosophical approach to consciousness, that is basically saying that, who you are your conscious

states, especially your phenomenal states, your inner subjective conscious states can be reduced to physical stuff or processes. Let me see if I get this. And that's why neuroscience you have to bring this to the audience because people miss that. Look, this is new stuff that comes along, they found 40 megahertz in the brain or something. There's some kind of frequency and some kind of happenings. Yeah. And they correlated to you having a coffee, therefore, they found the basis of consciousness. Hold on a second, my friend, yeah, this time down the kind of you know, neuro mania, as Talia says neuro mania them up down a bit. All they're shown is a correlation. They haven't shown that the 40

megahertz, for example, is identical to that subjective experience. To make that claim, you now have to expose your philosophical assumption that physical stuff is identical to inner subjective conscious states. And that is the problem. Let me see if I get this right. And you correct me if I'm wrong, okay. Is what you're saying is follows. Say, for example, I get someone, I'm not sure that's even possible. But let's say I got someone right. Put them onto an MRI scanner. Get them to eat or speak to them? Yeah. I'll say to them, I'll give them keywords, which will trigger certain emotions, for example, using they say something which has emotive resonance to them, right.

And the scientist in the MRI room, he says, Okay, well, here, when you say this word, these areas in this in the brain are these neurological pathways are triggered or, or this part of the brain is, is triggered, you can see that this part of the brain is triggered. Now, obviously, from a scientific perspective, we don't have a problem with that you have not taught no emotion. Now, the issue you're saying you have and we have is that actually you can't say just because that part of the brain is, let's say, Now aroused. It's now this new chemical firing is neuro chemical fire firing. You can't say that that is that is the basis for significant yours that your your let's say, for example,

love, you can't say love is reduced to a chemical bundle. No, that's extremely reductionist, because there's other parts of the brain that firing as well. Yeah. And in different studies. There are so many contradictions in neuroscience. Yeah. But the interesting thing here is this. Say you prove that that is the basis of law.

Yeah. Does that now mean that is love?

Do you see my point? Right? No, it doesn't mean it is love, right? It could just be a physical manifestation of be part of the process. It could be something that allows love to happen. But it doesn't mean it is love. It doesn't mean is the experience of love? Yes, loving. That's the first point. Yeah. The second point is, even if you were to claim that it is love, you still have not solved the hard problem. Because I would ask you, right?

What is it for that person to fall in love? What is it like for them? And they will give you more descriptions, then you just ask those descriptions? What is it like for those people to have those descriptions?

Words of equals to meaning meaning is a representation of subjectivity. You can still never find out what it's like for Muhammad, he got to fall in love. Right. And that's the point here. And that's saying very important, but something that's very interesting about the method of neuroscience was very interesting. David Peppino gave a brilliant argument. And he's, I think you've mentioned about 50 people now. Yeah, so but let

me just pick up my notes here. Because this is chapter two of a forthcoming book. That means somewhat amateur writing code. The third hypothesis, there's a new book coming up. Yeah, that's what a lot of studies on this is based on my post grad thesis as well. Okay. So basically, the David Peppino argument is really, really clever. So let me just give it to your duplicators. I mean, for these papers, I was gonna look like a little mad, mad philosopher here, but I do apologize.

If you do philosophy, you can be refuted modern.

Philosophy is fine with everyone does philosophy.

If I'm going to be refuted that my answer is this, there is no such thing as a philosophy free reputation.

Right.

Now,

school, isn't it?

So yeah, so that limitate one of the limitations of neuroscience is this and it's very, very interesting for everyone to actually understand this and transcend the kind of online hype that happens sometimes. Yeah. Okay, good. So

there's a variety of material candidates, let me just read too much easier. So David Peppino he postulates that neuroscience will not be able to target the material basis for conscious experience. Because when neuroscientists attempt to correlate neurochemical events in the brain with phenomenal experience, in a subjective experience, there will always be a number of different material properties set apart again. So every time and neuroscience was a correlate

neurochemical events happenings in the brain. So this goes back to what Mr. Reagan Yes. So say you see the MRI or whatever you see here, and you see neurochemical happenings in the brain. Yeah, they want to correlate that with the subject of actually is actually feeling whatever has been the emotion Yeah, they will, there will always be a number of different material properties which fit the evidence equally well. Okay, so he admits that neuroscientific research is able to narrow down so neuroscience is really good and clever, we love it as well as Muslims is able to narrow down the physical brain events that correspond to conscious experience correspond correlate not cause, but

there will always be a variety of material candidates and this way, he says, when we look for some material property common to all those cases where humans report they are phenomenally conscious meaning subjective experience and absence whenever they deny this, we will inevitably find a variety of material candidates which fit perfectly with the database, apart from any strictly physical property, there would also be various structural properties. Now, this is very, very, very interesting. What Peppino basically says here is that, well, you don't have a strong argument, you can't now say that the neurochemical event is identical with the conscious experience. Okay. So

here's the argument that he presents and try and follow. It's a bit detailed, logically, I think you get it. Yeah.

Number one, a neurochemical event he is identical with a conscious experience p e cannot be absent when p is testified to so saga. So let me read it once we break it down, okay. Yeah. So, number one and neurochemical event he is identical with the conscious experience p okay. Number two, he cannot be absent when p is testify to be present. Number three, he cannot be present when p is testified to be absent before he must be present to be necessary for p number five, he is sometimes absent when p is testified to be present. Number six, he is sometimes present when p is testified to be absent. Number seven, therefore, he is not necessary for P. So it's a very brilliant argument because he was

Yes. So let's break it down in very layman English.

Peppino says this. So you have a neurochemical subjective experience going on right states correlate to subjective experience. So you have a neurochemical event, we see something firings Yeah. And what neuroscience says are some people that adopt a wrong approach to neuroscience. They say this neuro chemical firing is identical

With the conscious experience, yes. Okay. That's the main assumption here. But he said when you look at the massive database and all of these scans and neurochemical findings and happenings in the database, there's more than one candidate. It is not. Yes, a lot more than one candidate. They can narrow down but there's still more more than one candidate. Right. That's the first issue. So yeah, so we sit here now is now the, the neurochemical event.

I do apologize, my conscious experience of a computer.

So you're by yourself now. See, Siri on the iPhone was you're trying to prove internal conscious experience anyway.

So a neurochemical event is identical to conscious experience. So what's happening in the brain? The assumption is, is that it's identical to the internal conscious experience. But then he breaks it down. Okay. So this would mean that the neurochemical event cannot be absent when someone is talking about the subjective conscious experience, because if it's the same, it can't be absent. Right. So here's Yes. Well, so he's saying that if this thing is this thing, so they have to be both, if the neurological firings represent the subjective experience, if the subjective experience is present, where the neurological firing is not happening, then that would represent a competition. Yes. So

yeah. So basically, what you're saying is, you've got the neurochemical event happening. Yeah. It can't be absent when the thing when you're saying that your chemical event is responsible for the spirit. Yes. So you said that they both have to be present versatile. Yeah, yes. So therefore, the new chemical fine firings right, have to be present, to be necessary for the conscious experience. Because if it's causal,

if you think there's no chemical finding, is the conscious, the conscious experience, then the many?

Yes. So it has to be necessary, necessarily. But what is basically you can't say that love is caused by this part of the brain. Unless it's always there when love is there. Absolutely. And yes, good. And also, yeah, absolutely. Yeah, in a nutshell. So therefore, what he's seen in the database of neuro neurobiological studies, he says, however,

that that thing that you're saying is causing love that neurochemical pathway and those neurochemical happenings, yeah, there's sometimes absent when love is present, when p is present. That's really Yes. Yeah. And then he says, also, at the same time, the neurochemical happening is sometimes present, when love is absent.

Exactly. So therefore, he conclude it's a brilliant argument, and it is the journalists from is called

David pepino. Could they be a science of consciousness philosophical issues? What do you 13 2003 pages? 28209? Do you know how powerful this is? Of course it is.

He put us in labor. So until you correct me if I'm wrong, but

therefore, yeah, the neurochemical firings is not necessary for that particular inner subjective conscious state. You know what you're saying? Let me see what you're saying. You correct me if I'm wrong. Yeah. You all say, Well, David happy never seen, right. But generally, you're making the argument using Yes. What we're saying what you're saying what specific is love, hate all the subjective experiences, you know, compassion, going through any even eating like, even pain, even pledges? Hey, yeah, all of that cannot be explained using euro. None of that is come down to the language. It can be explained. But it doesn't euro. Okay.

So you're saying that all of those things cannot be said to be caused by euro science? Yeah. Okay. This is yes. So I know what you're trying to say here. Basically, what we're saying is that neuroscience cannot solve the hard problem of consciousness. It cannot tell us what is it like for Mohammed have a banana on a Sunday morning? Yes. And it cannot say why that neurochemical the why that subjective experience comes from arises from neurobiological happenings or physical processes. That's the hard problem of consciousness. Now, you can you can never This is my view, you can never even claim neuroscience cannot can answer the question, Why? The reason being is because the only

thing that neuroscience can do this book as a method, that's a beautiful method is basically say that that physical happening is identical to that conscious experience. Yes, but you need to prove that all you've seen is a neurochemical happening and a conscious experience to say that they are identical. Now, given the fact that they look so different, feels so different can be spoken about in different ways. One is first person want to step up exactly right. In that way, you now need to prove that assumption you've made because it's not as it

result of the data. It's your interpretation of the data because you have that philosophical assumption baggage that you're imposing on the data, which is they are identical. But frankly, they are not identical. And that kind of

assumption is actually a philosophical study. That's why neuroscience is not philosophically free as well, to really just iron this out. I'm not just making the sign. I just say one thing, and you correct me Of course. Yeah. I wanted to ask, now, put it this way, right. If science can only deal with falsifying material, material things, yeah. So science cannot because it has naturalistic presuppositions. Yes. So since science can only falsify that which is naturalistic, it cannot falsify that which is metaphysical. And therefore to discount that which is metaphysical. Whilst using only a naturalistic framework, is not possible. There's no such thing as a metaphysics free

science anyway, especially in your interpretations, because you have some assumptions that offers principles for you, and metaphysics or widefield. metaphysics not only talks about like a like ontology, the nature of sorts of things, it talks about first principles, you have first principles and science all the time, like a footprint of sciences that you have to believe in assume

metaphysical things under a microscope. Agree, but there's a lot of scientific things you can't find in the microscope. Like when people think science is about falsification, that's not true. Read popper, if you read that analysis of popper, people have moved away from this kind of hard preparing stance of Yeah, everything must be falsified. Here's a proof. And I let the challenge everybody go find their or go to any philosophy of science any any scientist and say, can you have Can you revive a falsified theory?

Yes, you can you just change the assumptions.

And here's an example.

Right, so the believing obits, right, all the great day that we saw. And then what did they start finding? They saw the perturbations, the wobbly orbit of Uranus, right? That is what they falsified the data. Right? It's falsified the signal with orbits are not you know, there's no orbits anymore. We have to change the way we understand celestial mechanics. This is one I'm going to do that we've got so much good data has been affirmed. So well forget this thing that has basically gone against our, you know, theory. So what do they do? They just change the assumption. This is fine. There's another planet. There's another planet Neptune. And that's how Neptune? Yeah, that's it. So it

happens in science all the time. It's called epistemic holism. Right, that there is a kind of network of different beliefs that have been affirmed. And some of them, you know, those supported by a child is that this kind of coherent ism going on in science, this this very hardcore falsification? People don't use it anymore. This is useful. Don't get me wrong. I wrote an essay on it.

It has limitations. Yep. So I sort of just go back on basically neurosciences assumptions, just to really show that I'm not just making this up, right. And it's very important for us to understand this. So the philosophical assumptions of neuroscience. Okay. So take, for example, what, you know, modern Mozarteum what urato, they highlight that neuroscience is not metaphysically innocent, and that empirical data needs to be interpreted for from the perspective of some premise. Yeah. Rex washin. Right. He also posits neuroscience explanation of consciousness is based on an assumption, that phenomenal experience can be reduced to biology. Right, right. So there's an assumption there.

And that's why if sorry, if neuroscience claims If so, the heartbeat of consciousness, which I believe is nonsense, nonsense, especially from a logical point of view. If they do claim all they're doing is bringing their philosophical, unproven assumption to the table, just like what Rex Wilson says, right? And he's and he's a physicalist. Right, Ian golden Idina Russkies, they explained that science is based on physical physicalist guiding assumptions, which are taken from other fields and the up for grabs, right? You have, I mean, you have so much you have so many people that response your makes a really good point. He basically says anti robots. So if you were to really go somewhere

I've been saying, it's a little different philosophical approaches to the hard problem of consciousness, read the book called consciousness, the science of subjectivity by entierro, once you I think, was published in 2010. Really good book. And he even says that neuroscience neurobiological theories or neurobiological studies about consciousness, especially subjective consciousness.

They're not they're not philosophically innocent. They have the right philosophy, they have philosophical baggage, and many of them because of the nature of the science, they adopt what you call physicalism. Now, there are different types of physicalism, by the way, so

we can't do that today, though, is to know or could you summarize the title and put it on the video rose to know Yeah, because you have things like reductive reductive materialism or reductive eliminative. materialism, you have functionalism you have emergent materialism strong and weak emergent materialism, but all of them I mean, you could summarize it, all of them have the same kind of I don't want to misrepresent academic discussions. There are strong disruptive anyone by generally speaking and what I've read my post grad studies, they're not addressing the hard problem of consciousness yet. Some people claim it's only a

epistemic gap that there is a gap in our knowledge. Yeah. Yes, there is a gap in our knowledge. We don't know how the physical stuff, you know, allows consciousness subjective consciousness to exist right? Or to come into reality. Yeah. We don't know that and we don't know. And it's true. We don't know what it's like for Mohammed, he got to have a banana on a Sunday. You know, we don't know that way. It's like specifically for you. Oh, no, it's for me. I might know neurochemical pathways. I might understand your descriptions, but your first person innocent experience, I don't know. So it's true. There is an epistemic gap, a knowledge gap. But I will go further. Like many others, I

remember I believe Professor Nagel argue this as well and many others.

There is a ontological gap. It's metaphysics. It's a metaphysical question, because the two thing that you're talking about the source and nature of these things seemed fundamentally so different. How can you even start to claim right, that new chemical firings? Yeah, new chemical firings are identical and equivalent to inner subjective conscious experience? Surely, you know, is the mark of a rational mind to question something that didn't have to be?

And let's question this. Are you saying that it's just a knowledge gap? Here's the proof. Say, you know, everything about the brain? Does it now follow you know, his first person experience? Because Science is all about third person?

Do you see my point, no matter how much more about the brain and physical processes, I will still not know what it's like for Mohammed, he got to have a banana Sundae, and to understand why they arise from physical processes. That is a metaphysical question is about ontology. metaphysics is a different kettle of fish. Hopefully, I know, we haven't gone to detail. But hopefully we could discuss this and another time, go through reductive materialism and emitted materialism. And all this isn't a schism function is also very interesting as well. And I want to go more into hopefully by to the computational models as well, can a computer be rational because computers do deductive

logic, that's like an expression of rationality and consciousness does that mean computers can be conscious, and about artificial intelligence, and we got some really good arguments about this. But that's not the type as I was gonna say that. So this is kind of to bring it to a sonic model now, because in terms of explanatory framework, now the atheistic naturalistic framework, we are saying that consciousness remains a hard problem, it cannot be explained. There is no physical, materialistic or physical aesthetic way of explaining consciousness, that all of those approaches the aforementioned they're not really said to be useful and explained, or coherent and comprehensive

enough. So our concept of for example, we have the concept of a row. It's a little rock and roll, they ask you about the row. The soul is the commander. Here, it says from the command of our Lord. What would you do blind? Milan? Exactly. Luckily, that I haven't been given a knowledge of except for.

So this isn't something that I think it was at one. And the idea that narrative of for examples, as well as palaces for it as a way to one of us to be humanoid for Pablo Saturday. When so when I have fashioned him I Adam,

and I've breathed into him of my spirit spirit. Yeah. So the angels, how long said you didn't fall into frustration to him? The the narrative being that there is and as I spoke to you before the video, Dido within the forces the widget, like the idea that they have gentlemen, you have the body, and then you have an Asana be married again, brought together again, yeah, right. So this, this really, in my view, and I've written about this in the book, not my book, but the new book that's coming out. So hypothesis, what we're seeing is my view, I think, an integrative dualism works, right? The lack of like, what was not Judaism because we have a different approach. Yeah, yes, we do

be the two different substances body and the body and the soul are different. Yes. So for example, the law is different and the body is different, right? As per the Islamic evidences, yes, but they interact. Right? Now. That's one contention, like, for example, the philosopher of biology, Eliot, sober, he says, one condition Buddhism is, well we don't know how to interact, but to be honest, not knowing how to interact doesn't undermine your your approach to false argument Renan. So, they call that interaction is problem, but put that aside for now. So you have these two different substances, you have the the, the law of the soul, in essence of consciousness or inner subjective conscious

states, whatever you want to call it, and you have the body and the mind and the brain Rather, they interact. This is your metaphysical thesis. This is your understanding of reality. This is the social nature of who we are, right? But it's integrative with the science, allow the scientist to do their job, allow neuroscience to do his job. Allah allow other scientific hypotheses to come into play and compete and discuss some trivia filmed and falsified or whatever, and allow that to happen. There's nothing wrong with that. All we're saying is, it basically makes the science and the neuroscience metaphysical

Comprehensive that they don't start jumping into other spheres of thought like philosophy, which they can't really deal with, and bring out their false assumptions that they kind of are really justifying. All we're saying is, we believe in a world in a universe that has consciousness that is distinct from the material stuff, they interact in some way. Right? And as human beings, we can look at the physical stuff, the neurobiological chemical happenings, to find correlations, and how they interact from that point of view and what and what is happening. Yeah, and, and the, and the physical happenings we could when we allow neuroscience to continue this amazing journey. But

because of our metaphysical, comprehensive approach here, we will not now say, even if we were to know everything about the brain in now means we can now ignore in us of different kinds of states. Or it means we've now answered the hard problem by saying they're identical. Because we've said the audio problem by doing that,

it's a far more complex way of saying, I was gonna say, great to do this. So here the question that I sort of started, I know, there's some ways that you're very incoherent, but it's really good code. Judaism, a contemporary defensibility posed by Rutan. It's very good. I was gonna say, it's gone back to what we started with, maybe good way to end as well.

The fact we started with robots, maybe you don't like the idea, or the example that we're by, I find it useful. Like the idea now, because we're talking about, we're an age of artificial intelligence and giving robots rights and all this kind of things, right. And we talked about the fact that if you if I create a robot Hamza 2.0, with your exact characteristics, aesthetic, and

like psychological characteristics and your reactions and everything, that if I break that, that robot, it wouldn't be murder, it would be, it would basically be damaging property. Yeah.

This reminds me of a verse of the Quran was fantastic Hajj, there's a verse that says, boy, we mustn't have a semi Allah, there was an example that was struck. So listen to it, it says that you will never be that your Gods will never be able to or the gods that you worship will never be able to create a Baba, which is a flight? Well, I would just come out like, even if they come together, and they try and create it. And if you think about this from the like, because we start off with robots, right? Yeah. Do you have like a material structure, which mimics aesthetically, say, for example, another biological structure with life and consciousness? Right? Yeah. You said to us that

that would be property damage, it wouldn't be murder of a broken, right. Yes. So this idea of the chronic challenge here, because there's many creditors, it's actually one of them, we wouldn't be able to actually, you could say, aesthetically, we could make a handsome 2.0. We could make a robot that mimics hanza. 2.0 has resources. But we could make a robot that mimics a fly, fly Fly 2.0. But but from this perspective, that we just talked about this metaphysical perspective, we would never be able to endow such a an entity with life and consciousness. Is that correct? Yeah. Well, I would argue that you can't have a robot with inner subjective conscious states. Yeah. For you to claim

that they can, then what you're claiming is that that physical stuff is identical to inner subjective conscious states, which should be a big problem, because it can't even dress the hard problem of consciousness, as we just discussed. So you have to bring in you have to bring to light your philosophy of why you think physicalism is true, from that point of view, or a type of physicalism. Or there is functionalism, or emergent materialism or eliminative. materialism or reductive materialism, so whatever. Yeah, whatever it is. So that's, that's a very good challenge. Absolutely. With that, guys.

I would like to say to you that this last thing before we can kind of cut off it.

There's a lot of jargon, a lot of terminology that you might not understand. But once again, the point is, we're trying to bring forward an Islamic explanation. At the end of the day, if you're a naturalist atheist watching this video with respect with respect to you, we're happy that you've watched it to this to this length. I know a lot of you do do that. A lot of you subscribe to my channel, and I want a lot more of you to subscribe because we want to share ideas. But the point is this guys, it really is a problem. When

I say for example, your worldview, a worldview that you have, is limited in its ability to explain basic phenomena, I would say. Like for example, first person subjective experience for me and for you is I would describe it as almost axiomatic like, the first thing you realize about yourself that you exist, first thing that you realize about yourself, how you feel and where you are, at any particular point in time.

The worldview that you guys have, and once again, it's up to you guys with respect. The worldview that you guys have, is not only just limited in, in explaining to us how we got here, and how we're placed in the universe, but it's even limited in the fact that it doesn't explain to us who we are and how we are. It can only do so at

Best from a neurological biological perspective. I said you guys think outside the neurological sorry neurobiological box.

And think about the metaphysics think about these things. Think about consciousness. Why are you?

That's the question your answer, you're gonna make something funny.

Imagine the people that you dearly love, like your mother, your grandparents, your children, your loved ones, your partner, someone that you really love. And then they went through a traumatic experience like God forbid this happens you like a death in the family or something. And then in the morning and upset and really, really sad, and I've got so much pain and anguish and I don't know what to do and I feel really upset and just turn around and say to them, if you want to be consistent, turn around and say to them, darling, don't worry, everything you're feeling is just neurochemicals firing.

I know that sounds really bad. But can you do that to imagine like my kids, right and my son and my daughter, she comes up to me she says, Barbara I'm really upset today because you know, Zachary stole my toy took my toy away. I'm like, Honey, don't worry. It's not a big deal. You know, these these new chemical fires in your brain? That's all it is. Right? What if that person turns around and says what do you see people's argument?

Too loud I guess