The Myth Of A Universal Islamic State

Why don't we go to any more questions at the ends? It seems like it's working. I can certainly hear myself no natural way. Okay?

So you're gonna have to all experience something horrible. My handwriting. This is actually me trying to

you don't want to see the normal, no federal what happened to me, I looked at my notes when I was in grad school, it's all very clear. Now I think there's just a psychological stress that just, you can actually this isn't it, I think I have now actually a learning disability, I think I can get some of my students they they're having so bad, they get to use computers, it's technically learning disability, suffer briefly. And then hopefully, I'll be able to decipher everything for you. I thought I would just talk about kind of a history of the concept of Caliphate and how it interacts with other notions of authority, or at least political authority and concentration, political

legitimacy in Islamic civilization. And one of the first things to keep in mind in Islamic civilization is as the great historian Marshall Hobson called it, it's really better to call it Islamic case, civilization, Islamic civilization. Why? Because Islamic civilization suggests that everything is rooted in Islam has some basis in Islam as an expression of Islam. Whereas what actually happened historically, is that the Muslim conquest in the Middle East led to the creation of a an amalgamation of the pre existing cultural, political, religious traditions in the Near East, and Islam, and then express itself in Islamic idiom, but lots of the institutions of Islamic hate

civilization, which ultimately spread from Morocco to Southeast Asia.

My institution's not mentioned in the cram and I mentioned in the seminar, the Prophet Muhammad, there are institutions that are developed either from pre existing institutions that preceded Islam, or that Muslims came up with things like pious and dominance, things like metrics, things like mosques, or

things like the idea of assault innate. These are all notions, the fact that you have someone in Brunei college, across the Delta salt and O'Brien in Indonesia, or Malaysia is a federation of multiple states, each with its own salt in

the crowd never says, verily there is this notion of the salt and eight and this is what the office means it's either something that was

inducted maybe by Muslim scholars from their scripture, and then

use to describe existing notions.

And so it's actually these these institutions like

the Madras, the Sufi brotherhood, the idea of saltin, a sherea. These institutions are buying together Islamic case, civilization, but not all of them are actually rooted in the original scriptures of Islam. So it's a very important distinction that that Marshall has made and is very helpful.

Means have suffered through us and as they discussed in his in our salon acts of class, where he was my ta for several years. Okay, so when you have when you begin with the I thought, we're just talking about sort of three concepts or idioms for talking about rule or authority that appear in the lifetime of the Prophet and in the immediate, let's say, 20 years after his death, and 632 to come here, one of them the over here is Amanda, Amanda means leadership generally.

Now, if you look in not only in the deeds of the Prophet his sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, which are problematic as a source, because a lot of them are made up after the death of the Prophet by various competing factions in political, sectarian legal disputes, so they oftentimes reflect existing disputes instead of really exactly what the prophet said. But if we assume that there's some origin of this material and the earliest time period, you can see it expressed there. And you also see expressed in fit or Islamic jurisprudence when they talk about cost of leadership. So if we talk, let's say about the first 300 years of Islam, you have, the emotion of leadership is actually

extremely important just in Manama for the theorization of authority for the series theorisation. Now, it becomes there's ambiguity here because the person who leads the prayer is the mmm

So we can all pray right now I can be the amount. And I have no authority over you. I just happy to be the prayer. But the leader of the community is also called the Imam.

So Muslims, legal scholars discuss the qualifications for EMA as leadership prayer, and they talk about the qualifications for the leadership of the community. And there's the two overlap because one of the things that the leader of a community whether it's the leader of the Muslims overall or the leader of a city, or the governor of a province, one of the things he's supposed to do is meet the community in prayer.

But that that ambiguity is important, because you see that there's this overlap of religious leadership and temporal leadership. Now, the person who leads a prayer doesn't necessarily have any, like I said, I might, the fact that I happen to think you know, certain things right or wrong in Islamic law, I have no right to force that upon the people who might meet in prayer. But there is this notion of religious leadership in the sense of act of meeting the community in prayer. The second concept is that of Alaska. That's the idea of successorship.

And as you saw, this is a term that's invoked by Abu Bakar. He's the founding fathers except the successor of the prophet of God.

And the last one boy, this is it's an honor, I guess. imara in modern means command. So the word Emir is the

active participle or the noun from the verb, the verbal NaVi mode of command, he's the commander. And oftentimes, when the Prophet talks about commanders he's talking about, I'm making someone a commander for a campaign, this person is your commander, you obey this person on this kind of campaign. So it can be a commander in the limited sense of a military campaign, and it can be the commander in the greater sense of being the leader of the community. And that's, again, the term that Omar takes is mutable, meaning the command to the faithful. And this is the most common term you'll see for the first I'd say 200, at least 200 years of Islamic history.

And any of my students since I have so much respect for you having either had no impact on your head, a lot of In fact, many of you think I've made a mistake and you want to correct me please raise your hands.

These two because these two are very interested in political history. If you guys have any corrections, feel free to I would

guess around the first 200 years, really immutable means what do leaders call themselves

Commander of the Faithful

now, so basically, time goes on with the first four Kayla's who are often later termed the right guy to qualify

for rules for me two years Omar rules for 10 years assassinated with manuals for 12 years assassinated and Addie rules for three years, four years is assassinated.

Or ghost saves 5660 for let's say, four years, what would you say assassinated you don't mean killed in battle? No, I mean assassinated You know, I'm going to pray stabbed in the back and that's how it was.

man was killed in his house by a large group of disgruntled Muslims Okay, and Omar was stabbed as well by incense but that he was killed in during the war No, no, he was killed when he was walking to It was during the war is that there was a civil war going on. But he was walking to the mosque to pray and poof it was staffed by a giant assassin.

Okay, then, in the first Civil War, basically starts about 6366 60. And we won't go into what the different parties are, but the group that tribes is the Mayan dynasty, that my family which then becomes the first dynasty, and this is when you were referring to about the Prophet not liking kings is in one hand he talks about you'll have a certain number of rightly guided Kalos and then you'll have Manu kunaal, which is kings bites, like kings won't let go they bite on just to cling on.

So there is this idea of Kings don't really have legitimacy there

and then you see this with you might Allah sighs well, though the king doesn't have legitimacy because a king what is I mean, it's very clear in the turn of the Prophet and Abu Bakr and Omar does not mean that you don't get you don't become a ruler because your father was a ruler

through some kind of dynamic. There's not a dynastic motion, whereas the Mayans introduced the notion of time

dynastic succession. Actually I need to

know I mean, if you're, if you're if you're a Shiite, and then you believe that there's dynastic succession, but it's not dynastic succession, just because you're the son, you're done after you have succession from the previous Imam, because your father happens to transfer to you know, it's called nos, or this esoteric, perfect understanding of the religion. So your other sons are basically left out, you know, they can go and be cobblers or whatever they want to do. And they have no, they have no right to succession, the only person who writes succession is the one who receives the transmission of this authority. Yeah, so it's not, when we talk about succession, you don't ask

access to your liking, but it's basically your belonging to a certain family, that gives you the right tool. And that is introduced by the people my eggs. And of course, the mighty dynasty makes their capital Damascus from 660 until the late six 740s, when they're challenged by the last group that actually successfully overthrow Islam, in 750 v. ambassade. dynasty, this is a dynasty that starts out in north and North Eastern Persia, but is led by descendant from the profits, Uncle bass. And so I take they take the name of the ambassador, that they build the city of Baghdad in the 760s. And they that's the imperial capital, until 1258. Well, there's, they occasionally go to other

places when they feel like it, but that's basically the capital until 1238, when it's sacked by mumbles. Now, around, and there's no exact date here. Sometimes you would like to talk about the year 945. But I think that's on the later and from the mid eight, hundreds to the mid 1900s. An important change occurs in the this Muslim Empire, it is one states

in 636 3637, the Muslims conquer Syria and Iran. In 650, a re essential additive reached the city of Mars, which is now on the border between his back Stan and Tajikistan are starting to Japan and Iran in 711, they invade a bearded pencil and also sinned in India. So you see this huge territorial conquest that occurs. And one of the features of pre modern states is that

if you have a large territorial, large area territorial control, in theory, it's going to be actually very hard to control that, in reality, states simply do not have the technology to do that. They don't have the technology in terms of communication, terms of transportation, in terms of administration. So what happens is this, as long as you're expanded,

you can maintain control because your armies you're, you're they're off fighting other people. The second you stop expanding, you have a problem, because now these armies are saying, Well, what are we gonna do now who's gonna pay us and if I'm not getting any spoils of war, so I'm going to start paying the salary. And if you just stop, if you don't get give them a salary from the central government, then they eventually kind of carved out local, stateless are states that are under the suzerainty of the Central State, but in reality are pseudo independent. So you get basically the emergence of local local dynasties. This begins really in the early to mid 1800s. And by the mid

1900s, it's become de reality. By the mid 1900s, the ambassador bailiffs are no longer exercising any real temporal authority, except maybe just in Baghdad, even then they don't really they're that appoint a figurehead.

And this is a process that

begins, let's say, the mid 1800s. And complete in the mid 1900s. At that point, you have a new

time, a new mode of rule, conception of state has developed, you have the Kayla F. And this is really when the notion of the kaylah becomes important before that,

you know, it's one of these things. When someone's really in power, they don't need to stress that they're in power. If someone's really the authority, they don't have to sit around talking about authority all the time. They might even not even have a title. They're just the person in charge.

It's really when you have a splitting of let's say theoretical or nominal symbolic authority and actual temporal authority, then you have to spend titles become much more important. So what happens in the mid 1900s is this group called the Buddha dynasty. It's a basically a band of warlord Turkic brothers from the Persians after Northeastern Iran. They come they take over all Iran and take over Iraq, and they go to

Baghdad may become the protector they offer to become the protector of the kid. And that's the rule under this title. They are the protectors of the chaos. But in fact, the Caleb is now in effect, as he had been for some time before that actually a hostage and under the control of whoever is really in charge.

And this is where you have really a distinction between the Sultan, which is the authority. And basically what that means is a military world.

unless you happen to live in, you know, the Republic of Venice, or the Republic of

Ragusa later.

Most human beings in history live under some kind of military authority, because person who has weapons and the ability to force people to obey and to provide their security will be the rule. So this is really an effective military Warlord of one form or the other. In the in the central Islamic lands from the nine hundreds until the 1200s. There are either a Persian or they're a turkey. In some cases, there's a few dynasties, local dynasties like in Mosul where they're Arabs, but most of the time, they're Turkish or Persian. And

and so the actual time with an S, that's an S at the end in brackets, because if there's not just one, so autonomy, so the buoy it's happened to control Iran and Iraq. But there's all sorts of other dioceses there is the exedy dynasty in Egypt, there is dynasty in Tunis, there's dynasty and what's not Morocco, there's dynasty, what's now in Yemen, there's dynasty in

parts of Iran outside of control. And these are also tongs. And in theory, they all recognize the nominal authority of the ambassador Taylor, they will print coins, if they make coins, they make coins with the title of the for the picture of the ambassador.

If they in their Friday Prayer sermons, you hear prayers for the ambassador. So the ambassador to Canada really continues to provide the overarching theoretical unity of Islamic civilization of this Islamic State, even though in reality, you have lots of different local

authorities who are really in charge. So this was should not this should have been over here, but I wrote it too early. So the important date Baghdad falls conquered by the Mongols, and people oftentimes, yes. Is that a problem?

No, he is an exception to that.

The latest he actually had a large and large territory but did not adhere to the killer.

That's a good point. But I'll just I'll mention that that's a good point.

Yes, that's an important point. So I actually was playing softball, but the

the even the term, Caleb doesn't become that important. So 945 degrees take over now, early earlier in the nine hundreds, a Shiite religious movement that began in Syria, and then was defeated there and go over into North Africa was in Algeria, and then with the help of this Berber tribe basically takes over North Africa eventually in the 1960s, Congress Egypt and create balance city of salad city of Cairo, in around 969, that in the early 1900s, that movement, which later becomes called the Fatuma dynasty, takes the title of Caleb.

So now, in the 1920s, the title Caleb is starts to become it becomes really more of a currency of authority or currency of contention, because now there's more than one person claiming to be Caleb.

In the when you the ambassadors were defeated in 750, the survivors of the Umayyad dynasty fled to Spain and actually, the Maya dynasty continued in Spain until around 10 100 of the economy here, and why don't they just call themselves the mirrors that mirror me when the proximate chicks called themselves the Caleb then the lions in Spain also call themselves kale so round? It was the year 929 Can you check that for me? 929 is that correct? Okay. 929 The the my ruler in Spain also calls himself to kill so it's sort of like the the period in the late 1800s, early 1400s in in Italy in southern France and you have three Pope's tonight three tails. So the reason why the term Caliphate

one of the reasons becomes more important is now a lot of people are claiming it and so it brought its currency right razor razor

fifteens tough da baguette false. The Mongols and most of the ambassade families wiped out now all of them because some of them flee to Egypt.

Actually, this is important the ambassade Caliphate continues in Egypt, under the protection of the mamluk dynasty until 1517. And that's not just people sometimes think that's because they called the shadow caliphate. It's actually very important. And it's important not necessarily just for the Mahmood dynasty in Egypt and Syria, but Muslim states are arising elsewhere in the Muslim world at this time in the 1200. And 1300s, is when you really have expansion of Muslim rule in India, in Central Asia,

eventually in Southeast Asia and the 1400s and 1500s, that the Delhi Sultan's who really the first major dynasty in India, from 1192, until the late 1800s, when they're destroyed by channeling they in the early 1300s, they get a letter of investiture from the ambassador Taylor saying, I recognize you as my legitimate representatives in India. And that's so important that this letter is always read at the by prayer.

And they the Delhi salts actually build a whole city. Now if you go to the if you ever go to Delhi, there's an area called coast boss, which now has really upscale nice furniture, shopping and good restaurants. But it's that actual area was called it was built for the offended representative of the Basset dynasty, they built a whole little city just for a representative the bass dynasty become so an extremely powerful idea for legitimacy of Muslim rulers who are out there in what at the time of marginal areas.

Now, so what happens in this period of let's say, the 900, to the 1300s, is

the concept of Caliphate becomes much less important. So you have this contestation over the title of Caleb in the 910 hundreds.

But by the late 1800s, early 1900s, the fosmid dynasty is no longer a threat, the

mighty dynasty in Spain has been conquered. And what really from you could say around maybe 1100, to

going up into even a Late Middle early modern period, the 1600s. The concept of Caliphate is not very important anymore, because by this time, it's really the notion of sulphonates. That is important. And it's not an Islamic notion of salts. It's a continuation of the pre Islamic Near Eastern tradition of the Roman Emperor, and the Persian Emperor, which is that the ruler is God's shadow on Earth.

The ruler is God's shadow on Earth, the ruler is a deserves total obedience, because it's also the rulers duty to provide total justice. And this really becomes the model the mode of conceptualizing rule. And there's other streams that feed into this. So in

the mid 1200s, when the Mongols invaded Middle East and 1250

and then you have a dynasty ruling most of Iraq and Iran, which are the early 1300s, the Mongol dynasty, and then the dynasty of Tamar lands in the late 1300s through the early 1500s, mid 1500s, in the Middle East, and through the 1700s in South Asia, the diversity of Timberland, there are Mongols.

Tamra Lee marries a descendant a daughter or granddaughter or a great granddaughter of Genghis Khan. And he rules as his title is the son in law Tamra lane. dama timberlane, the son in law hate his son, son in law of gangs

because from the mid 1200s, until almost up into the 1800s it is descent from the golden family of Genghis Khan, that gives you the right to rule. This is a totally

totally on Islamic read this from outside Islamic tradition.

Martial Arts, it causes the age of Mambo prestige, his descent from Mongol

heritage especially the golden family, Genghis Khan gives you the right not only to rule Muslim, but the right to Universal Empire. And it's not only notion of universal empire that that feeds into notions of legitimate rule and Islamic traditions time, because in 1453, when the Ottomans conquer Istanbul,

what did they start calling themselves

assemble our contents noble is the capital of the Roman Empire. So who's the Roman rule growing Empire is Caesar. They call themselves Caesars. And they make the case to European monarchs that they have the right to Universal Empire because they are the inheritors of the Roman Empire.

There's other ideas that you'll see the idea the notion of being the next Alexander the Great going back to the Islamic Near Eastern tradition of Alexander the Great receiving advice.

From his teacher Aristotle on how to be adjust ruler. So Alexander the Great becomes the epitome of just rule and also the example of conquest and and favor from God.

The idea of the renewer that's the word renewer, which you probably barely read,

drawing on a Hadith of the Prophet in which he says that every 100 years God has sent a renewer for his religion. Another. Here's the notion of decentering Ganga is Khan, possessor of the fortunate conjunction.

Not the most charismatic term in English but in Arabic or Persian Sahib Khurana, the one who owns or comments at the time of his certain planetary conjunction here, this is going back to pre Islamic Near Eastern traditions of astrology that the heavens have some will tell you when certain events propitious and so route when Tamra Lange Congress Damascus in the early 1400s, the famous Muslim historian and scholar even if I'll do it actually meets with

Timberline, and general and asked him about what do you think about my claims to rule and things like that says you're the possessor of the fortunate conjunction.

This is the time when the

certain conjunction of planets is going about and you have the right to divine universal Empire because of that.

And one of the so

let's take the Ottomans. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, who that's rules from 1520 to 1566.

You can see pictures of Superman a magnificent and over his head or you know their paintings. It'll be titled it'll say, potty shy as long as the emperor of Islam

saw had Quran, the possessor of the fortunate conjunction the MACD the rightly guided person who's messianic figure is supposed to come at the end of time. 1591 was the year 1000 in Islamic on the Islamic calendar. So around that time people were also thinking in terms of Messianic which end of the world and then somewhere on that list, you find Caleb,

whatever Caleb is just one of the things that these people are at this point.

And another thing that's very important, I won't get into that actually.

Maybe in the question, so.

So Caleb is really not important title. This one, just one of the things you can do.

Psychologically for the Muslim world, it was very important, because when was the bookmark abolished? Because we're still in the 1500s you're way ahead of us. Okay. So, some, what are some other things that are you you people looking very antsy even listening for too long?

This world class, I would give you a break, bring bring the modern world.

You only want the modern world bring us that way.

7274 sorry, 1774 interesting event happened, the Ottoman Empire loses its first chunk of territory, it's actually majority inhabited by Muslims to the Russians and uses the North Shore of the Black Sea.

And there's an agreement that the Autumn is called within the Treaty of origins and 74 with Catherine the Great, where she acknowledges the Ottoman Sultan as the Kayla of the Muslims, even in Russian territory. Why is this important? Because what this means is now there's this idea that there's a Muslim ruler, who's the Kayla. In this case, it happens to be the Ottomans. Because they're just one of the people calling themselves Caleb, in the 1700s.

He is recognized by the Russians as the protector, or at least the sort of religious meter of the Muslims who live under Russian rule.

By the mid 1800s. At that point, it's become very obvious to the Ottoman Empire, which at this point, becoming increasingly weak that the various European countries, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia have designs on encroaching on automated software.

But nobody wants to actually destroy the Empire because that means someone else might take content. And it's not the British or the Russians, they don't they want to basically keep the Empire propped up, but while increasing their own each country's own influence on the area of the Ottoman Empire.

So what the Ottomans are doing in the mid 1800s, is they realized that this notion of Caliphate can actually be a very useful

tool in foreign policy.

By the way, later, in 1517, when the Ottomans conquered Cairo,

they actually glass the basket, Caleb went to Africa the second actually goes and surrenders the Ottoman Sultan sunny the grand until he says, nice to meet you, sends it back to assemble for a couple years removes the gaps and then he goes on to power on dies then later on.

In the 700 800, you have this idea that 70 the last Batman kalo transferred the caliphate to somebody. This there's no evidence it's actually happened. So he didn't write home, he wrote a letter home to his son saying I just taught her the entire Middle East. And he didn't say By the way, I am also the Caleb now, in case you know, that will impress you. There's no mention of this. It's not important. It's only later on in the late 1800s, that Ottomans start bringing up this idea that they came off as something special.

And not just

list item number seven on the list of why they have the right to universe.

So for example, during the first war of independence, slash the Indian union 87, the British asked the Ottoman Sultan to issue a ruling as the ruler of theory of Muslims around the world.

To say to the Muslim rebels, of course, there was rebellion, both by Hindus and Muslim soldiers, that you should not rebellious approach. That didn't work. But the point is that you can start seeing how the Ottomans realized they have this tool they can use.

And in the last time is to use is in November 1949, November 1914, when the Ottomans officially joined with the Germans, in World War One, they issue a declaration of jihad to all the Muslims in the world, especially the ones living under British rule in India, and North Africa.

And France, right? North Africa, French colonies in North Africa, same fight with the tail up against your enemies.

So this becomes its that also doesn't really work. But you can see how this is becoming an important tool. Now.

Finally, we're now at the end so you can all relax 1924 the

Turkish Parliament or the Parliament of the New Republic of Turkey abolishes The Guild.

And now in the end of World War One, and tonight 44. And in fact, beyond that, there's a movement that rise especially in South Asia, and British India called the philosophic movement, which is really Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire, especially South Asia, in emphasizing the importance of the caliphate, and urging the Turkish Republic not to the authorities to take over after the fall of the Ottoman dynasty, not to abolish the caliphate. Because of this, it's important role as a symbolic leader in the Muslim world. And when it gets abolished unites 24 then you have real, it's not so much a crisis.

But Muslims in especially the Middle East,

had looked to the Ottoman Empire as a potential political point of political rally. And Muslims outside of the Middle East and South Asia in Southeast Asia had looked to the Ottoman Empire as a model for an alternative notion of modernity, a non Western or alternative majority. People don't remember this, but the Ottoman Empire had totally reformed its legal system totally for its educational system totally formed its infrastructure, had railroads had everything had Telegraph's In fact, they they fought really well and one, a third of the all the British troops were stationed in, in the middle east on Ottoman borders. If the Germans had happened and the Ottomans had won

World War One, people would look to the Ottoman Empire as victorious. He was victorious because they had reformed because they had modernized. So people looked at Darren part of it the sense of your role as a model for modern Islamic modernity. After they follow that model has gone into people's look for other alternative models of generals. Right. Okay. So that's kind of the history of

concessions, the caliphate. What is how does this relate to ISIS? I would say it relates in this way.

There is really no

agreed upon list of what you have to do to be killed or what you have to be to kill

Muslims. Some Muslim scholars said you have to be senator the Quraysh. The Ottomans weren't descendants of the British and they didn't care because other

Major Muslim scholars, for example, non Hunter, Manju veiny in the 10, hundreds, he says, courageous dissent is not a requirement for killing.

The Ottoman said, We're the Kalos. One operation to embrace tribe because the Christ tribe is that is not a requirement to be to kill.

Only some Muslim scholars require the the Caleb to be it's probably the majority, but historically, that most of the people who claimed the title Caleb, from the

1500s onward, were not Arabs. They're not only were they not descendants of Christ, they weren't even arrows.

And they still claim to be the guilds. So why is it the Ottoman claim to Caliphate was believed a lot of other dynasties we didn't get into claiming to go Why is that they were not. We're not talking about them when we talk about the pale, because the Ottomans happened to realize in the late mid 1800s, that the idea of being Kayleigh and appealing as a religious authorities and Muslims outside your territory, and in fact, under European or under Christian rule that this was a certain gave you certain leverage potential leverage in relation to non Muslim countries.

And they use that and this was believed by especially the European powers.

So that's what really gives us the idea that the Ottoman somehow are the bearers of the caliphate. And if that 1924 at the end of the caliphate was at some major moment

in reality, you could have a Turkic warlord who happens to take over all the Middle East and then gets up and says I'm the Caleb and he would have just pretty much just as much right to do that as anybody else. What makes somebody you know, follow it as a Kayla is their success as a state or as a leader.

If you take over and you call yourself to Caleb and you have a lot of power, and you can command territory and defeat your enemies, you'll probably consider legitimate Caleb.

Okay, thanks very much. We can now have

questions for both of us. I guess.

My horrible handwriting.

Yes.

discussion. I never hear the word moolah Ayatollah.

So mole I think originally comes from melodyne. I'm not sure about that. lm er master. But

I think it originates as a term in the persianate world in the 1300 and 1400s. But then it did. Because the Ottomans themselves are mean the maid and state language in the Ottoman Empire until the mid 1800s is Persian. They're a persianate

dynasty Persian culture. So you see that word used by Ottoman scholars.

But it just means Bolivians, a scholar is a great religious scholar is always used in

in the beginning the mid 1800s. In amongst the Torah Shiites in southern Iraq and Iran, mean sign of God and now it means someone who's qualified to perform independent religious interpretation.

I think in the leader part of the Ottoman Empire, he said 1934, when Parliament abolished the caliphate in India, huge, huge reaction

against the British or the Muslims wanted to restore

was the kind of contradiction because they were fighting for their own independence from the British. But there was a nationalism also in the Arabs, a lot of it

is based on their own nations. They wanted to be independent, although they were all losers. But that was not strong enough, pull them under the Ottoman rule. So the Ottomans, the Arab Revolt

was sort of a contradiction. So I think, you know, we don't we shouldn't go back and

read history, the light later events or the light of Lawrence of Arabia, the movie, so it wasn't like there was some awakening amongst all the population of the Arab speaking world that somehow they were Arabs and they should unite and have their own state. And that was going to rebel against the Turks so that the leader of rebels leads the rebellion against the Ottoman kingdom,

Sheriff

Mecca and his two sons, right? He actually if you look, he's late, planting his loyalty both to the Ottomans and to the British. And the and the British offer a huge amount of money goes into British but it's really just his he gets his followers and then a certain number of Bedouin tribes to follow. And that's that the army and then of course, have support

From the British and then

works alongside the actual British campaign in Mesopotamia and Palestine. So we shouldn't look at the Arab Revolt as some, you know, the entire world rose up Arab world rose up against the Turks. If you look at the, the lists of people who belong to Arab nationalist organizations, that list is very small until 1918, which pointed balloons because those people have previously been loyal Ottoman members, and now they're no longer the Ottoman Empire. So now that become Arab nationalists. So your nationalism, I think, really developed strongly after world war one not, and really only strong after World War Two. It's not something I think that is important for us.

But it would have given the time, because that's basically the world is I don't think, do you think that our ups would have consented to live under the alternative for much longer? I think that all the I think the Ottoman Empire and its provinces were all falling off into various national causes. I'm not sure if that national cause would have been one of Arab nationalism as opposed to Egyptian nationalism or

southern iraq nationalism, or certainly there wouldn't have been Jordanian nationalism, wasn't it?

Yeah, I mean,

so the question is, why don't you bias What about the 1700s?

The Hello, merci, Danny, Southern Palestine, arco blood support and, and southern Lebanon. He, he governed for 75 years, the head of Oman, see them in the center might know something about them, because, yeah, brain Subbu was his minister. So

he was it was a second that wasn't that movement. Okay, so all the Ottoman Empire, like I said, before, with all these pre modern states, you have very limited central control, and Ottoman Empire, interesting Empire right from the basically 1299, which is usually the beginning of the Empire until it's fallen 1929 24.

There's not even another dynasty that compete, it is a serious competitor with them, this is a very long period of time to go without even a compact, competing dynastic claim within the state. And that's because the Ottomans were very effective at convincing local populations that it was in their best interest to be part of this overarching system, because they actually can have a lot of local autonomy. So people in what later on became the move to solder from Lebanon, and later became states of Syria and Jordan and Iraq and things like that. These people often did live under the rule of local nobles, under various, various titles, many of them Christian, Muslim. And so I mean, this is

one example of that.

Yes. So this is the more I realize based on both, and that is, so it seems like they get the caliphate isn't the caliphate isn't as powerful, all powerful. That's the first thing.

The second thing is that it did offer some sort of religious unity or legitimacy throughout its history. So could you then conceive that, you know, even if the Arabs you said, maybe want to have

Indians or whatever, if you can still have that framework within the concept of some maybe elected or appointed leader? Who is the representative the Muslim world would you call the Catholic? So the role of the Kayla, as a, let's say, conveyor of some kind of legitimacy or religious leadership is also a contestant. Scholars Iowa's 1111 e book, there are certain scholars like him who believe that if there's no Kayla, not No, not nothing in Islamic law, it's about your marriages aren't valid, nothing is valid you need to Caleb to exist because they can't even if he has no power to Caleb is the the pin the source from which the entire system of the Sharia and Muslim religious life flows.

All his alleys teacher ology, Vandy says that's nonsense. The person who is whoever is in charge and has power and can establish justice, that's the case.

And so he's much more functional by others. As a surgeon, you have to have this formal office of the caliphate or else nothing Muslims do is really valid. And Muslims since then, I think they kind of fall between these polls. The majority of them would,

because they lived under some Muslim rule or another. They didn't doubt the Islamic legitimacy.

of their lives or the state they lived in. This only becomes a problem when Muslims are living under states that are obviously not Muslim. So when the British when the Muslims in South Asia or India are living under British rule, non Muslim rule there, especially after the

1770s, when the British East India Company actually starts administrating areas and has Sharia courts that are run by British judges and things like that. There's a lot of debate amongst Muslim scholars in India. Are we still under we're still living in the abode of Islam, I was still living in Muslim law. But I think you have that exists. For example, like, yes, there's many Muslims who live the United States or Crimea or whatever. But that country was political rule is that the Muslims can accept that. But it's up to the Caliph to basically represent their interests as well. So so I think that idea really only there was a there was the question of what, how do you talk

about non Muslim minorities living in Muslim majority states? That's an issue that comes up

throughout Islamic history, especially after the Christian kingdoms in what becomes Spain expand, after attendee five the copper to load 1236 a copper cord, the rods that are so

the majority answer is that Muslims shouldn't live there, they should not live like a normal simple.

Another answer is that they can continue to live there as long as they're able to practice their religion freely. And if they're able to practice that was, really there's not really a question of their interests being spoken up for because they're the only interest that matters religious for Muslim scholars whether they can practice their religion, if you know, otherwise, it's nothing, no one cares. If you can't get a cheap house or something like that. That's not a problem. So

this is what you're talking about really comes up

after the late 1700s, when you have the idea that European sovereigns can be the official protectors of religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire, like the desires of Russia are the official protectors of the Orthodox church there. The French King is effective for the French government is official protector of the Catholics, etc, etc. Then any alternative the Muslims, then the autumn Kayla's being the official protector of

Muslim subjects. I think that that's not, I don't know of any example, I'm not sure if someone else does. I don't know any example where you could say that the Ottoman Sultans African shoe can arja somehow actually really have some important influence where they were able to better the condition and Muslims living International, I can't think of any example.

European rulers were certainly able to promote the interests of Christian minorities under Ottoman rule, but they did it because they were powerful. And this was actually for them a way of exerting their authority, whereas the Ottomans didn't have that power. But in the modern period, where you now have states that maybe are more powerful, or have we have more national organizations that can communicate work together to help you know, people in other countries where they are not using that a model like that is more practical, where you maybe maybe we have a bunch of different Muslim countries based on ethnicity, or whatever they want to be based on. But they still have some sort of

Confederation based on this palette. I mean, yeah, there's

the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and it was founded in 1987. I'm not sure exactly.

You could have that if you had to be totally ahead of the ice. And you just said this person is now Taylor. Yeah, I think that would in fact be what it is. Right? A couple a couple of points that

we can keep on looking at history, and we can keep on concepts and see

today's world.

What are the claims and where do we go? First point that you brought up, that when in 1924, the Turkish Parliament abolished a law that there was a huge outcry in India. In fact, that is not true. There was a falafel movement. This movement essentially consisted of two brothers, Muhammad Ali and chocolate alley.

There was some stuff going on in the northwest in the performing

but they were more focused on the hatred movement, which said if we want to defeat the British, we have to immigrate to a milestone, get ready, and then come back and attack.

Verizon, I know about terrorists because my grandfather was assigned that role it was it was a big failure, a huge failure.

The money and chocolate money went around looking for someone who would accept the title of just the title and no one would agree they even went to to see

Abdul Aziz who had just started conquering,

you know, the eastern Nigeria.

So it really is, it's a good it's a good story for the Indians to tell when in fact, there was no huge movement

in the the people of the Middle East, especially Lebanon and so on. They didn't like the tracks to begin with, mainly because they had become more aggressive,

particularly in tax collection and so on.

So the,

I mean, that you agree with what I was saying,

the religious fact that the Ottomans have a common religion, with Arabs, or Muslims, South Asians is not even that term sufficient, not all them together as a required No,

no, no, no, in fact, the differences among Muslims, as I start to see from the beginning, the differences within the different groups have always been dominant,

rather than the religious unity more about Dilma,

for all Muslims, well, actually the word oma for Muslims. The Quran uses the word Omar for the people of all prophets,

all prophets that were oma and many, many almost

in the work.

This will move on Why that?

To the profit, it comes after the CDs, of statements about other people. So you cannot even see it's talking about the profit, and not the omoto omaka. Probably all of those other own was in the queue are a part of this.

Certainly, you know, the idea that Muslims worldwide belong to one of them is extremely

the origin of it is multiple. Well, I mean, it could be that the Prophet was talking to

Christians and Jews and pagan Arabs and saying you all should become followers of Islam.

So he was kind of making a call. But the idea that the crowd just says, you know, hydrometallurgy, kidnaps You are the best omo brought out for the four people. And Muslims understood that to be talking about Muslims. So after the death of the Prophet, muscle to understand these references of oma to mean, the most the followers of the Prophet, you don't need to Holly halifa to have

no agenda, you don't need to.

Yes.

Thank you both for your presentation.

I actually have a question about, so maybe I misheard you. But after you finish your presentation, you said that you don't think that it's possible to have an Islamic State? Because

there's not unity? You were talking about how you reverse the movie, what sort of synchronicity and universal single configuration is possible. Okay, but even that is problematic. And the reason is that the Muslims, you see, as soon as it went beyond Medina, and God to other cities, it became a problem immediately.

You know, Dr. Brown talked about, you know, later people claiming to be showtimes and so on, which is a little later.

But in fact, I've done that.

So bad, you know, did not accept he and declared himself aloof, and he was only for four or five years.

Yeah, you know, so as soon as you went from Medina to other cities, then they were more leaders. And therefore, you have to know who by consensus, okay. And then the nature of rulers is they don't like consensus. And I think another point that we need to remember the oma yet

the people who took that leadership, and made it to a kingship,

they did not understand the Prophet, they were the latest Muslims.

So they were not among his companions, they did not know what he or his thought was, and so on. And then they went to went to the Roman Empire, right, the Masters,

which is an entirely different culture, and they took all of the institutions from the thing in fact, they didn't even make their own coins for decades. And when they did, they took a Roman coin and just change something on it.

So I think that the thing that is important is, when we look at history

in retrospect,

We can make it look smooth.

This is like, you know, when you teach science, everything looks great. But it doesn't when it is happening, it's always messy.

So the question is, what is it that was come? And the answer is not much.

But I think Dr. Brown made a good point when you're expanding, it's easy to do things.

But as soon as you stop expanding, then people, you know, start asking questions, the boys,

that really is what actually run the government. And in fact, our our, even our Shia Russia,

institutions,

the Adidas shoe in Harlem, and so on, they were all established by the brains.

So even the whole concept of the shy mommy is developed during the time a 10th century names.

Okay, so the thing is, you cannot look at history in retrospect and make it look pretty. Okay. But the thing is, the concepts are there. The question is, how universal weren't? They? The answer is they were never really knew the person. And people disagreed as soon as more centers of power became available. So my question is, then that doesn't that so I'm really sort of a stickler on words. Right? So I think that when I think, yeah, so like the Islamic State, sort of what Dr. Brown was talking about, like using Islamic hate versus, you know, using Islamic State, if you say the word Islamic, and maybe I'm being too simplistic, but I feel like who even posited in the first place

that there could be a universal one, it doesn't Islam already provide as a theology, room for pluralism in terms of thought of different leaders, this idea of consensus, this idea of representative government, this idea of religious freedom and minority rights, when you're talking about a state, we focus a lot on the concept of a ruler of a power. But there's so much more that goes into a state than just a figurehead, which, frankly, I would argue, is not even necessarily Islamic in that sense, sort of what you're arguing, is that too simplistic? Not one, not really. But the thing is that the word Islamic itself is problematic.

Because when you say Islamic in a legal sense, which is your lawyer,

then it's not a single definition. Because we have one of the things that I tend to people, especially the academics, I said, you know, our traditional way, was to say, we disagree, I think I'm right, I think you are wrong, but I accept the possibility that you could be right. And I could be wrong. I mean, that was automation.

And we always ended our documents by saying, well, I wonder what is it is disagreement? You know, when God knows it is my opinion. We have gotten away from that.

Even in our scholarly discussions, and that's a problem. Second point that is important is we we throw the word Islamic into everything you can do we have Islamic centers and Islamic schools and law. I mean, there's nothing Islamic about the schools. Okay. Or even the centers that the centers

show the word Islamic doesn't make anything Islamic. The question is, what are the what are the principles involved? What are the authorities? Where do these authorities come from? Is there a consensus? There's no consensus that cannot be universal? Okay. And there's very different consensus, in fact,

I think the reason you don't see the term Islamic used to talk about states is because Muslims are always either Muslims always ruled by other Muslims. And there's basically only a period they're not is basically 12 or 15, around 1295, in parts of Iran and Iraq, Iran and Sudan become Muslim. So

there's, it only becomes an issue, as long as the rule is Muslim. And the ruler says that the Sharia

that can be anything is

that state is considered legitimate by Muslim scholars.

When does that when does it become a problem when you're clearly ruling people who are not Muslim, and you have a totally different civilizational religious tradition, which happens basically under in the colonial period. And in India that happens in the late 1700s. And and Ottoman world that happens Mediterranean world, it happens from the early 1800s on and so that's when this becomes an issue.

And that's when you start having movements calling for various stripes and various sorts calling for some notion of Islamic rule. And when the Ottoman Empire collapses, and you have the last kind of great Muslim state, goes out of existence,

then your peoples are looking for local Islamic movements, local Islamic states

to provide

people like more Louis,

who was the only one who's written stuff about this.

Moody never talks about a universal or universal state. He explicitly says, Here is what we think should happen in Pakistan, and everybody else has to figure out their own way as to how to work. Yeah, there are, you know, specific issues, what kind of a judiciary should

you know, how about making sure that the laws that are paid are not against Islam? Do you need to Superior Courts? And he said, No, not just He said, No, he had 17. scholars agree with him. He's the only one who has had meetings with everybody in the office and said, okay, let us discuss what the principles are.

And even the question of simple thing, the head of the state should be a man, which he explicitly says in his books, right. But what in Pakistan in 1964

Fatima Jinnah was running I guess, or you pawn, he supported her. And I went to his lecture, I was teaching at Karachi at that time. And then he says, One, there are other requirements for being the head of a state.

And I don't remember all of them. But he said, one of them is being a man. And then he, he, he pulls through each one of those, I couldn't hear everything.

And he says at the end, he says, Therefore,

the only qualification or UConn has is that he's a man. And the only disqualification is

that she's a woman.

Maybe, you know, he backed out even at that point, because there are there are other factors involved. What about Muslim qualification, the head of the government

that have the goal of being a Muslim? Yes, that one is

not a man. Yes, I think where this is going, and one of your slides that you talked about this calling for is that government as a response to corruption, so bridging to what Dr. Brown has said before, the point at which in modern times, what's being called for is the substance not as much as the form of Islamic rule, they may have the title, and that might have been arrived at through all this historical discussion as a sort of will to power kind of form or establishing the substance, in one way or another book, what the substance is, is the criteria under which one carries out rule islamically.

criteria, just a good example, what you're saying is that, you know, in since 1999, all the northern states of Nigeria and Federation, Nigeria, declared Sharia law.

And people vote around the argument for why they said, No, this is just political Sharia is the state basically, you guys are you guys arrest little thief's and deal with them? quite sure your law and you have this huge corruption at the top levels and no one gets punished. So but you're precisely Right. I mean, I'm not advocating for Boko Haram or anything. But I mean, that point is with a one of their arguments is

actually this isn't true yet, because the big thieves the big the great examples of corruption are being totally unaddressed.

Yeah, but the thing that as far as the masses are concerned, you really care about the big issues. They know that the the legal systems don't work in these countries.

They know that the system up and down is cop. They know that the old systems, the front door systems really because you know one of the things we forget is that most of these people if you if you go to the private areas in Pakistan, Afghanistan and so on, they considered everything they do Islamic.

So because they think they have tradition is Islamic.

But the fact is

system work, there was a crime, they took care of it. If there was a case, the case that went to the court, it was decided it didn't stay there forever. You don't have Egypt or turkey and ours improvement, you know where the entire system is corrupt. In every single tear of the F the court system is. So what people are looking for is we have these problems. And we cannot go anyone to come up with a solution.

And maybe, you know, they want to use the word, Sharia. But in fact, what this is about local leaders beside

being in a one is done, even though we've been forcing the modern system on them. Most of the decisions are still made by the tribal councils.

And one American reporter,

complaint complained that there was one case that went to the thing in the guy who was in charge. he consulted 17 people, he said he was very upset with the fact that he had thought of 17 people before he decided, well, that's the way the problem systems work. And that's the way people should react systems work. You did not apply the law.

You did justice, which was not always applied at all.

And I think people are looking for solutions is really what are the society's destiny to live?

Other questions for you to leave? On? Make sure everybody who has questions get a chance to ask questions.

How many of you have a question?

you're referencing?

Okay, so I want to bring up in this presentation, I think there was much of this kind of question of difference, which I don't think anybody would deny. But I think

a few different

points or

even use the time slot. You know, what does that mean? The only differences? That's what they go out there, and they'll be able to have this question on, for example.

You know, there was never again, the significance of one central thing. Again, I find it difficult to contend with these kinds of

presentations of issues, because the same way, they're consistent within the differences within Congress.

Same goes for Islam, again, like it's a reference point to which people are making a claim. And when they are trying to

say, Oh, I'm operating within an assignment framework

for what that is, but I think that the use of the template itself cannot be deemed illegitimate.

People will make mistakes. Same goes for, again, this question of caliphate.

This point that even within the differences of

governance or rules within the game, that was one,

this kind of is a good segue into my second point, which is, again, I think, the

topic as it was kind of presented

for this whole discussion with this question of the possibility like a universal

against us. And and I agree, I think if we're going to be talking about

a conception of a universal Islamic State has a very centralized,

essentially.

And I think, again, even if

you find very few groups that really push it,

and that's their conception of what this should look like.

But most Islamic groups even advocate for the standard thing.

Many of these groups when they can see

both I think that their conception of today as they would like to see them as being or for that matter, the way many of you theorize it historically is a sort of existence. They don't consider that in that way as a universal, centralized thing. They do have a new world.

And conceptual,

local, I think of it as they think universal but highly decentralized, some kind of

something more like a confederation or Commonwealth or something like that.

And again, I think another interesting point like this

diversity. And,

again, we're gonna look at the web of this presentation, because it's kind of an

attempt to kind of play off this

multiplicity and diversity within history. But then when we actually had this kind of random, brown,

despite the fact that yes, there are areas where that is more salient than others, for a significant

period. And obviously, again,

this idea of a Central Catholic,

even if they're not really governed by it was a very salient point. And it might have disappeared, this interim period that came back.

And I think that that in itself is something very significant. And it is why throughout the 20th century and beyond

this

domain, so say get in again.

I think your points are very good. And I mean, I have to say, so, you know, I was brought into this presentation on a pinch hitter or whatever. But from my own perspective, I don't, I'm not in the business of saying people should or should not make claims of universal states. I mean, that's, first of all, because I think people shouldn't be limited in their rights to political ideology. But I think also, that really plays into precisely the hand of groups like ISIS, which is that they their main

thing that leads people to support groups like that is because those groups call out hypocrisy of global systems, or Western dominated systems. So there's the European countries can get together and say you want the European Union. You can have NAFTA, you can have Irish Americans who identify as Irish in some ways for Irish causes and Jewish Americans because nobody support Israel, right. So everybody is acknowledged, right to some kind of notion of conformity with others with whom they identify across nation, the borders of nation states, and even you have the right to sue notions of supranational unions are of various sorts. And in fact, there's already organizational Islamic

Cooperation. Why is it that in Great Britain, in the UK, believing in a caliphate is something that will get you put on a list as an Islamic extremist? Right where it technically from the majority of Muslim scholars throughout history, they will tell you that Muslims are required to believe in the caliphate, as we just discussed, that can mean a lot of things. It can mean that somewhere way off, there's some guy who happens to be called the Kayleigh who has no role in my life, but he exists and that legitimizes my my religious contracts. That's very different from saying, I'm going to respond to Abu Bakr by daddy's call, and I'm going to go and kill someone in the street. These are totally

two totally different

phenomena, right. But I think I actually think it's important if you believe in freedom of expression and freedom of belief,

freedom of religious ideology that people be allowed to identify with supranational organizations. Because otherwise you're basically saying Muslims don't have that right. But everyone else does.