Sami Hamdi – Geopolitics
AI: Summary ©
The transcript discusses the history and potential involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the conflict, as well as the potential involvement of Saudi Arabia in the conflict. The speakers also mention the influence of Saudi Arabia on the conflict and the potential involvement of Saudi Arabia in the conflict.
AI: Summary ©
What is the impact of October 7, not only on the Middle East, but
on global affairs? I think that what October 7 did was it brought
everything to the fore. It's important to remember the week
before October 7 when Netanyahu, I went to United Nations, held up
that map that had raised Palestine, when he talked about
normalization being the greatest deal since the end of the Cold
War, when the Israeli ambassador told can television that
normalization with Saudi Arabia means the complete Arab
abandonment of the Palestinians. When Erdogan, when he saw the
Middle East corridor, announced at the g20 in India, only a few
months back, that Biden celebrated and hailed that would essentially
connect India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel and then enter
into Europe, we saw Erdogan shake hands with Netanyahu for the first
time since Erdogan came to power in 2003 there was this sense that
the whole world was moving towards a normalization with Israel over
the heads of the Palestinians. In the way that King Abdullah of
Jordan had put it, we saw the UAE, for example, coming out and
effectively saying that normalization is no longer for the
Palestinians use federal taba, the UAE Ambassador told think it was
Brookings or Carnegie when he was asked, What has normalization
achieved for the Palestinians? He said, it hasn't achieved anything
as an UAE normalization. And he says, now it's on for the it's on
the future countries that normalize with Israel to decide if
they want to do something for the Palestinians. But not Don't fret,
because now we have wonderful trade deals. And do you know how
many flights there are now between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi? So October
7 happened in that particular context where the world looks like
it's squeezing the Palestinians and hoping that this normalization
over their heads will end the Palestinian cause in a way that
favors the Israelis. And by that, what I mean is essentially
rendering the Palestinians abandoned, hopeless, with no
agency to continue with their cause or even insist on their
cause. What October 7 demonstrated? And here I'm not I'm
not justifying it or saying it was right or and I'm not making any
comment on on what about October 7 itself? What I'm saying is that
what October 7 demonstrated was what Bloomberg and Erdogan and
King Abdullah and all these other analysts had been saying, which is
that you can't normalize ties over the heads of the Palestinians
without risking a backlash. And Sisi himself is on record as
having warned the Israelis that the way they were going about
normalization, if you remember the report, they were saying that the
nesi had warned Netanyahu, there's something brewing in Gaza this,
and it's unclear whether he was warning them of October 7, or if
he was telling that Netanyahu the way you're going about things, you
know it's going to result in a backlash you're underestimating.
And that's why I think what October 7, it brought everything
to the fore, even the idea of Netanyahu and his bid to and next
to expand the Israeli borders, there's a lot of focus on the
Israelis and what they're doing in Gaza. And that October 7 was the
beginning of a chain of events. But people forget that the week
before October 7, Netanyahu was moving the troops and units around
to position them near to the Jenin refugee camp and the West Bank, in
anticipation of a preparation to invade the West Bank and finally
annex the territories. Remember, since 2019 he's been trying to
annex those at least 2019 2019 he tried. Trump told him, don't do it
so that UAE can normalize. So you give them some face to show the
Muslim more than give time for UAE scholars to say that normalization
is a good thing and to do all these interfaith things and the
and then when he wanted to go invade again, he lost. He fell out
of power, and Naftali Bennett became prime minister. Naftali
Bennett tried to invade. You know, Janine as well, began the raids.
They killed sharina Barkha in the process, which ruined it too much,
you know, heat. They had to stop the invasion. Netanyahu comes back
to power, and he wants to invade again. Now he's shaking hands with
Erdogan. Now he's been to Saudi Arabia twice and met with Bin
Salman. Now that the UAE is saying Abraham accords were not going
back, now that CC is more focused on domestic politics, now that
King Abdullah of Jordan is under pressure from the Saudis and the
UAE to hand over custodianship of ALSA, Netanyahu I believe this was
the time to finally go into the Jenin refugee camp, go into the
West Bank, to invade so what October 7 did was it categorically
blew up the suggestion that there can be any resolution to the
Middle East conflict without the participation of the Palestinians,
without talking to the Palestinians, without Having
dialog to the Palestinians. The second thing that October 7 did
was expose the fallacy of international communities approach
to Palestine and Israel. The idea being that even when you look at
the normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel, if you
notice, they went from talking about normalization in exchange
for a Palestinian state to normalization in exchange for a
pathway to a Palestinian state, the same constant kind of language
that they use in Oslo, the same kind of language that they use
after the Second Intifada, to sort of suggest that they're doing
something without actually doing anything. What October 7
demonstrated or brought to the fore is also the fallacy of these
to the extent that the EU now is sort of operating on its own in
terms of trying to present its ideas on the Palestine Israel,
independently of the United States. Which is why, when we saw
Cameron call for this idea that we might recognize a Palestinian
state, irrespective of the Israelis, Spain came out said,
we're ready to recognize a Palestinian state. Macron said,
we're ready to recognize a ceasefire. We have to talk about a
Palestinian state. I think when these European countries are
saying it, it's a reflection that the Europeans are coming to a.
Conclusion that the American and Israeli approach to the situation
resulted in October 7, and therefore there needs to be new
eyes and a new way of approaching the Palestine Israel issue. So I
think these are the two main things that October 7
demonstrated. Of course, there are side things. I want to side
things. They're also significant as well in terms of, you know,
media hypocrisy and the like we saw, you know, New York at the
time of the recording. We're recording we're recording one day
after New York Times published that Thomas Friedman article that
we talk about the Middle East in the same way that we're looking
at, you know, the animal kingdom and the like. But I think those
two in essence, the idea that Netanyahu was pushing for peace at
the expense of the Palestinians. I think now people are saying that
you can't have peace unless you talk to the Palestinians, having
said that there are still attempts to install the Palestinian
Authority into Gaza, which is still an idea of imposing, you
know, their own way, onto the Palestinians. But I think that the
difficulties that Blinken is finding in that there was a report
that Netanyahu asked bin Zayed the UAE,
if UAE could help with rebuilding Gaza. And binza is on record as
telling Netanyahu, go ask Zelensky, because he's getting all
this money from the Americans. You can't do all that damage. Expect
me to pay for it, because they're very frustrated with Netanyahu or
the like. But the but the idea being that they're struggling to
implement their way. But I think more broadly, those are the two,
the two main things, either you can't normalize at the expense of
the Palestinians, and also the fallacy of the approach to
Palestine Israel, which is making what was once a united block
behind Israel because splinter off into different initiatives, which
opens the door to a more in depth discussion as to how exactly we
should proceed on this I want to ask you about the resistance. Is
what we'll call them, or hummus, for the sake of the algorithm so
the video is not demonetized or de platformed. Given the current
situation, what really were they expecting to take place? Did they
think that they could capture these hostages and that Israel
would actually negotiate with them in good faith for the lives of the
soldiers in the civilians captured? Or have they been
completely blindsided and surprised by the extent of the
ruthlessness of the Israeli government and their Hannibal
directive policy to murder their own people. I think that when it
comes to hummus,
I think that first of all, it's important to remember the context
of the previous question to understand why October 7 happened.
There is a suggestion somehow that, how did they not expect that
this would be the response, but if you acknowledge that Israel was
preparing to invade the Jenin refugee camp and the West Bank.
The point is, war was coming irrespective. October 7 just
happened to be Kudo or to be on to preemptive strike or the like. But
the notion that it came out of nowhere is something that is
denied now, even by EU officials and the like. Everybody's aware
that there is a context to what happened again. It's not about
justifying all the like. It's about providing analysis of what
actually happened, the idea that, you know, there's all this
normalization taking place. Erdogan is shaking hazard.
Netanyahu bin Salman is ready, about getting ready to know, as
he's doing interview Fox News, and saying, we're, we're getting
closer every single day. And Netanyahu understanding from all
this normalization that now's the time to invade union refugee camp.
My point is, war was coming. Netanyahu was about to put in the
West Bank. And one of the reasons, one of the theories, why there was
no Gaza defense force when October 7 happened is because there are
reports that Netanyahu had moved those units towards the West Bank
in preparation for an invasion of the West Bank itself. So I think
that's the first point when we look at, could they not have
predicted it. That question presupposes that the status quo
was sustainable, when, in reality, the sustainable the status quo was
reaching fever pitch after Netanyahu was receiving all these
assurances that he could do what he wanted with impunity. The
second thing that's worth noting is that when you look at, for
example, the hummus and how they are able to continue firing
rockets at the Israelis? I think Kissinger had a really interesting
statement where he said, The issue with fighting guerrilla forces is
that a conventional army loses if it does not win, whereas a
guerrilla force wins so long as it does not lose. And I think Hassan
abusita, I saw a podcast of him. I think he was talking to thinking
Muslim or somebody else. I think Hassan abusita made a statement
where he said that, you know, we win by surviving. We win just by
existing. And I think that's very much what is frustrating the
Israelis, because you think about it this way, Israel objectively,
has absolutely decimated as we talking almost 30,000 killed.
We're talking 10,000 children. We're talking, you know, mainly
women, civilians, or like we're talking about a genuine decimation
of Raza, but when you read the news, you don't get the sense that
the Israelis are on the verge of any sort of victory, whether it's
military, or whether it's even like a moral or whether it's even
a PR victory. On the contrary, the more Israel seems to be bombarding
Raza, the worse this image seems to be getting. Think about it,
Israel, militarily on the ground is decimating, but the ICJ ruling
has said that Israel now has to stand trial for genocide. Biden
was unable to get the case kicked out. 15 judges to two ruled that
Israel should stand trial for genocide, and now that's moving
ahead.
Macron says it's unsustainable. We need a ceasefire, and he called
for a ceasefire before even a.
Asking Biden to do so. Separated from Biden, the Deputy Prime
Minister of Belgium is saying, now we need to Belgium with is saying
we need to put sanctions on Israel. Joseph Borrell, the
foreign policy chief of the European Union, is talking about
consequences on Israel because they reject a two state solution.
These aren't the positions of allies who believe Israel is
winning. These aren't the positions of allies who believe
that Israel is gaining from what it's doing in Gaza. And that's the
point that I want to emphasize here in that that when we look at,
for example, you know, homicide and what they're doing, they're
aware that as long as they survive, even today, before on the
day of that we're recording, I saw news that, you know, homicide
conducting operations in the northern areas where the Israelis
have insisted that they have full control, suggesting that every
time they pull back, they, you know, it's like, uh, whack a mole,
you know, like they just pop up and, and there are all these
videos, and normally that you see testimonies of Israeli soldiers
going back to Israel and saying, you know, Israel is not telling
you the full truth of what's happening. Like, we're getting
kicked here by people in Adidas, you know, track suits and slippers
that are just coming up and firing. And they're like, and I
think it's less to do with the idea. I think the wording of the
question might be changed a little because, because the one in
question suggests that you know the resistance is, you know,
making gains or the like, whereas in reality, it's hard to look at
what's happening and say the resistance is winning. I think
it's more accurate to say that in this war, Israel has done so much
damage to its image, that even if it wins the military victory in
the long term, it won't actually count for much, because they lose
more on the international stage in terms of its legitimacy, its
interaction with its allies, the shift in public opinion, we're
seeing it here in America. We're seeing under 30 fives now. They
are no longer, you know, supporting the Israelis. When they
asked Tiktok, they said, Please limit the reach of these pro
Palestinian content the Tiktok chiefs, they said, listen, like
we'll show you the data. It's not the algorithm. It's just the new
generation. It's pro Palestinian Kamala Harris's daughter, I heard
she's raising money for Palestine as well. Showing you in the same
household, there is this generational shift, and that
suggests that the next generation will not be as ideologically
inclined towards Zionism in the way that we see today. And that's
why sometimes I think that if Israel one day when it reflects on
Netanyahu or indeed, Benny Gantz or Yahi Lapid.
I think if they were offered a choice to go back and choose to
maintain the monopoly over the narrative or decimate Raza, they
would choose to preserve their monopoly over the narrative that's
been emphatically broken at this time. It's also worth noting that
even domestically, you know, when you look at Ehud olmer, the former
Israeli prime minister, or you look at, you know, Yahi Lapid, or
you look at some of these other like Israeli politicians who are
in favor of the ground offensive, but turning against Netanyahu and
openly saying that there is no strategic victory for us here.
There's no even Lloyd Austin. He said, You know, the the civilian
casualties, casualties means that you may win a, I can't remember
that phrase. It was like you may win a tactical factory victory,
but not a strategic victory, or something along those lines.
Saying, you know, this short term gain, you're getting more benefit
you in the long term. And I think that's the point. As long as
hummus continue to, you know, pop their heads out, it makes the
Israelis even more difficult. It makes it difficult for the
Israelis to assert any sort of victory. Which is why I think that
one of the reasons we haven't seen a ceasefire yet is because
although Blinken and Biden are now more inclined towards a ceasefire,
Biden is worried about the elections. He's looking for any
Masjid in Michigan that will receive Him, looking for any
Muslims who will sit with him so he can take a photo where he can,
you know, sort of show himself listening to them. There are
still, you know, and but the point is that I think it's less that
Biden and Blinken are now averse to a ceasefire. I think they, I
think they're pushed, certainly pushing for one in their own way,
but I think
they're struggling to find a way out for the Israelis in a manner
that allows them to claim that the Israelis won, and that's why they
keep talking about the day after Gaza, and this idea of the trying
to impose the Palestinian Authority on Gaza. The final point
worth mentioning is actually this a couple of weeks ago, maybe 10
days ago, mine's a bit of a blow with all the traveling. But
Netanyahu made a statement which was interesting. In the statement
that he said that we don't recognize a two state solution, or
we won't accept a two state solution, contradicting Biden, who
had to make Swedes. No, that's not what he meant. But Netanyahu was
humiliating Biden, this regard, Netanyahu also made another
statement in which he said, Now is not the right time to hold
elections. And I think that was a response to Blinken, because
Blinken, when he went to Tel Aviv last time, met with yay Lapid, and
he met with Benny Gantz, and he met with some of the oppositions.
And it was said he did that without consulting Netanyahu,
suggesting he was trying to get them to push for elections so they
could get Netanyahu out of the picture and then orchestrate a way
out for Israel. It looks like they won, even now we're looking at the
ceasefire deal. Hummus. Sorry, hummus, have said that they will
reject the deal, because although they agree on the hostage release
and hostage exchanges, I think it's female hostages for one month
and the military one month. Netanyahu is so concerned that
this will be considered a defeat that he wants to insist on being
allowed to continue the military offensive after, you know, the
truce ends. And I think that's revealing in and of itself, that
Netanyahu finds himself in a position that for all of the
Palestinians he's killed, for all of the buildings he's destroyed,
for all of the hospitals that he bombed, he doesn't feel like he's
anywhere closer to rescuing his political future. He still
believes if the war ends now, the Israelis will force him out of
office. I think that says everything you need to know about
the.
Stints about hummus in that they have nowhere else to go. They have
nothing to lose. The Palestinians have nothing to lose each more
land gets taken each time or for them, you know, it's an idea. You
squeeze them. You squeeze them. And I think even when we look at,
you know, the events of October 7, I always say that. And I say to
some friends of mine, you know, you know, non Muslim friends,
people who are just learning about Palestine Israel, you know, they
say, yeah, there was a party taking place, you know, and the
party was attacked. But think about it this way, how
desensitized do you have to be to the Palestine Israel issue, that a
party or a rave at the walls of the world's biggest open air
prison, that a party at the walls of what can be only be described
as a concentration camp, concentration of civilians in one
place. It's just considered normal that you can just say the
sentence, there was a party at the walls of the concentration and you
say it without any like, oh, wait a minute, that's insane. You know,
like, like, Germans dancing to having a rave, you know, next to,
you know, the concentration camps where they used to put the Jews
in, or the like, I know some people don't like the comparisons,
but in reality, we're looking at the same. It's a persecution of a
people by virtue of what they look like and who they believe, same
way that the Nazi Germany persecuted the Jews. And that's
why I think that, to answer this question very simply, I think that
for all the destruction that we've seen, I think it's very telling
that the Israelis are yet to come up with a narrative that suggests
they're winning, while the Palestinians are very easily
coming up with narratives to suggest that they are the ones in
fact, winning. The Palestinians are saying, you know, public
opinion has shifted. Israelis under pressure now as a genocide
regime, the ICJ, South Africa, global south versus global north,
and all the Europeans, the Palestinians can point to things
and say, You know what, a genocide is taking place, but the world is
starting to hear us now, and I think that's why the Israelis are
panicking and trying to spend millions to get, you know, tick
tockers and influencers to push back against videos like this. I
think that it's very difficult to predict the future or what
happens. And the reason why I say this is that if you look at
history, history, take the Algerian liberation, for example,
of France. You know, we had two main movements. We had musalia
Hajj and we had Farhat Abbas, and they were the dominant trends, you
know, in the fight against the French or the like. But the group
that liberated Algeria ended up being the front liberation
Nacional, the FLN that popped up in 1954 rendered the other two
like obsolete, and then ended up delivering the independence. Not
to say the other two didn't have a role, but that was the final stage
that happened. In other words, it may well be next 510, years. We
don't have any homicides and we don't have passing authority,
maybe, like a new movement. I think that in terms of short term,
I think what we're seeing is
a move not necessarily towards a ceasefire, but a phasing out of
the conflict, phasing out in stages, releasing the hostages,
keeping a state of war in in terms of name, while in substance, no
war. Very similar to what we saw in Yemen, where the Houthis and
the Saudis didn't have an official ceasefire because they didn't
renew it, but there was no real fighting taking place in those two
years when they were negotiating. The reason the Saudis didn't want
to sign the ceasefires because they felt it would acknowledge the
legitimacy of the Houthis, which they later on ended up not
acknowledging anyway, by sending their ambassador. But the point is
that it may work. They're trying to find a solution whereby they
can tone down the war, or reduce or phase out the fighting to buy
time for Biden to convince the Muslims that in Michigan and these
other six swing states, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Florida is
somebody told me Florida might be one of them, but I'm not entirely
sure. But in any case, to give Biden time until November to
convince the Muslims that although he committed a genocide, Trump is
going to be worse, and therefore they should forgive the genocide
and go vote for Biden. I think they will be phasing out of the
fighting, primarily because Biden wants a solution in which he can
claim that he supported the Israelis, so he can have the
Zionist block on board without saying that he allowed us to
continue or Hamas to continue ruling Gaza. The idea being that
this is why, when you read all the news, at least today, you know,
before I entered, it's all about, how do you get the Palestinian
Authority? Palestinian Authority back into Gaza? You know, all the
all these policymakers are saying we need a ceasefire, but we need
to think how to get Palestinian Authority back in Gaza to make
sure that the Hamas can't say that they survived it, and they're
still in Gaza, and they're still ruling Gaza as well. How they
achieve that? I don't know at all, to be honest. There's also the
other angle in that, although everybody else is talking about a
ceasefire, and the Israeli allies are trying to pressure them for a
ceasefire, the Israelis do appear to be pressing forward. They're
trying to go to the Rafah crossing. They're trying to take
over, you know, that border from the Egyptians as well. There is
this sort of, you know, this is a golden opportunity to annex Raza.
This is a golden opportunity to ethnically cleanse it. This is a
golden opportunity that might not come again, whereby we can kick
out the entire population and take this land and attach it to this
holy land of Judea, or whatever they call it. And the point, and I
think that in many ways, is trumping the pressure to push for
a ceasefire, and why Netanyahu is also resisting it as well. So
although it looks like we're getting closer to a ceasefire, the
closer we get to a ceasefire is also we're also seeing a an
increased ferociousness of the assault on Gaza itself. But to
answer your question, simply, I think it won't necessarily be a
ceasefire, although it could be. I mean, no one knows the future, but
it could be a ceasefire, but I think that more it's as it stands,
it's more likely to be a phasing out of the five.
Fighting that allows room to make sure they don't recognize homos in
Gaza, and allows a stage of a state of war where there's no
fighting, but there are negotiations to bring amenable
Palestinian parties to rule over Gaza itself. Having said that,
there's also the other alternative, which is that when
you look at the provocations that are taking place in the West Bank,
remember this fighting in a genocide. There's also flare ups,
and a lot of you know fight taking place in the West Bank as Israel
tries to take advantage to go into the West Bank itself.
There could be an identity, Father, you never know. I mean,
it's when you squeeze a population so much you don't give them
recourse. The only what ends up happening is you end up having
this explosion lashing out as well. So in reality, I don't, I'm
not. I'm not entirely sure what happens next, primarily because it
does appear that there's still a push to provide an environment of
impunity for the Israelis. And although Biden is concerned about
the elections in November, Biden is receiving assurances from
certain Muslim groups in America and Muslim leaders in the region
that Muslims will not punish him in November. And I know that
sounds extraordinary, but you know, I saw a tweet from you know,
an American Muslim who said that Biden still has a chance to win
back the Muslim vote if he shows empathy and understanding. You
know about their feelings, that even after genocide, 30,000 this
American Muslim believes they still hope to vote for Biden,
because a man who committed genocide is better than a man who
might commit genocide. You know, Biden might be better than Trump.
I'm not endorsing Trump in any way whatsoever. I'm saying that Biden,
on the one hand, is reading in the paper that the Muslim vote intends
to punish him, but he's being told by Muslim leaders and some Muslims
in America that we won't punish you because we're so scared of
Trump that we're willing to let go of the genocide. And I actually
think that's one of the reasons why Biden before Biden, before he
calls for a ceasefire, he's testing the waters first
domestically, sending his campaign manager to Michigan. Can we find
people to meet us? Can we find Mercedes to meet us? Can we find
these people to sit with us? And if he can find them, he will say,
You know what, the Muslims are not united block. They're divided. I
think I can win enough of them in November, I don't need to call for
a ceasefire. Let me expand this window and allow them to commit
genocide further. Having said that, I do think the window of
genocide is closing, it's abundantly clear the shift is this
unprecedented shift taking place in terms of how people are
approaching the Israelis. And it does appear that Netanyahu now
appears to be the sole man standing in the way of a
ceasefire, because he fears that if he ends the fighting now, he
will be kicked out of power, and that Biden wants to see him out.
Erdogan wants to see him out. France wants to see him out. Benny
Gantz wants to see him out. Yay. Lapid wants to see him out. The
families or hostages want to see him out. The protesters in Tel
Aviv want to see him out. They all want to see Netanyahu out. And I
think it's more about, how do we market this in a way that won't
allow your podcast to say that the Israelis lost? And I think they
haven't come up with that scenario. And given that, you
know, there's still they, they believe there's still hope to
mitigate the worst of the consequences. Let's see how long
it goes. Having said that ceasefire talks are still ongoing,
so you never know what will happen. Many Muslims are
disappointed with the lack of action by Muslim and Arab states
in the region. Some have called for war, while others would just
like to see some sort of economic action. I personally don't think
people understand the weakness and dependency these nations have on
Israel in the West without trying to make excuses or provide
justifications for what appears to be an absolute betrayal of the
Palestinian people. I would like to go through the interests and
positions of the Middle Eastern nations so that people can gain a
deeper understanding of the complexity of the geopolitics of
the region. I'd like to start first with Turkey. Or Duran has
been quite vocal in his condemnation of Israel, however,
many are disappointed with his lack of ability and or willingness
to take economic action against the State of Israel. So can you
break down for us, Turkey's relations with Israel and the US
to give us a better understanding of Ursa fans sensitive position.
Let me make it clear, we're analyzing the position. We're not
justifying it. You asked me to analyze the position. You didn't
ask me my opinion on the on the position, and we're going to
continue in that regard. I will just say one thing, because I
noticed in your question about understanding that they don't have
the power to do whatever you know, my job as a political risk
consultant. There are many governments that they are also
clients and advise their ambassadors, or sometimes they're
foreign ministries or the like. When you hear the questions they
ask, we might believe that the Muslim world doesn't have agency.
Their questions suggest that the Muslim world does. A lot of the
questions are, what if this Muslim country does this? What if Turkey
opens more military bases? What if, you know, like they express a
a concern over a scenario that agency might actually be deployed.
And in asking that question, they are affirming that they see agency
in the Muslim world, even if the Muslims don't see it, which is why
I'm a firm believer that the Ummah always has power. It's just that
there are conditions to manifest that power, and part of that
condition is perseverance in the struggle that results from
manifesting that power, which I think many of them are not
necessarily ready for, particularly those in the West. I
think other parts of Ummah, they are. But I haven't put in that
aside. Let's put ourselves in the position of Raja Tai verduan.
You
for.
Find gas in the eastern Mediterranean, and you believe
that you have a right to access that gas.
The problem, however, is as a result of you standing with the
Arab people in the Arab Spring, you alienated nearly everybody who
is around the Mediterranean, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, not
so much. But not only that,
you in order to access it, Greece also wants access. So the Cyprus,
there are maritime issues, so you're falling out with Cyprus
over the Turkish issue in the north because they don't want to
recognize, you know, they talk about two state solution, or one
state or the like. And the Greeks are upset at your position on
Cyprus as well. So if you look on the map, Greece doesn't like you,
Cyprus doesn't like you. Israel doesn't like you, Syria doesn't
like you, Egypt doesn't like us. That's literally everybody that's
relevant in that Mediterranean.
In 2019 the UAE backed warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya launches
an attack on the capital.
If Haftar takes the capital, you know for a fact that your entire
maritime interest in the Mediterranean will be at the mercy
of those countries that don't like you. They will cut you out of any
deal. And the proof is that Israel, Greece and Egypt try to
sign their own economic zone with regards to access in there. And
that's why, when when they try to push back against erdogan's access
to the Mediterranean. That's why Erdogan announced that unilateral
maritime maritime border with Libya. We literally just created a
border and said, I'm allowed access, because this is the border
with
Libya. Erdogan wrestles with the Israelis on that front, and he's
wrestling with Saudi wrestling with UAE, wrestling with the like,
he takes in 5 million Syrian refugees,
knowing it might cost him politically, domestically.
I remember being in Turkey in 2014 I know anecdotes are bad form, but
tolerate me just on this one. I remember being in Turkey in 2014
2015 I remember texts on the streets saying, you know, Erdogan
gives them free education, free health care, whatever, and I have
to pay for it.
I do believe Erdogan took in the Syrian refugees, knowing he would
pay a political price for it. 2016 coup. Then 2019 when he has the
elections after Libya. So 2019 you have Libya. I know it sounds like
I'm going like everywhere, but you understand where it's coming to
2019 comes. He's wrestling in Libya, but then he has the mayoral
elections in Istanbul, Ankara, and he loses them because of the
refugee question.
The reason why I say the refugee question is because on the night
before the vote, Bin Ali yielded him the the AK Party candidate in
Istanbul for erdogan's candidate in Istanbul. He does a last gasp
effort to try to win votes by coming out and saying I promised
to deal with the issue of the refugees as well, something that
shocked everybody. I remember sitting in Istanbul that night. I
was having dinner with Turkish friends, and one of them says to
me, Sammy Bay, I'm really sorry. I'm really, really sorry, like it
doesn't reflect our real position. I said, dude, like politics is
what
it is. Erdogan wakes up one day after raising interest rates for
20 years and says, interest rates is harder, so I need to bring them
down now violently. And the currency starts crashing, so the
economy starts crashing, and then he has a presidential election,
existential crisis. If he loses, the sense is that everything would
be reversed, and he throws everything at this presidential
election. Six Parties unite with kelesh darunlu
Erdogan wins the election, but the nationalists also get a sizable
vote. So it's clear that people didn't vote for Erdogan. They
voted against kirij darulu. I'm talking about the Muslims
specifically because Muslim 35 36% block. It's clear to Erdogan that
these Muslim block did not vote in support of Erdogan. They voted in
fear of killish Daru, expressing their discontent to what Erdogan
is doing
Erdogan system. Self. Look, you know what?
I'm struggling. I've got economic crisis.
The Americans are on my back. They won't sell me f sixteens, and
they're treating me badly. EU is not moving on the issue of the
Customs Union. I'm wrestling in the Mediterranean. I need the
access to the gas. They're trying to cut me out of that gas. He
tried in 2021 he tried to invite the Israeli energy minister to
Istanbul, and then the invitation got ruined by when Israel bombed
Raza again, Erdogan says, I'm stuck. I'm wrestling with Russia
in Central Asia because they're upset that I set up the turkey
Council, and I'm gaining influence in Central Asia. And Putin is
trying to make a point. He sent troops to Kazakhstan to rescue the
government, to send a message to the regimes that you might be
getting closer to Erdogan, but I'm the real power here in this
region.
Erdogan says, You know what I've done 1011, years of antagonism.
I need the breathing space like I need the breathing space. And then
he gets shocked and stunned when he reads the news that at the g20
Summit, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Israel and India have announced the
Middle East corridor, which is going to be a direct challenge to
the belt and Silk Road of the Chinese. The Chinese are angry
that it's been announced at the g20 and Turkey realizes, or
Erdogan realizes, that the whole economic landscape of the region
is going to change, and Turkey is going to be kicked out of it like
it's gonna, it's gonna so Erdogan says, You know what,
I need to slow.
Down a bit,
goes to bin Salman. Tells him, you have been Salman, I'll kick out
the Khashoggi case, please. And I asked if I'm sorry, like I'm
sorry, let's just reconcile and let's make peace this. Salman
doesn't forgive him, because bin Salman believes Erdogan is the
reason everybody found the bash. I could have just ignored it. So Bin
Salman tells him, on security issues, I'm happy to have some bad
actors beyond that, I'm not. Don't count me too much. UAE sees a
golden opportunity.
They invest 50 billion. And the UAE commentators, they say, look
how the Sultan is selling out his allies now for us. And you know
the text, you know, you know. They say, Look, we're stuck. We can't
do anything. And they tell, you know, the Muslim Brotherhood
allies in Istanbul, we need you to be quiet. Now. On, you. On, on, CC
and and they thought it's joke in the beginning, like it's a
friendly and then when they really start, they say, Listen, no, like
we're serious, like you need to stop. So they start leaving
Istanbul, Min Salman. Then Erdogan says, You know what, Mediterranean
gas? I don't need to be antagonistic. Haftar is no longer,
you know, taking over Tripoli because I intervened and the like,
I want to make peace with CC so that I can agree on a deal on how
we can extract that gas in the Mediterranean. And I want to talk
to the Israelis to establish so Erdogan says, Look, I need a
breather. I
need to solve my currency. I want to talk to the Israelis about
setting up a joint gas pipeline so we can all have access to the gas.
And we'll talk to the Saudis, and I hope I get more investment so
they can calm down in their lobbying against me. And we'll
talk to the UAE. They're going to invest, and we're going to work
together in Libya, in Libya, in Somalia, these other places in
Ethiopia and Sudan, where we have mutual interests as well. Even in
Sudan, they have mutual interest. Turkey does have contacts with the
other militia that is backed by the UAE. And Erdogan says, Look,
Muslims just need to understand. I tried, and now I'm struggling.
Then Gaza, October 7, takes place, and it completely humiliates him,
because at a time in which he's trying to wind things down, he's
now being asked to escalate. So he comes out and he says, you know,
we want to be neutral and reconciled with you. And the Turks
get so angry at the stance that they start taking to the streets
in protest, not only in support of Raza, but in protest against
Erdogan. There's a video that goes viral of a Turkish guy who says,
Erdogan, week, you called us out in 2016 in the coup, and we came
out for you. Call us out for what are you doing? And Erdogan,
eventually you see speech start changing from very neutral to he
does a rally where he gives him the speech that they want to hear,
but he's very careful. He says, I can't work with Netanyahu. I don't
want to talk to Netanyahu. I don't want to deal with Netanyahu. I
don't want to with Netanyahu to give something to the crowd while
telling the Israelis guys like, like, like, come on. Like, like,
not now. Like, of all the places,
that's not to justify erdogan's position. I truly believe,
honestly, even even analysis wise, I believe that Erdogan
does have convictions when it comes to Muslim issues. I don't
think Turkey changes in the way that it's changed in the past 20
years. Unless you have conviction.
I don't think you go to the AYA Sophia for the first time in the
history of secular Turkey the night before an election. I don't
think a leader leaves at a tax grave, abandons, doesn't go there,
and goes instead to Aya Sophia. I don't think you do that unless you
have conviction. I don't think you bring about those changes unless
you have conviction. I do believe this. Why people say sometimes why
people say sometimes you soften Erdogan. Is because Erdogan, I
hate the pragmatism, and I denounce it, and I think that it's
wrong. That doesn't mean I think he doesn't have conviction.
There's a difference between someone like bin Salman, who is
proactively de islamizing the kingdom and showing no remorse for
Gaza for his personal interest, and between Erdogan who pursues
personal interest, but you can feel he's, you know, it's like, I
wish it did not have to be this way. I think there's a difference
between that. And that's, I think, where Erdogan for Gaza, he says
one, what can I realistically do?
What I think he's under heavy pressure for, is that there are
reports, and I haven't confirmed them, but there are reports that
Turkey that trade those accusations, and it went it went
around in social media, and this is what put pressure on Erdogan,
that trade between Turkey and Israel increased 30% since October
7, increased or decreased increased 30% since October 7. Now
there are reports saying that Erdogan is taking Israel off the
export list. This was last week taking Israel off the export list.
There was a list that went viral in Turkey that listed companies
that are trading with the Israelis. And there were
accusations, you know, that people close to Erdogan, you know, that
they were also involved in this particular trade. The it also
caused a
a reflection of what Turkey has done, or Turkey has done for
Philistine. By that, what I mean is
Egyptians, albeit I think they exaggerate a little bit. The
Egyptians say we fought two wars for Philistine, which I think is a
bit of an exaggeration, because the two wars were not really
fought for Philistine. They were fought for other reasons that
Philistine happened to provide an umbrella under which they were
able to fight. One of the fights was for seyna, because it was
taken by by the Israelis and
but you look at Turkey like even when they kicked out the Israeli
ambassador, they didn't actually kick out the Israeli ambassador.
The Israel withdrew the ambassador because the Turks were so angry.
And then Turkey left its ambassador for a few days, and
then realized it's untenable. I need to withdraw my ambassador as
well. It's the.
Things that raise doubts about Erdogan, in that it makes clear
that Erdogan believes himself to be in such a situation that this
October 7 came at the worst time. I need to toe down. I don't have
the power to push forward. And that's why, in reality, he's
become irrelevant to what's happening in Ghazal Palestine. And
a lot of people are upset like with his stance. And even when he
tried to justify the reality, it makes it quite difficult, given
that, you know, he's a lion in Syria and unable to do anything
like in Israel itself. And it is like bitterly, bitterly
disappointing to see erdogan's position on it. And I think that,
you know, some of my clients, they ask after this genocide, will
trade with Turkey and Egypt go back to normal trade with Turkey.
And I can't lie to you. I can't, in good faith. Rule it out. I
can't rule out that Erdogan will very quickly go back to normal
trade with Israel, because, in his view, Israel is fundamentally
important to Turkish economic interests. And Erdogan says, If I
have to calculate it, the Turks will forgive me for dealing with
is for working with Israel, if I provide them greater comforts, but
they will not forgive me if I go against Israel and they suffer
greater discomfort. And I think in reality, that's why it's not that
I'm soft on Erdogan, but I think he reflects a wider trend, which
is, like Pakistan, like Imran Khan, which is, you
know, at the end of the day, Imran Khan made a good statement. He
said, they're not coming after me. They're coming after you. I'm just
standing in the way. The point being that it's an environment
that lends itself to Erdogan making these conclusions as well,
which is, if I knew the Turks had my back, if I did something on
Israel like they had my back, I'd probably do something. But I know
if I go to Israel, the Turks won't have my back. Switching over to
Jordan, same concept in the context of their position. So 50%
of Jordan's population are Palestinians. Despite outrage,
we've seen Jordan continue to do business with Israel. Most
recently, they allowed goods to cross into Israel from overland
routes in the Middle East corridor, coming from the UAE
through Saudi and this is in response to the Houthi blockade of
the Red Sea. Can you break down for us Jordan's position in all of
this, and help us understand their actions. I'll be honest with you,
and it might displease some people,
I want to go easy on the king Abdul King Abdullah of Jordan, and
I tell you why.
King Abdullah of Jordan is in a very difficult position.
It's not to justify the actions, but to give some context, King
Abdullah of Jordan, is aware that what's happening in Gaza puts him
in a very difficult position with the Palestinian population in
Jordan, and actually, he's been one of the loudest to condemn
what's happening in Gaza, and also coming out and rejecting the day
after plans that Blinken has been trying To impose,
Jordan has been quite blunt diplomatically, that it deeply
resents the US stance. And one of the reasons why Biden went back on
the Congress bill that he proposed on the 20th of October, 14 billion
to give to Egypt and Jordan to take in Palestine Refugees, is
because King Abdullah put his foot down and said, I'm not taking them
in. Like, I will not allow you to drive these people out. Like you
can't, like it's a red line.
The reason why I said in the beginning, I'll go easy on him, is
because the greater threat to King Abdullah of Jordan is not actually
the Palestinians or even the Israelis. It's Saudi Arabian UAE.
Saudi Arabian UAE have been pressing the Jordanians to hand
over custodianship of Al Aqsa
to who to them so telling King Abdullah of Jordan share the
custodianship with us, with UAE and with Saudi Arabia. The reason
that's significant is for two reasons.
The first is that Mohammed bin Jason, the former Qatari Prime
Minister, tweeted maybe a year ago, two years ago, the tweet is
still up. He said there is an Arab country that is buying land around
Al Aqsa and handing it over to the Israelis.
There are testimonies from Palestinians that I've spoken to
who say that UAE is buying land and handing it over to the
Israelis.
If you remember, there was a coup, attempted coup last year on the
Jordanian King. Two people were arrested, the brother that tried
to do the coup and Saudis. Man in Jordan. The arrest of Saudis man
in Jordan made it clear who King Abdullah thought was behind the
coup.
When you look at why does Saudi Arabia want custodianship of Al
Aqsa? One day, I was sitting in a room of diplomats. I know
anecdotes a bad form, but tolerate me with it.
And during the session, one of the diplomats said, Do you think it's
possible that Saudi Arabia would hand over Al Aqsa to the Israelis
as part of normalization of ties with Israel? And my immediate
reaction is absolutely not.
Why on earth would you ask such a question,
and they said, because our Israeli counterparts are telling us
that it's going to happen. And I was like, maybe they speculated
like, you know, and they go, no, no, there's a difference between
maybe, or we're negotiating, or we're talking, or it's possible
they're not saying that. They're talking as if it's a done deal
that Al Aqsa will be handed over to.
To the Israelis.
I think that when you look at the way the Saudis are making
concessions to the Israelis, and the way the UAE are making
concessions to the Israelis, and when you look at the way, for
example, that Saudi Arabia throughout this genocide, can only
be described as being, you know, in the Israeli camp, not in the
Palestinian camp, whether it's, you know, asking the Imams to come
up with fatwas to say, you know, don't talk about hazard because
it's a fitna. Or whether it's bringing Shakira to dance on the
night that the grand offensive begins, or bringing Jared Kushner
to give a keynote speech to emphasize that normalization is
still on the cards. Jared Kushner said it from the heart of Saudi
Arabia. I think that the reason I go easy on King Abdullah of Jordan
is because I think that for King Abdullah, he's aware that he's
supremely isolated.
Primarily because he's feeling the pressure, even from the Arabs, to
do something on Al Aqsa that will favor the Israelis. And that's
why, when the Saudi ambassador, you know, went to Ramallah, and
you know, they were trying to get the Palestinians to celebrate a
potential normalization with Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah of Jordan,
protested. He said, You can't normalize over the heads of the
Palestinians like this is wrong, like you shouldn't. Is wrong, like
you shouldn't be doing this kind of thing, and it's also why the
Palestinians refused to allow the Saudi ambassador to pray in Al
Aqsa. So I think King Abdullah of Jordan is genuinely very worried
about what's happening in ghaza. Doesn't want to see the genocide,
wants to see an end to it, but has no power, really, to do anything,
and is desperately navigating pressure that is being brought to
bear on him to betray the Palestinians and stab them in the
back. And so far, He's resisting that pressure. We've seen Israel
bomb the Syrian airport dozens, if not hundreds of times over the
last few years, Syria has been unable to deter Israeli attacks.
Clearly weakened by the decade long civil war and the presence of
US troops on their territory, I don't think anyone expects them to
join the fight against Israel. Still, Syria has a role to play.
Can you help us understand what their position might be? I think
Syria is non existent. It doesn't exist for it to have a role to
play. I think that what Israel is bombing is now an Iranian proxy
and Iranian pro Iranian militias that are in Syria Assad does not
have the power to order a counter attack on Israel. Does not have
the power to resist Israel. When Israel is bombing Syria, it
believes it's bombing Iran, and Iran is deciding whether Syria
retaliates or not. Iran is deciding the mobilization of the
forces on Syrian territory to apply pressure on Israel. Assad is
out of the picture, impotent, with no power whatsoever to do
anything. On the contrary, * is more focused on Idlib and bombing
Idlib at the same time that there's a genocide taking place in
razed there's a bombardment of Idlib as he seeks to take
advantage of the diversion of attention to the genocide to try
to finish off those in Idlib and retake all of Syria, but he's
struggling because the Turks are still bombing the Kurdish
positions, and the Russians are there and the Americans are there.
In other words, I think that when Israel is attacking Syria, I think
it has much more to do with Iran. And I
think in this particular context, Syria's role is primarily as a
launch pad for Iran to keep the pressure up on Israel. And I think
in reality, it's a damning indictment on Syria itself. Bashar
Al Assad destroyed the whole country. You know, all the people
wanted was a chance to choose their rulers and stop, you know, a
family rule that last two decades. He said, I'd rather destroy, burn
the whole country then allow the people you know to choose their
own leaders, and Syria is now effectively irrelevant. Hezbollah
has exchanged skirmishes and rocket fire with the Israelis for
several months now, despite the overly hyped propaganda videos,
there is no doubt that they are applying pressure, even if it is
slight. To date, over 100 Hezbollah soldiers have lost their
lives in the these skirmishes, Lebanon cannot afford another
destructive war after decades of instability, hyperinflation,
corruption, mismanagement and the recent catastrophic ports
explosion. Given this, what role is Hezbollah currently playing?
What role might they play next, and what are their interests in
this situation? There's a very interesting timeline of events. So
if you remember, Israel delayed its ground offensive, there was
all this talk. Why? When will it begin? Will it happen and the
like, and one of the reasons they said it will delay is because they
were concerned that if they invaded, then Hezbollah and the
Iranian proxies would attack from behind, and that Iran was
genuinely serious, that it would escalate if the Israelis began a
grand invasion.
Reuters
reported
that it was leaked
that
that Thomas's Politburo leader Ismail Hania, went to Tehran. Was
a Reuters of Times of Israel. I can't remember, but any case, like
one of the somebody reported that Ismail haniye had gone to Tehran
and asked Khamenei, please, can you, you know, increase your
efforts, you know, because we're under pressure. And Khamenei
allegedly said to him, You didn't consult us before you did this.
You didn't tell us this was happening. You know, we were going
through a period of de escalation, of rapprochement. We were
negotiating bin Salman. We were talking to the Americans. We.
We were trying to entrench ourselves, that we didn't need
this at this moment in time, you didn't tell us, this is the
maximum that we're going to do. Three days after that meeting took
place, Israel began as ground offensive, suggesting that the
Israelis found out that this was the maximum that the Iranians
would do. These are the maximum that the proxies would
do. I think it is true that the Iranian proxies
are having the greatest impact in frustrating the Israelis. I think
it is true that while Israel might believe that this is the maximum
Hezbollah will do, the uncertainty, or the 1% 2% that
they might do more, means that they are leaving troops there on
the Lebanese border, which means they can't concentrate everything
on azerbaima. They don't need to. But in any case,
Lebanon is true. Can't afford another war.
I think that Hezbollah has sent clear messages that will exchange
missiles. You hurt us. We'll hurt you. Let's keep it there. We don't
want to escalate it too much. And the Americans seem to be settled
with this. I think a good example of it would be, you know, the Iran
and US exchanging missiles on each other. They each give the
locations first before they do it, to make sure that they have time
to withdraw any personnel who, if they're killed, would result in
war. So America, when it retaliated, it gave the locations
to the Baghdad government, to Iraq, Iraq, which is de facto
under Tehran's influence, and Baghdad, you know, if you give it
to by this like you're giving it to Tehran, Tehran move their
personnel out of the areas with Americans. So I think we're seeing
that in that
it doesn't mean that they're cooperating with each other. It
means they're both saying to each other, Listen, please stop. We
don't want to escalate. Don't force us to and, you know, there's
sort of, who's going to blink first game of chicken, you know,
who's going to blink first? I think Hezbollah is in, is in that
role as well. The Houthis, I think, have had also a huge impact
on the Red Sea. There's been exaggeration in that the Houthis
have stopped all trade. The Houthis are stopping ships going
to the Israelis. And they said, if you stop what's happening in
Ghazal, we stop what's happening in the Red Sea. Like it's not big
deal. I think that's why the Houthis are being celebrated by
many, and why many Yemenis who have suffered under the Houthis
are upset that, you know, Houthis are being celebrated. But in
reality, you know, if nobody else is doing so, Philistine for sin
has that has the ability to But to answer your question, I think that
Hezbollah is doing the maximum that it can. It
doesn't want an escalation. It's quietly praying that all of this
will go away. That's not to take away from what they've done. I do
have my opinions on Iranian proxies. I do believe Iranian
proxies have killed more of the Sunnah than Israel has
Palestinians.
I think that, you know, in nafikalbi, Ina, like my heart is
not at ease to see those that persecuted the Muslims in Iraq,
Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, suddenly be presented as champions of
Palestine.
Having said that, I do understand that, you know, in the absence of
other Muslim leaders putting pressure on Israel, their pressure
did have some benefit for the Palestinians. I don't know if I
can say more than that, the UAE normalized ties with Israel
several years ago, and has been unapologetic in their
relationship, even during the current attack on hudza, they have
admitted that they have no leverage over Israeli actions in
Palestine and don't seem to be interested in attaining any we
know they are part of this new trade corridor from India to
Haifa, and they are currently helping to facilitate the transfer
of goods to Israel overland through this corridor. What are
the UAE s interests in the region, and why do they insist on this
relationship with Israel? Well, it's simply the UAE insists on
preserving normalization of ties because they're benefiting
emphatically from normalization of ties. The whole purpose of
normalization with Israel, in the words of the former Qatari Prime
Minister Hamad bin Jassim in a France 24 interview in 2018 in
2018 he said, When the Arabs get close to the Israelis, it's not
because they like the Israelis. It's because they believe that
Israel is the key to the White House and Congress. If you think
about what UAE is doing in Libya, in Sudan, in Somalia, in Ethiopia,
in Eritrea, in Chad, in Mali, Mali, not so much, but in Chad, if
you look at what the UAE is doing elsewhere in Yemen or the like,
you'd be hard pressed to find Congress condemning any of it,
even though it's pretty outrageous, like what's happening.
And the reason being is the UAE believes that normalization
ensures absolute impunity in Congress and the White House, that
for them, normalization with Arab state is so important that there's
no it's not worth provoking or antagonizing Abu Dhabi, which is
why, for example, in Sudan, where you have a situation where the
Bashir is government fell, and then Washington and UAE came
together, and they said, Guys, if we allow elections here the
Sudanese, they will vote for Islamic leaning parties. Remember,
as bin Zayed said in the article in The New York Times article The
Dark Prince of the Middle East, he said that, you know, these are
people who believe a 1400 year old book should be a constitution. The
implication is, do you really want these people to vote and choose
their
leader? So in Sudan, they got together. They got parties that
would never win an election, leftist liberal parties allied
with the generals, the two, the two commanders that toppled Al
Bashir, and they made a transition agreement. They removed.
Israel. They removed Islam from the Constitution, they normalized
ties with Israel, and then they fell out with each other because
the general didn't want to hand over power to the political
parties. Instead of going to elections, they decided to do new
negotiations. And then when the UAE got frustrated with the
general who refused to hand over power, they said they asked the
militia, you know, can you go and plunge the country into war and go
and get rid of that general? That's preferable to Western
elections, because we don't want Sudanese to choose their leaders.
America knows all of this, but Congress doesn't say anything
about it, or very rarely says anything about it, and doesn't
actually call UAE out, because normalization is so important they
don't want to jeopardize that normalization of ties. So the UAE
believes, why am I going to compromise the impunity that I
have secured through normalization of ties with Israel for the sake
of Palestinians who aren't really going anywhere anyway. I think
that's why, for the UAE, they believe that the Abraham Accords
are absolutely fundamental and essential, not because of any
peace. They don't really care about the peace or not, but
because of what the Israelis are providing in America, in terms of
the White House of Congress, where the UE is becoming one of the
primary influences on US foreign policy itself.
The UAE also says, Look, you know, like Qatar, 1996 first country to
willingly normalize. And you know, Qatar was the first country to
receive Israeli President six, when Shimon Peres went to visit
them, said that went to Israel, but Shimon Peres came to Qatar.
So, you know, and the UAE says, you know, many scholars, they made
excuses for it like no problem, it's and that's why even bin
Salman is considering he sees the impunity that, you know, UAE gets
to join. He says, this is, you know, with normalization of
Israel. And you know, there are scholars justifying normalization
and saying it might be a good thing. Maybe I can do the same
thing as well. So the UAE, they say, Listen, at the end of the
day, we've benefited from the Israelis. We're not interested in
this Palestinian cause, like we're not. We believe it can be resolved
with just a bit of money, like spraying money here and there. And
you know, what's happening in Raza. If we have to make a
statement, we'll make one. If we don't, UAE, like Saudi, will take
the brunt of what's happening as well. I think that's the sad
tragedy. Because you think that UAE, in my opinion, is one of the
countries that can end the genocide tomorrow if it wanted to,
if it kicked out the Israeli ambassador and reversed the
Abraham Accords, I think the Americans would panic, and they
would tell the Israeli, stop, stop, stop. We need to preserve
that. That's how you use normalization in favor of the
Palestinians. That's the leverage that they have that we choose not
to use. But the UAE, at the day, they say we have more important
priorities. We want to become like the new Venice of this era all
these ports, you know, in Somalia, they've recently brokered an
agreement with Somaliland to provide a strip of land for
Ethiopia to access the sea, something that has angered
Somalia. You know, they're everywhere. There was an article
that came out that said the UAE now is a major play in East
Africa, and that's not a good thing.
The idea being that the UAE is expanding all this, and the UAE
says the reason it's able to do so without normalization, it would be
criticized heavily in Washington, but with normalization, it's able
to do what it wants. So it says, Why should I compromise all of
these gains that I'm making for the sake of Palestinians, who they
argue don't appreciate anything that I did before. I never sounds
tragic, but that's, I think that's the UAE position. Palestinians are
not worth it. It's no secret that Saudi Arabia was close to a
normalization deal with the Swahili, and many argue that
behind the scenes, this deal is still very much real and will
continue after the situation and huzzah dies down, one of the
stated objectives of Operation Al Aqsa flood was to disrupt
normalization talks and remind the region of the importance of the
Palestinian cause. What is Saudis position in all of this? And why
are they interested in normalization with Israel? Saudi
they are interested in normalization for two reasons.
They have an economic, existential economic crisis and an existential
security crisis. From their perspective, the existential
economic crisis is easily understood if you put yourself in
the position of Bin Salman. 2017 you come to power. 2018 you come
to America. You meet everybody who's anybody. You meet all these
tech guys. And Saudi Arabia is a new thing. But in 2018 you kill
Khashoggi, or allegedly kill Khashoggi.
As a result, companies don't come and they don't come rushing to
invest in your vision. 2030 2019 Houthis fire missiles, they hit
your oil facility. So companies aren't coming because it's not
safe. 2020 covid hits, so nobody's investing anyway. 2021 Biden comes
to power in January, calls you a pariah, and then companies aren't
coming. 2022 Biden comes to reset relations, but talks about hashok
Ji when he's with you in gender. So companies are hesitant. What's
going on over
here? Not only that, companies are setting up in UAE to do business
in Saudi Arabia, which means that bin Salman turns around he imposes
tariffs on the border with UAE to tell people you can't just do
business, expensive if you want to stay in the UAE. And also says
anybody who doesn't have a headquarters in Saudi Arabia will
have to anyone doesn't have a headquarters in Saudi Arabia.
Cannot pitch for government contracts. They cannot win
government tenders.
Then the Saudi Crown Prince twice in the year, he just randomly does
spot checks on the UAE board, the meaning trucks are lingering there
for like a week to tell companies that I'm unpredictable. If you
want to do business in UAE, no, you have to like, do business like
here.
He has to take in enlarged dividend from Aramco in 2022 2023
I could have made. I'm sure it's 2023 to shore up the budget. And
he has to restructure the public investment fund because it's
making losses. The point is 2017 to 2024 where we are now, Vision
20.
30 is not moving in the way that you wanted it to move. You're
still heavily reliant on oil price. You still need, I know
8090, $100 like a barrel, in order to you know, balance your budgets.
All that talk about vision 2030, and your diversification is not
taking place in the way that it is. And companies are not eagerly
running to you. The companies are going to Saudi Arabia are taking
your checks to build, but they are not investing the money to stay.
They're not investing in they're taking money from Saudi Arabia
itself.
Bin Salman believes that if he normalizes ties with Israel, he
can resolve the issue in Congress and the White House and Israel.
When those companies come, they'll bring with them the American
companies for vision 2030 because bin Salman says vision 2030 is
supposed to look like Miami, not Shanghai or Moscow, like Miami. He
makes the Miami reference in his own documentary when he talks
about Neom and other projects. The existential security crisis is
that when you open the map of Saudi Arabia to the north, you
have those 23 pro Iran militias that have fired rockets in the
past at Saudi Arabia, whose leader in 2019 Abu mahdin mohandes, who
was killed by Donald Trump, said that the target before Aqsa is
Riyadh. Riyadh is the target first, he told a group of students
in Tehran. To the east, you have Iran itself, which always
threatens to shut the Hormuz straight from which 30% of the oil
goes through. And the South, you have the Houthis, who are now
essentially entrenched, like in northern Yemen, who have five
missiles at you. Saudi Arabia believes it's in a pincer. Saudi
Arabia's security has always been outsourced to the Americans. But
when the Houthis hit in 2019 when they hit the uptake oil facility,
they expected the Americans to react. The Americans didn't react.
So the Saudis entered into negotiations with the Iranians to
say, Listen, guys, I just need a five year truce. Iranians, they
said, We need to see sincerity. Bring Assad back to the Arab
League. Said, how to bring as back to Arab League? Invest in Iraq
because they need to pay electricity bill. They need money.
Put money there so they can pay us. So he put 6 billion in Iraq
and it goes to the Iranians. Afterwards, the Iranians say, talk
to the Houthis and consider compensation. About halasa. Talk
to the Houthis,
where, when the Israelis suggest normalization in exchange for a
NATO style security agreement, the negotiations slowed down between
Saudi and Iran, because now bin Salman is thinking, hang on.
Thinking, hang on a second, if I can secure the need to start
security agreement, I don't need to be humiliated by Iran like, I
don't need to continue these talks during the post. Of course. He's
also sent Cristiano Ronaldo to Tehran, you know, as a gift like
as well. Like to pray for macho weather. Bin Salman believes that
these existential crises require Israel in order to resolve them,
and that therefore his relationship with Israel is not
worth compromising for the sake of the Palestinians.
And that's what I think is a tragedy in that
in order to allay the fears of Israel, to bin Salman has
proactively told Israelis and Americans their normalization
still on the cards, whether it's bringing Jared Kush to give a
keynote speech, whether it's continuing with the concepts and
the raves, whether it's getting Imam to say, don't talk about
Gaza, whether it's informing tourism boards that they shouldn't
bring kefirs or Free Gaza stickers to Saudi Arabia, although after
the public backlash, it looks like they've calmed down. They're not
arresting as many people anymore, or confronting many people, with
regards to the kafirs or the like the light. The Saudi Crown Prince
believes that normalization with Israel is the way forward, and he
also believes he can do it. He wants to die as a kingdom, you
know, lowering the loudspeakers to 33% of the volume for the adhan,
banning them for being used for the Quran, banning all masajid
from broadcasting taraweeh, praise, except makadina. Although
Medina was a cause, was a concession after a backlash when
people thought it would make me be included. The reason being is that
bin Salman was frustrated that while he's doing all the raves and
parties or the like, if you do hashtag Saudi on Tiktok, you're
just seeing parties like from Riyadh, from the man from
whatever, he wanted to limit and restrict that to give greater
viewership for the raves and the concepts. So he said, let's leave
it to Mecca Medina. So you have the hashtag Mecca Medina, while
hashtag Saudi can be limited to, or can be exclusive to Red Sea
resort, Iggy, Azalea, twerking, Nicki Minaj, if she ever accepts
an invitation she rejected the first one. Or, for example,
Shakira coming to dance, or Tyson fury and ingano, or the like it's
about. You know, changing Saudi Arabia's image or the like, Saudi
Crown Prince has been proactively reassuring the Israelis that look,
I want good ties. I'm ready to normalize. Just give me the three
things. Give me the NATO style security agreement against Iran,
because they're a threat to me, not the Israelis. Give me a
nuclear technology to build a nuclear weapon and give me support
for vision 2030, make your companies come and invest and
Biden, before October 7, actually
told it was, I think it was Reuters that reported it. He told
the Saudis that I can't give you NATO style security agreement, but
I can give you a status like Bahrain where we deploy a fleet
that's exclusively designed to defend you. And Netanyahu was also
reportedly to have agreed to with the Americans to give nuclear
technology to the Saudis in exchange for normalization of
ties. So the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman says himself,
listen, I'm on the verge of resolving these two existential
crises through normalization of ties with Israel. And not only
that, if the Ummah made excuses for Qatar and UAE, why won't they
make excuses for me? For example, the introduction of alcohol in
Saudi
Arabia, when the Qataris did the World Cup, remember, initially
they said, no alcohol, and then they made a concession. They
allowed alcohol in certain areas. There were some Saudis who
commented on it at the time, and they said, you know, this might be
the way we.
Introduce alcohol. Because, look, there's no backlash. Qatar is
being celebrated for introducing alcohol, but in limited places,
maybe we can do the same in Saudi Arabia itself. And sure enough,
one year or two years later, now they're introducing alcohol. But
for diplomats only, it's like gradually, there was a sheik made
like a semi joke. He said to me, the Quran got rid of it gradually.
Bin Salman is reintroducing it gradually.
But the point is that when you look at the, you know, Bin Salman
is going towards a particular direction, and he believes Israel
is at the heart of it. And he believes he could find an Islamic
justification for normalization. He has Imams who could find him
any Islamic justification. And he believes that these two
existential crises are not worth compromising for Palestine. He's
already, you know, pressuring Jordan. He's already working with
the Israelis. He's already allowed the Israeli national anthem at the
EA Sports tournament. He allowed Israeli sports team to participate
at Dakar Rally in 2021 he's allowed Israeli delegation to go
to Medina. Hirado, Hindutva delegation as well. Like to go to
Medina as well. Monowara, the trajectory is clear. And I think
this a man is just not as interested in, you know, automatic
issues anymore. For him, it's not relevant. For him, he's very
pragmatic Machiavellian, I need Israel to solve my two existential
crises. I'm not going to compromise that for Felicity. Do
you view the existential crisis as being serious enough to merit even
the consideration of this normalization? My issue with the
existential crisis is not that I deny them. I believe they are
legitimate fears. Genuinely, I don't deny that at all. I do think
that Iran
is an imminent threat to Saudi Arabia. 100% I believe the economy
badly needs to be diversified 100% what I disagree with is the
methodology through which he's decided to resolve those two
The reason Iran, has a project in the region. This idea of, you
know, Khomeini. I think it was Khomeini who once put it. He said,
Allah gave the Khilafah to the Arabs, the Turks, the Kurds, the
Berbers, and this is the time for the Persians. Iran has a project
that unites the Shia in the region so much so that you can't buy
Hassan Al sallallah. You can't buy Muqtada Al Sadr you can't buy
Houthis. Saudis have tried. They've spent millions trying to
buy these organized they can't buy them because they believe in an
ideology. Hassan, a Salalah crossed over the border from
Lebanon to Syria and rescued Bashar Al Assad in 2013 2014 in
Corsair, knowing full well, he was about to lose all of the credit
that he'd got from the Sunni world, from his war with Israel in
2000 6000, 8008,
I think so.
For him, the loyalty to the cause was worth compromising all of that
goodwill because they believe in something. Saudis don't have an
equivalent project. My issue, for example, is that, for example,
when you look at the economic diversification, there's so much
in the Muslim world that you could diversity. You could open the visa
and let the Muslims go back in Medina, to go to Taif and go to
Tabuk and go to these other places. In terms of startups, you
don't need the Israelis or the likes to do your startup. You have
startups you can invest in Singapore and these other places
will alike and do your own and set up your own model. You don't need
to de israelize Saudi Arabia in order to achieve that, you know,
grander if the issue was perhaps the strict interpretation of Saudi
Arabia, the solution is not to go from, you know, strict
interpretation to Bikini beaches in Jeddah. It's to shift it, you
know, away, like through scholarly discussion and the like. That's
why I don't deny the urgency of the existential crisis in Saudi
Arabia. And I think it would be unfair for anybody to do that. I
just believe that bin Salman's approach to resolving them is one
that will lead to even more disaster for Saudi Arabia itself.
I mean, you consider bin Salman had come out and said, you know,
similar, we will not tolerate the genocide, and we're taking a
position, and we've gathered leaders. He would have been a
hero. People would have forgiven him for all those concerts. They
would have forgiven him for standing on top of the Kaaba. They
would have forgiven him for all the things I would have I would
have said, You know what, mashaAllah butter, like he's doing
something now. But you feel like bin Salman his vision of Saudi
Arabia is one in which Islam is no longer part of the identity. When
he changes the date of the founding of the kingdom from 1744
to 1727 1744 the Saudis used to always say that the Saudi Arabia
was established in 1744 when Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab shakes
hands with Muhammad Al Saud and they make a pact in which they
agree to reestablish Quran and Sunnah in Saudi Arabia, whatever
you think of them, is irrelevant. I'm saying that the Saudis point
to the founding of their kingdom as a pact to uphold Islam, which
is why the Saudi princes would always say Allah gave us dominion
because we agreed to go out and uphold Islam. And why King Salman.
When he was emir of Riyadh, he wrote in 2008 in the Riyadh
newspaper, he wrote that the founding of Saudi Arabia was not a
tribal endeavor, nor what is a human ideological endeavor. It was
an Islamic endeavor to establish Quran soon. Whether it's true or
not, is irrelevant. The point is where they see the Saudi identity
rooted in mens
changed from 1744 to 1727 which is the year that Muhammad Al Saud
becomes leader of the clan in a small town outside of RAF ko dira.
And the emblem that he uses to celebrate it is a horse, a palm
tree, a door and a soug like a market. And the flag he puts in
the middle has like no writing in it. And.
So he's saying, This is what represents Saudi Arabia. There's
no Islamic symbolism. Even the picture that he uses of diriyah to
explain the emblem doesn't have any minarets on it. The point is
like there's this clear he's trying. He believes that to
resolve the existential crisis, he needs to divorce the Saudi
identity from Islam. He needs to create a new nationalist Saudi
identity that is divorced from the Islamic undertones that define the
Saudi identity. Whether you agree not is irrelevant, but that define
the Saudi King, Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, who founded the latest
kingdom.
When they visited him in Mina, they said to him, you know people,
they call you Wahhabis. He said, They call us Wahhabis, but we're
not. We're just conservative Muslims that set out to establish
Quran soon. Again, Wadi is irrelevant. My point is, look at
how they define the Saudi idea. They define that as rooted in
somebody to Islam. Bin Salman is saying, No, it's not rooted in
Islam. It's rooted in tribal endeavor. It's rooted in being
surudi, being Arabi, being Islam is sort of a side thing that you
put on the side, and that's where I think that I don't think I think
if Saudi divorces from its Islamic identity, I don't think they'll
have the means to resolve those two existential crises, because
what it will do instead is in a region where Islam remains the
primary idea that the region sympathizes with. And the proof is
that after 90 years of top down secularism in Tunisia. First, free
and fair elections, Islamist parties win Egypt, after all of
those movies and Abdul Nassar laughing at the hijab and that
kind of stuff and whatnot. First, free and fair elections, Islamist
win Libya. The Islamists came second officially, but you count
those 70 independent candidates, Islamic leaning, you know,
individuals, they come first. Wherever you go, whoever says, you
know, I'm holding the flag of Islam, they're the ones who get
supported. I think in a region, that's what you need to tap into
to get the support that you need in order to resolve those
existential crises. And that's what I think. I don't deny that
Vincent man has existential crises. I don't deny that he needs
to move urgently to fix them. I don't deny that there's anything
wrong with economic diversification. I think that his
conclusion that the solution is to divorce the identity from Islam is
what is going to be catastrophic for Saudi Arabia. It's understood
that Israel wants to push the people of Gaza into the Sinai
Desert, or at least they wanted to. They tried during the Trump
era, and they have been speaking openly about it. Now we know Egypt
has $162 billion in debt. There have been suggestions that the US
and Israel would help arrange to have that debt wiped or reduced
somehow. Can you talk to us about Egypt's position in this current
situation and what their interests are? Sisi is aware that if he
opens that border and the Palestinians come rushing through
and they set up in the Sinai desert in refugee camps, he knows
that Israel will never allow them to return to Gaza again. He's also
aware he will go down in history as being considered a collaborator
who helped with the ethnic cleansing of Gaza. Sisi knows that
categorically, he cannot help to facilitate the Palestinians
leaving Gaza. Of course, I say that the stories of the borders
are that if you pay $9,000 to the Egyptians on the border, you can
cross. But that doesn't necessarily mean that Sisi is
telling them to take those bribes. I think it just shows the state of
affairs in Egypt, where you can bypass everything by paying
bribes.
When Blinken went to visit Sisi, if you remember his first visit to
Tel Aviv, and then he was supposed to buy to Washington, and he went
back to Saudi Arabia. And he went to Saudi Arabia, he got the fatwa,
don't talk about Raza, because he's a fitna. He went to UAE, he
got a statement condemning the Palestinians. But when he went to
Egypt, expecting the same sort of response that he got from Saudi in
the UAE, he got the opposite, Sisi turned on the camera and lambasted
Blinken for 45 minutes. Tell him, What do you mean you came to tell
if you said, I'm here as a Jew, we never persecuted the Jews here.
That's something unique to you Europeans. Touche, whatever you
think of CC, was a decent speech.
Not only that, when Blinken suggested that they open the
border and taken the Palestinians, same as shokari, the foreign
minister told the Financial Times reported that same as Shukri had
told someone privately, or told the gathering privately, that if
they force us to take the Palestinians, we'll load the
Palestinians on boats and send them straight to Europe like we're
not. We won't be forced into this. When Blinken went back to
Washington, Blinken seemed to have interpreted as a money issue, and
that's where the rumors came out that the US might forgive some
debt or ease the debt.
In reality, what happened was Biden, on the 20 October proposed
to Congress a $14 billion bill
in which that money would be given to Egypt and Jordan in order to
facilitate funding those tents for the Palestinians. But on the 28th
of October, Biden came out and said, We no longer support the
displacement of the Palestinians. And I thought Biden was lying,
because he lied about the beheaded babies, but John Kirby confirmed
it the next day. The reason being is that CC dug his heels in. He
made absolutely clear, I'm not willing to take in like those
Palestinians and come across the board, cc has a problem in that
he doesn't enjoy popular support. He
has an economic crisis on his hands. And Egypt is boiling, like
the people are boiling. There was a video I think, of an Egyptian
guy walking through a like a hay, like an area, you know, like,
where partner blocks are, and he's saying, Yeah, ay bad, Allah, you
know, like there's a genocide. Take, basically has a right across
the board. And we.
Do anything like them, and everybody's crying around him, you
know, like coming out the windows, like you could feel like people
are very angry. CC's issue is that economically, none of his mega
projects have worked. He did an early election because he knows he
has to devalue the Egyptian pound, which is going to make things even
harder for ordinary Egyptians, but it's a requirement in order to
seek external help for his economy. The interesting thing is,
why did he have to do an early election? If he was completely in
power, he did the early election so that no rival of his can use
the election as a means to topple him later, when he devalues the
pound and the people decide to protest or riot, which shows that
CC believes that election showed that CC believes he's not in
complete control, as he would like to be. So that was a betrayal of
weakness.
Sisi believes that he's being treated unfairly by the Israelis
and the Americans that he did that he helped them to blockade Raza.
He
helped them with intelligence efforts. He helped them to contain
Hamas. He helped them to contain the Palestinian people. He
collaborated and, you know, worked with them on security and the
like. You know, he was a good friend to them. There was a Wall
Street Journal article in 2015 I think I remember where Israeli
officials complained to the Americans, and they said, Sisi is
too eager to squeeze the Palestinians. If he keeps going
the way he is, they're gonna explode. He's gonna bring a wolf
on us. Like, tell Sisi, calm down. Don't be so excited. Like, Mubarak
used to close the board and leave the tunnels. This guy's flooding
the tunnels as well. Like, so like, come on. Like, give him a
bit of air to breathe. We're squeeze in this side. Give him
some
air. I think CC feels like he's not being appreciated by the
Americans or the Israelis, having said that, the interesting thing
is, it has pushed CC to develop closer ties with with hummus,
because that gives him leverage as a mediator to talk to them. And
I think CC is in an awkward position, whereby, when he thought
that maybe Palestine might give him popular legitimacy, remember,
he allowed protest for the first time since 2013 or 2014 he lifted
the restrictions. He was hoping that the people would protest for
Philistine. He knew was a gamble. He was worried that people take to
the streets in huge numbers for Philistine, but then go to Medina,
Tahirih, and they would protest against him instead, which is what
happened. People process for Philistine, and then, like, a
group of them went to Tahirih squared. He went, Okay, okay,
okay. Like it's clear, like the people are not with me. If I allow
that protest for Philistine, they will come and protest against me
instead, and they will topple me instead. And that's why Sisi is in
this very awkward situation whereby he keeps saying, Egyptian
people, be grateful for what you have. Be grateful you're not. Be
great. He went to Somalia next to the Somalian, you know, President
and the Swan Princess, thank you for your cooperation. And in front
of the Somalian president, he tweets to the camera, and he says
to my Egyptian people, I send you a message. Somalia fell into chaos
in 9192 and they've never recovered since. They're always in
Kerala. He's a always thinking like, he's offending the Somalis.
He's like, he goes, Do you want to be like that? He's like, you know
you need to, like, appreciate me. Like, no, no. It's really like
when you really are like, Yo, wow. Like, but Sisi feels isolated from
his people, from the Americans, from the Israelis, from the UAE,
which is bullying him in Sudan. Bin Zayed went to visit the Egypt
three days before, Sudan plunged into war. And
what was fascinating is that none of us could understand why UAE,
why binzaid went to Sisi, because they were arguing over economic
like investments and stuff like
that. And then three days later, the war begins. And the uaes, you
know, UAE backed militia in Sudan. They detained 80 Egyptian soldiers
in Marawi airport in Khartoum, which is humiliating for Sisi, and
everybody knows it's the UAE that have held them hostage to strong
arm Sisi into not intervening to rescue the general who they
support. So Egypt is with the general, and UAE is with the
militia trying to topple the general.
Sisi is in such an awkward position that when the 80 soldiers
were released, the Egyptian statement thanked the UAE, like
thank the UAE which orchestra, but thank the UAE for releasing those
hostages. To show you how Sisi feels like he's not in a position
to mobilize anyway, and that's why I think that to sum up Sisi, it's
not that he cares about Palestinians or like Sisi feels
like I invested so much with Israelis and Americans, and now
look how they're treating me. UAE and Saudi are no longer investing
in me because they invested like, more than 30 billion, like over
the past, like 10 years, they received nothing, and they're
openly saying that they won't invest in me anymore unless the
Army gives up some of his control over the economy. And if I tell
the army to give up some of its control over the economy, they
might lash out at me and replace me. So Sisi looks right, he has
trouble, looks left, he has trouble looks up, he has trouble
looks and he has no idea what to do except go on TV and tell the
Egyptian people, Egyptians, please understand that we're in difficult
position, but you need to appreciate me, because I will
guide you out of this position. And you know, at this moment, he's
only leverage his communications with ramasan and the hope that
somehow he will, even now, the Israelis now they're sending
troops of aid. When it goes into Gaza, it goes past the Egyptian
border, but then it has to be inspected by the Israelis, who are
right on his border with Rafa like it's humiliating for an Egyptian
army that the Israelis are then, you know, on the Egyptian side,
they're the ones controlling the borders. But it also speaks
volumes as to Sisi, his weakness, that he's unable to actually do
anything.
Me having said that he might have a potential outlet the Erdogan,
there's reports that he might meet Sisi
and that Turkey and Egypt might cooperate together on economic
projects or the like. And Erdogan is reaching out to CC to say, I
know you're isolated as well. Maybe we can work together on
multiple projects where that goes who knows? But yeah, Sisi is is in
a very difficult position. Sounds like all of the leaders are, with
the exception maybe of MBs, he has maybe some more creative freedom
too. But on that point, they're all in a difficult position. That
doesn't mean they don't have the power to do anything. I truly
believe that if Saudis said tomorrow that as a result of
30,000 Palestinians being killed through a genocide, that's a red
line. There's no normalization talks here.
And if UAE said Abraham accords was never facilitate 30,000
Palestinian kill, we're kicking out the Israeli ambassador and
reversing normalization of ties. And if Morocco comes out and it
says You haven't even delivered on Western Sahara, so the
normalization was useless anyway, and you've killed 30,000 palaces.
Red Line, we're kicking out Israeli ambassador. I think the
Americans tomorrow would rush to Tel Aviv and say, Stop it. You're
about to undo the deals of the century. I truly believe that's
why, when people say, we they want Muslim countries to go to war,
they don't need to. They don't need to send armies. They have the
ability, without armies, to stop the genocide, but they choose not
to. They choose not to. That's why there are people who are
suggesting, you know that. You know maybe normalization in
exchange for enter genocide. The reason I don't accept the argument
is because that argument should only be considered when we've
already used the powers that are at our disposal, the Muslim
leaders heaven. And it's not because they don't have it. It's
not because they're worried about using it. It's because genuinely
they don't want to. Bin Salman has no inclination to. It's not
because he's worried about the backlash. He doesn't want to use
it. UAE is not worried about a backlash. If UAE reverses
normalization tomorrow, there won't be a backlash. There will be
a begging tour from us, delegation to UAE say, Please, please,
please, reverse course, the same way that Biden sent the highest
level delegation to the funeral of Muhammad bin Zayed, his brother
who died the former president Khalifa bin Zayed. I think
he sent the Vice President, his chief in the Congress, he sent the
head of CIA, he sent defense secretary, he sent Blinken. He
sent all that to say to bin Zayed, I'm sorry, please, let's reset
ties. So when the suggestion that maybe you made, you didn't intend
to make it, but when the suggestion is that the Muslim
leaders could move but they're worried about the consequences, my
issue is the Muslim leaders have tools at their disposal that they
could use without the consequences that they fear, but they're
choosing not to do so because they are in the Zionist camp. They are
choosing not to do so because they standing willingly, proactively
with the Israelis. Because it's not because they see as a short
term they see their future with the Israelis. They see themselves
as New Age visionaries that moves beyond Islam and beyond Islamic
issues to an age in which the only thing that matters to an
individual is a nine to five job, salary in his pocket and
entertainment in the night time. They believe that's the pinnacle
of man. When the UAE opposes the Arab Spring. It's not opposing the
Arab Spring because you know, it says you know, the people you know
shouldn't have freedom, or, like the UAE, says that the people
don't want democracy. They don't want to choose their leaders.
You're mistaken. What people want is economic prosperity, and that's
where Ben Ali failed. That's where Mubarak failed. Let me build them
Abu Dhabi and Dubai and see they won't ask me for freedom. They'll
be willing to live like sheep that go to work and be entertained and
go home. You keep telling about rights, these people don't want
rights. They just want money. And that's the vision, even vision
2030 what is vision 2030 it's entertainment. It's it's concerts.
It's the idea of having to drop money in your pocket and going to
entertainment. And that's the pinnacle of life. Nothing beyond
that, you know, very and that's the issue that I have, is that if
they were trying to do something, but they were worried about the
consequences, maybe Erdogan, slightly maybe has that. But even
then, like, there are things you could do that perhaps he shouldn't
have, that he should have done. But I think it's humiliating that
the Israelis had to withdraw the ambassador, rather than him
kicking out the ambassador. But the point is, they have power to
do something without the consequences that you're
suggesting they might suffer, but they choose not to do so, and
that's why you cannot tell the story of the genocide without
talking about the phenomenal betrayal of the Arab leaders,
which is so outrageous, especially when you consider the lens that
they went to, including deploying the Imams of the state to come out
and find Islamic rulings to say, don't talk about Gaza because it's
fitna. Make dua. Maybe add tears for added effect, but don't talk
about it because it might turn you against your leader. And you
should trust that your leader knows what they're doing, even if
they bring Shakira to dance or the night of the grand invasion. It's
not the leaders are worried about the consequences. They're choosing
not to do anything about the genocide. Trust nothing, no laws
for your mind, everything is propaganda. Everything is
propaganda. Everything is propaganda. So
why not choose your own words?