Hamza Tzortzis – Andrew Huberman’s False Assumption About Consciousness

			Bismillah R Rahman r Rahim in Alhamdulillah wa Salatu was Salam ala Rasulillah Salam alaykum
Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh brothers and sisters and friends, may the peace and blessings of Allah be
upon every single one of you.
		

			In this video, I'm going to be responding to Dr. Andrew who Berman's force physicalist assumption,
he believes the terms brain and mind can be used interchangeably. And he believes the brain and the
mind are the same thing. Now, this is not neuroscience, this is philosophy. This is metaphysics.
Because to adopt such a position, you have to adopt a philosophical approach to the mind to the
brain. And that philosophical approach is known as physicalism. So he's adopting a physicalist
assumption. And I would argue it's a false assumption, because physicalism cannot adequately explain
the brain in the mind. And I'm gonna explain that in a few moments. Now, by the way, physicalism is
		

			the approach to the mind or the philosophy of the mind, or even the brain that basically argues that
consciousness can be reduced to or is identical to, in some way to physical processes or physical
stuff. But before I unpack the purpose of this video, let's introduce Dr. Andrew Huberman. Dr.
Andrew Huberman is a popular American neuroscientist and tenured associate professor in the
Department of neurobiology and psychiatry, and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University School of
Medicine. He has a very popular YouTube channel, Huberman lab, where he provides interesting
insights on the brain, neuroscience and behavior. So he said during a video the following words,
		

			yeah, so the brain and nervous system, which so it's like brain spinal cord connections with the
body and Baqi and I don't distinguish between brain and mind, I think that's like an 80s discussion,
were earlier. And I think it would take us down the wrong track. So brain or mind to me is
interchangeable. Now the purpose of this video is to respond to such a claim and to respond to those
words, and to also express to you that he's adopting a false physicalist assumption, a metaphysical
assumption, a philosophical assumption. This is not neuroscience.
		

			Yes, he's a neuroscientist, but neuroscience and neuroscientists, they have to adopt a particular
philosophical and metaphysical assumption, in order for the domain of knowledge known as
neuroscience to progress and grow. And just like with most domains of knowledge, you have to adopt
certain philosophical assumptions. And I want to unpack that. I also feel it's very important to
unpack Huberman assumption for the following reasons. Number one, neuroscience is not metaphysically
innocent, meaning it is not free from philosophical assumptions. Number two, a key aspect of the
mind includes inner subjective conscious experience. And in the language of neuroscience, this is
		

			referred to as qualia.
		

			And this also includes the hard problem of consciousness. And the hard problem of consciousness,
which we're going to unpack cannot be answered by neurobiological investigation. Number three, and
this is very important. Popular scientists or academics, just like Dr. Huberman provide a great
service to the viewers and followers. However, their popularity may blind people to the false
philosophical assumptions that may promote an atheistic or materialistic discourse. So in the
context of today's video, the main key objective is to show that humans assertion that the mind and
the brain are the same, which is held by many neuroscientists and atheists, is based on the false
		

			assumption that neuroscience can fully and adequately explain the mind in the brain. However,
neuroscience is based on the philosophical assumption known as physicalism. So given that
neuroscience adopts physicalism, Huberman will have to demonstrate that physicalism is true in order
for his claim to be coherent. However, Huberman cannot do this by engaging in neurobiological
investigation, because neuroscience is based on the assumption of physicalism. So to argue that
neuroscience can prove physicalism is like a dog trying to catch his tail. Because in order for
neuroscience to work, he has to assume physicalism to be true. Neuroscience cannot prove its own
		

			assumptions. So what Huberman needs to do is not refer to neuroscience, but to undergo philosophical
investigation or metaphysical inquiry in order to try and explain to us why his assertion is
actually true because he's assertion is based on a physicalist assumption. So here is a summary of
my points and I'm going to unpack them in the next few minutes. God willing inshallah I
		

			Want to show that Huberman seems to commit the causation correlation fallacy is a logical fallacy.
It's an error in reasoning. Due to the conflation between correlation and causation. I also want to
provide a useful analogy to explain how two different things can be different. Yet they're connected
in some way, just like the brain and the mind, consciousness and the mind, they're connected. But
they can also be distinct and different, I want to provide an analogy. To get you to understand
this, I also want to explain to you that the mind includes inner subjective conscious experience.
And this also includes the hard problem of consciousness. And I want to explain how the hard problem
		

			of consciousness cannot be explained by neuroscience and cannot be explained by the assumption of
neuroscience, which is physicalism. physicalism is not an adequate philosophical approach to the
mind to explain or to answer the two key questions that the hard problem of consciousness brings to
the table. And therefore, I want you to understand that, in order for humans claim to be true, he
would have to show that physicalism is an adequate philosophical explanation for the brain and the
mind. And finally, I'm going to briefly show why physicalism fails to address the hard problem of
consciousness. And in future videos, I'm going to unpack the various conceptions of physicalism on
		

			this channel, God willing, insha Allah. So let's explain why Huberman seems to commit the error in
reasoning, the logical fallacy known as the correlation causation fallacy. Now, it is well
established that if you do anything to the brain, it's going to affect your consciousness. No one is
denying this. Now, neuroscience as a domain of knowledge is essentially generally speaking, a
science of correlations is the study of correlations. They investigate neurobiological activity, and
they correlate it to states of consciousness, and behavior. Now, this doesn't mean the brain is the
same thing as consciousness, just because there is a correlation between the brain and
		

			consciousness, or the brain and behavior to claim such a thing will be committing the error in
reasoning, the logical fallacy known as the correlation causation fallacy, and this fallacy is when
two things seem to be correlated, then one of them must cause the other. Now, this is not true. Now,
let me give you a helpful analogy to understand just because two things may be correlated, that it
doesn't mean that they are the same.
		

			So just to reiterate, no one is denying that the physical brain and consciousness are related or
connected in some way. But it's just a relationship, the brain and consciousness are not necessarily
the same thing. And take the following analogy into consideration.
		

			Take for example, the car and the driver. So the car can represent the brain and the driver can
represent consciousness. Now we know if the car is broken,
		

			the human being the driver won't be able to move the car anywhere.
		

			And likewise, if the human being is dead, or not functioning, but the car is okay, and it's
functioning and it's able to move, the car won't be able to move anyway, either. So we know they
both need each other or they are connected in some way. But we know they are distinct. They're not
the same thing. And this is more in line with our kind of philosophical and metaphysical intuition.
And this is very important for us to understand. And this is a very helpful, useful analogy, because
in Huberman philosophical worldview, the car and the human being on the same thing, and you could
use them interchangeably. So let's now talk about the brain and the mind. So Huberman asserts that
		

			the brain and the mind are the same thing. And they can be used interchangeably. Now, what he's
ignoring here or he's not bringing to the table is the mind with regards to inner subjective
conscious experiences. And inner subjective conscious experiences is also related to this concept
known as the hard problem of consciousness. Now, the hard problem of consciousness is really
concerned with the nature and the source of our conscious experiences. And this is also referred to
as phenomenal experience. So in a subjective conscious experience is also referred to in academia as
phenomenal experience. So the hard problem of consciousness presents two key questions. Number one,
		

			what is it like for a particular organism or a human being, to have an inner subjective conscious
experience? And number two, why and how do these inner subjective conscious experiences arise from
seemingly cold blind non conscious physical processes? So that these are two key questions. The
first question is of an epistemic nature is about knowledge. The second question is an ontological
question. It's about the soul
		

			have an inner subjective, conscious experiences. So let me give you an example. Imagine on a Sunday
morning, I have a hot chocolate. When I'm having a hot chocolate, I'm having an inner subjective
conscious experience. So with regards to the first question we can ask, what is it like for Hamza to
have a hot chocolate on a Sunday morning? That's a valid question. So if we were to map out
everything in my brain, and understand all the neurobiological processes and all the neurochemical
activity, and correlate to my experience of having a hot chocolate and Sunday morning, it doesn't
follow that you now just by looking at this neurochemical firing, that you now know what it's like
		

			for me to have an inner subjective conscious experience, in this case. Now you know what it's like
for me to have a hot chocolate Sunday morning, you just don't know because you're not experiencing
what I'm experiencing. You're not me. You just have these neurochemical firings, you have this
neurobiological activity.
		

			So there is an epistemic gap if you like there is a knowledge gap. With regards to my inner
subjective conscious experience, you don't know what it's like for me to have that particular
experience. Now, you may argue, well, Hamza, you could describe it. You could say things like hot,
creamy, sweet, of course I can. But remember, words are vehicles to meaning and meaning is
essentially an expression, or a linguistic expression of my inner subjective conscious experience,
which you're not experiencing, I'm experiencing it. So just because I'm saying creamy, and you know
what creamy means for you, and you have correlated to your particular experiences of what it means
		

			to be creamy. It doesn't necessarily follow that those two terms are the same thing with regard to
our subjectivity. Our subjective experience is connected to those terms. We can also ask, How does
Hamza have an inner subjective conscious experience from having a hot chocolate in a Sunday morning,
and that experience that subjectivity that inner subjective conscious experience arises from cold,
non conscious physical processes? How and why does that happen?
		

			Because if you think about physicalism, as an approach to the philosophy of the mind, physicalism
doesn't say that physical processes are conscious. Because if you study physicalism, physical
processes and physical stuff, are blind and unconscious, meaning there is no intentional force
directing these physical processes anywhere. And these physical processes are not aware of
themselves, or aware of anything outside of themselves. And they're not about or of something. In
other words, they don't have intentionality.
		

			So how can inner subjective conscious experience which seems to have some kind of intentional force
seems to have some form of aboutness? Right, our conscious experiences about something or have
something? How can that arise from physical processes that are blind and cold, non conscious, and
they don't have any intentionality they're not about or have something.
		

			So, from this perspective, we see that the hard problem of consciousness is indeed a hard problem.
And this has been summarized and articulated by neuroscientists and philosophers of the mind. For
example, Professor David Chalmers, he says, the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem
of experience, when we think and perceive there is a wheel of information processing, but there is
also a subjective aspect, what unites all these states is that there is something it is like to be
in them, all of them are states of experience. If any problem qualifies as the problem of
consciousness, it is this one, in this central sense of consciousness and organism and a mental
		

			state is conscious, if there is something it is like to be in that state. Also, you have Professor
Torian altar, he says, How does my brains activity generate those experiences? Why those are not
others? Indeed, why is any physical event accompanied by conscious experience? The set of such
problems is known as the hard problem of consciousness. Even after all the associated functions and
abilities are explained. One might reasonably wonder why there is something it is like to see
letters appear on the computer screen.
		

			And even neuroscientists are starting to agree with this. And they agree with this, many of them.
For example, the neuroscientist Daniel ball, he states the following with regards to the hard
problem of consciousness and he essentially saying the hard problem is unresolved.
		

			There are lots of hard problems in the world, but only one gets to quote itself the hard problem.
That is the problem of consciousness, how 1300 grams or so have no
		

			of cells conjures up the seamless kaleidoscope of sensations, thoughts, memories and emotions that
occupy every waking moment, the hard problem remains unresolved. Now before we discuss how
physicalism fails to address the hard problem of consciousness, we have to summarize that actually
neuroscience has a metaphysical assumption and a philosophical assumption known as physicalism. So
take for instance, what philosopher and psychologist Ricardo min zoete and Professor of Psychology,
Paulo, moderato say, with regards to the neurosciences, they argue that they are not metaphysically
innocent. And they say and this is very important, empirical data needs to be interpreted from the
		

			perspective of some premise. And that's why there's no point giving you the different variations of
the empirical and your neurobiological studies and approaches that tried to explain consciousness in
the mind and the brain is kind of irrelevant. Why? Because all of them are based on a premise on a
philosophical premise of physicalism. And if you could show physicalism is not true, or it's not
adequate, then it's irrelevant, or it's neither here or there with regards to discussing the kind
of, you know, scientific nuances of these empirical approaches or these neurobiological
investigations concerning the brain and the mind. Also concerning this, you have Professor ante
		

			Ronseal, he makes an interesting point, he says, however, it is useful also for empirical scientists
to be aware of the different philosophical alternatives, because every empirical theory also
necessarily involves some sort of implicit philosophical commitments. The overall empirical approach
that a scientist takes to consciousness is guided by his prior philosophical commitments or
intuitions about the nature of science and the nature of consciousness, whether he is aware of such
commitments or not. Also, you have the Professor of Philosophy Rex Wilson, he posits that
neurosciences explanation of consciousness is based on assumption, that inner subjective conscious
		

			experience can be reduced to neurobiology.
		

			So what is this assumption? What is this premise? In a nutshell, it's physicalism. And just to
repeat physicalism, generally speaking, is the philosophical approach to consciousness, the brain,
the mind, that basically says that consciousness and the mind can be reduced to, in some way, or
identical to in some way to physical processes, or physical stuff. Now, before I provide some
general arguments, why physicalism is false. Let's explain, again, why neuroscience on its own fails
to actually understand the mind with regard to the hard problem of consciousness. I remember,
neuroscience is mainly a study of correlations. But these correlations cannot tell us what it's like
		

			for a particular conscious organism or person to have a specific inner subjective conscious
experience. Remember, if we were to map out all the neural chemistry in the brain, or the
neurochemical firings or the neurobiological activity, it will not follow that we know what that
particular person is experiencing what that particular person's inner subjective conscious state is
and what it's like to be in that state.
		

			It's very clear, this is a logical issue here, right? You may have all the neuro chemistry mapped
out. And you can correlate to someone's inner subjective conscious experience. But just because you
have the neuro chemistry mapped out, it doesn't follow, you now know what it's like for that person
to have that inner subjective conscious experience.
		

			Even if they were to express it in words like I'm hot, or this tastes creamy, or this is sweet. It
still doesn't follow you now know what it's like for that person to have that inner subjective
conscious experience. Why? Because words are vehicles to meaning and meaning is a representation of
that subjectivity. But you don't know what that subjectivity is. You may have your own subjectivity
or your own inner subjective, conscious experiences with regards to words like creamy and hot and
sweet, but it doesn't necessarily follow that they are the same experience. So just like what
Professor Thomas Nagel argued in his famous essay in the 1970s, concerning what it is like to be a
		

			bat, he basically argues that we cannot explain inner subjective conscious experiences with the
third person, language of science, because inner subjective conscious experiences the first person
fact and it has first person language, and you can't explain that with the third person language of
science. Now, it's important to know that just because neuroscience has been relatively successful,
and we appreciate this and we respect the neuroscientists, and we accept many of their findings and
the discoveries and
		

			We appreciate that it's helping us improve our lives and Dr. Andrew Huberman is one of them, right?
		

			But just because of the successes of neuroscience, it doesn't now mean we have to blindly adopt a
metaphysical assumption, the metaphysical assumption of physicalism. And we can't now say that now,
neuroscience with this false assumption, or this inadequate assumption, has to be the starting point
with regards to a full explanation of the brain in the mind. And this is interesting because Manzo,
to moderato. They basically postulate that despite neurosciences aim of explaining the nervous
system and how it works, it doesn't logically follow that the hard problem of consciousness is going
to be addressed. And what they maintain is that neuroscience must show how inner subjective
		

			conscious experience is linked to neurobiological processes in an adequate way. And it should not be
used as an unquestioned starting point. And to make the claim that Dr. Andrew Huberman does, the
brain in the mind is the same thing that the same thing. And to make the claim that neuroscience
with its philosophical baggage is the starting point is the unquestioned starting point is basically
neuro mania. And interestingly, philosopher, he's an atheist, by the way, philosopher, Raman Tallis,
he actually articulates this very well. He says, if we could obtain a complete record of all neural
activity, and we were able to see the firing state of every individual neuron, would this advance
		

			our understanding in the slightest, for this to be the case, one thing at least would be necessary,
we would have to be sure that neural activity we observed was in some strict sense identical with
consciousness, we need to move on from the technical limits, and methodological muddles of scan
based cognitive neuroscience to the conceptual indeed philosophical problems neuro mania ignores,
and Mendota and Madras to actually argue this point very well, they summarize this point very well.
They say there is a big difference between the experimental validity of neuroscientific research as
such, and the unwarranted mental ontology it conveys. So let me summarize why physicalism failed
		

			with regards to the hard problem of consciousness, which is related to the idea of the mind. And
there are two things I want to articulate. The first one is
		

			under physicalism physical processes, and I mentioned this before, but it's important to retreat.
physical processes or bits of metaphysical stuff are blind and unconscious, meaning there is no
intentional force directing them anywhere. They're not aware of themselves and not aware of anything
outside of themselves. They are not about or of something. In other words, they don't have
intentionality.
		

			So how can we claim the inner subjective conscious experience, which seems to be intentional,
meaning it has intentionality, it's about something our consciousness is of or about something. And
there seems to be an intentional force with regards to our conscious experience, right? How can that
arise from seemingly cold blind, non conscious physical processes to claim that inner subjective
conscious experiences arise from Blind non conscious, physical stuff of physical processes of
physical phenomena, is like saying if someone picks up a cold life, the stone and rubs it for half
an hour, you're gonna have butterflies emerging. But we know from a cold, lifeless, nonconscious
		

			stone, you're not going to have butterflies emerging, no matter how much you rub it. So from this
perspective, physicalism fails as an adequate philosophical or metaphysical explanation for the hard
problem of consciousness. Another reason why physicalism fails. And we've mentioned this before, but
it's important to reiterate this is that if you think about physicalism, and many conceptions of
physicalism, many of them basically argue that the more we know about the brain and the related
physical processes, and even the kind of complex causal connections, we will eventually know what
it's like for a specific conscious organism or a human being, to have an inner subjective conscious
		

			experience, but it is totally false. We've already mentioned this, if you get a human being who has
had an inner subjective conscious experience, and you map out their brain, you map out all the new
chemical activity, the neurobiological activity, that electrochemical activity, and you correlate it
to that specific experience. How does that now follow we know what it's like for that human being to
have that specific inner subjective conscious experience. We will not know at all, even if they
express it in words, even if they articulate it in words. Remember, words are vehicles to meaning
and meaning is a representation of that subjectivity but we haven't experienced their subjectivity
		

			their inner subjective consciousness
		

			appearance. Now, what many forms of physicalism may have to do is to deny the fact that we have
inner subjective conscious experiences. But with all due respect, that is denying what makes us
human and is denying a first person fact. So here's a smackdown argument concerning Dr. hoomans
physicalist. Assumption number one, neuroscience assumes physicalism to be true. Number two
physicalism cannot address the hard problem of consciousness. Number three, therefore, neuroscience
cannot address the hard problem of consciousness. Therefore, you cannot say the brain and the mind
are the same thing. Just because you claim to understand the brain. And to say that they are the
		

			same thing. And you could use these words interchangeably. You are ignoring the hard problem of
consciousness, or you're firstly, assuming that the brain or neuroscience can explain the hard
problem of consciousness. And we know that is not the case because neuroscience assumes physicalism
to be true, which is the metaphysical thesis is a philosophical assumption. And we've shown that
philosophical assumption is not adequate in explaining in a subjective conscious experience with
regards to the hard problem of consciousness. So let's conclude. Dr. Andrew Huberman has claimed
that the mind and the brain are the same, will require Huberman to show that physicalism is true.
		

			Yet this requires philosophical investigation, and not neuroscientific exploration. Remember,
neuroscience is based on this philosophical assumption of physicalism. So whoever needs to be clear
about the philosophical baggage that he is carrying, and he needs to justify the false philosophical
assumption of physicalism. Because he makes the claim that the brain and the mind are the same. But
the mind also refers to inner subjective conscious experience. And inner subjective conscious
experience can also relate to the hard problem of consciousness, and physicalism cannot address that
adequately. So he needs to show how that could be the case if he really believes that neuroscience
		

			solves this problem, or he believes that the brain and the mind can be used interchangeably and that
the same thing, but he can't do such a thing, because physicalism is one of his assumptions behind
that assertion and physicalism cannot adequately explain, in a subjective conscious experiences
cannot answer the two key problems of the hard problem of consciousness. And that's why it'd be very
hard for Dr. Huberman to even try to do this because we already explained why physicalism fails to
address the hard problem of consciousness. And since neuroscience is based on a physicalist
assumption. Therefore, neuroscience also fails to explain the brain and the mind therefore, Dr.
		

			Huberman should not and cannot make the claim that the brain and the mind are the same thing and
they can be used interchangeably. Now, I know in the philosophy of the mind, because I did this for
my postgrad. I did it for my dissertation. With regards to consciousness and related topics. There's
lots of nuances and academic nuances. So this is just like a kind of summary. And in future videos,
I'm going to be unpacking various physicalist conceptions with regards to the mind and the brain.
And we could unpack the kind of academic nuances in these future videos, God willing, insha Allah
but for now, thank you very much for listening and watching and Allah bless every single one of you
		

			as Salaam Alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh