Dilly Hussain – The reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II Sheffield Hallam Uni
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My dear brothers and sisters and friends.
Look.
Let me begin by thanking Sheffield Hallam University's
Islamic Society for inviting me today,
to discuss,
briefly the life of a very important
figure in Islamic history, and that is Khalif
or Sultan Abdul Hamid the second Rahim Allah.
I'll be using the title Khalif and Sultan
interchangeably,
and I won't go into the semantics of
the difference between the two terms, but, essentially,
they mean the same thing.
When you look at Ottoman history
and you look at
Islamic societies and Masajid, the Muslim organizations, when
they talk about Ottoman history,
they nearly always only speak about 2 leaders.
Yeah?
Considering it's the dynasty that,
ruled large swathes of the Muslim world for,
like, over 600 years, held the seat of
the caliphate
for over 400 years. But We nearly only
speak about 2 rulers.
Sultan Fatih, who conquered
Constantinople in 14/53,
and Khalif Abdulhamid
And
that's 2 out of potentially, I think, 40
rulers.
And that's because
the life of Khalif Abdul Hamid
has a massive significance
in the world we live in today.
In
many parts of the world where our parents
originate from, whether that be from the Maghreb
in North Africa, or the Arab world, or
even the India subcontinent.
Many of the political realities
in those existing regions right now
has something or another to do with the
many challenges that Khalif Abdul Hamid
faced during his reign.
Of all the Ottoman rulers,
Khalif Abdul Hamid is the only one that
has an entire period named after him by
both Muslim
and non Muslim European historians. It's called the
Hamidian period.
You don't get that with any other ruler
in in the Ottoman dynasty, yet he
has an entire historical period named after him
in literature, the Hamidian period.
There is no justice that I can even
remotely give
in terms of real depth about his reign
in the space of 30 to 40 minutes.
Or even if this was a whole day
course,
I would not be able to give
any serious justice to the depth
of his life, his reign, his struggles, and
the many things
which he experienced during his 33
year rule.
So what I decided to do today
is to go over
a chronological overview
of the main events in his life. So
you all should have a handout of a
timeline
and go over some of these events, briefly
discuss why they're significant to his reign, and
conclude
with
the lessons that we can extrapolate from his
reign and his life
as to what it means
for us as Muslims
in 2019.
Khalif Abdul Hamid or
He was the 34th
Sultan
and the 25th Khalifa
of the Ottoman dynasty.
That's because the first 8 Ottoman rulers
were not caliphs.
From Sultan Salim Yoavaz onward, 9th Sultan onwards,
they were Khalifa and they were Sultans.
And he ruled for 33 years.
One of the longest ruling Ottoman rulers
in history.
Right? And so therefore, many many things happened
in his life. Right?
And essentially,
he was the last
not Ottoman ruler.
He was perhaps the last Islamic Muslim ruler
to have real independent
legislative
and executive authority over the domains he controlled.
After Khalif Abdul Hamid,
whether it be within the Ottoman domains or
beyond,
no Muslim ruler
had the authority, the independent authority,
which Khalif Abdulhamid yielded during his reign.
Again, another important factor, which we will look
into later on in the talk.
Now Khalif Abdul Hamid came into power
in 18/76.
And one of the very first things he
oversaw
was the implementation
of the first Ottoman constitution.
Now the First Ottoman Constitution
was a set of liberal and modern reforms
that were born out of the Tanzimat period.
The Tanzimat
period began around 18/39.
In short,
this was a set of
reforms and a movement
that sought to emulate,
certain aspects actually, not even certain aspects, major
aspects of,
surrounding European powers,
in in an effort to modernize the Ottoman
state so it could survive
at a time where it was declining
economically,
politically,
militarily.
But the issue with the Tanzimat
reforms
was that many of the reforms was based
on secular liberal epistemology
and philosophy.
That
it essentially was focused around emulating and mirroring
the neighboring European powers
and how they sought to
modernize
and and and survive in the era that
they were respectively in, and that that would
somehow grant the Ottoman state longevity
for it to be a contemporary and competing
power with the surrounding European powers. So that
Tanzimat movement,
was is what essentially led to the first
Ottoman constitution
of 1876.
There's also
a misunderstanding,
I would say, that those who pushed for
the Tanzimat reforms were all Western European ages.
That's not true. Right?
To begin with,
those who wanted these modernization
reforms
had the interest
of the Ottoman state at heart.
Right? Irrelevant of where they sought those answers
and solutions from,
their intentions was that they wanted the Ottoman
Empire and the Ottoman state to survive
and to be strong,
and they couldn't find answers anywhere else except
for in Europe. Right? And, sadly, many of
those reforms
went against fundamental basics and principles of Islam.
Right?
So, anyway, 18/76,
the first Ottoman constitution,
which then meant that there was now a
parliament.
The Ottoman state was a constitutional monarchy. Right?
I don't like using that term because these
terms
have,
have their meanings and the definition in European
Christian
language and political paradigms. But nevertheless,
that's what it was. Right? The Ottoman state
in 18/76 had a constitution. It had a
parliament,
and it had the head of state who
was Khalifa Abdul Hamid. And for laws to
get passed through, it had to go through
parliament and then kind of signed off by
the Khalif Abdul Hamid. Alright.
Khalif Abdul Hamid also inherited a state
which had major
debt.
He inherited a state
which was under constant threat in all frontiers.
He inherited a state which
had kind of lost its identity and had
lost its way,
and it was constant its its sovereignty was
constantly encroached upon by neighboring European powers,
namely
Russia
and, to a lesser degree, Britain and France,
who were constantly seeking opportunities when that opportunity
arose
to either wage war against the Ottoman state
or
to agitate,
fund, or arm
separatist rebellions
within
the Ottoman state, namely in the Balkan areas.
Right?
This was the context in which Khalifa bin
Hamid came to power. This is what he
inherited.
In 18/77,
Russia declared war
on the Ottomans.
It was an unprovoked war,
and
it was basically to just take advantage at
a weakening state.
From around
early 18 thirties,
there were no expansionist military campaigns from the
Ottomans.
The Ottomans essentially always fought defensively.
Right. There were no,
you know, wars or battles or campaigns to
extend the frontiers and the domains of the
Ottoman state. It was nearly always defensive.
And so when the Russians declared war against
the Ottomans in 18/77,
they were swiftly defeated, the Ottomans, sadly.
And in 18/78,
we saw
the Treaty of San Stefano.
Now the Treaty of San Stefano,
it was a very harsh
treaty,
which resulted in the loss
of,
Romania,
Serbia, and Montenegro. Those countries,
or those lands that were formerly Ottoman provinces,
they were they became independent.
Parts of Armenia was given to Russia, and
there were major reparations,
war reparations.
And these reparations came with interest. It was
a very harsh set of treaties.
Right?
So
looking at that,
the Treaty of San Stefano,
other European powers intervened
to ease
some of these,
clauses
of Stefano. So Britain, France, Germany, and Italy,
they intervened.
I don't want anyone to think that they
intervened
to genuinely and sincerely help the Ottomans. They
did it to prevent Russian rapid Russian advancements
in the Balkans and the Far East. So
it was in their benefit
to prevent
and change some of these clauses in Stefano,
the Treaty of Stefano,
so they could counter Russia. So they had
the
they had the Congress of Berlin in 18/78.
And in that congress,
the other European powers basically told Russia, look.
Take it easy on the Ottomans.
They're a weak and crumbling state,
and they collectively put pressure on Russia,
whilst obviously looking at their own colonial interests
at the same time.
But what happened in the congress of Berlin
was the likes of Britain and France also
sought to capitalize on the weakness of the
Ottomans. So Cyprus
was subsequently
kind of sold off to the to to
the Brits for easing off,
the conditions of the Treaty of Stefano.
We saw in 18/81,
France occupied Tunisia. We see in 18/82, Britain
enter Egypt
and Sudan under the premise that the Ottomans
could not, maintain law and order, and they
stayed there. We saw in 18/90 to 18/93,
the Armenian uprisings.
So I wanna just comment something on the
Armenian uprisings. For those of you
who know a bit about Ottoman history,
or even if you follow current affairs, you
know that the Armenian genocide or what's understood
to be the Armenian genocide is something that's
regularly
it's it's an accusation that's,
levied against,
the Ottomans historically and even the modern Turkish
state.
There were 2 incidents,
which fall under what is known or regarded
as the Armenian genocide. It was the uprisings
of 18 90 to 18 93, which was
quelled by Khalifa Abdulhamid.
And then there was,
the exile,
during World War 1
under the leadership of the 3 Pashas. Yeah.
After Khalifa Abdulhamid,
no Khalifa, no Sultan
really had any influence or proper control of
the Ottoman state. It was essentially run by
a group called the Young Turks and then
later these 3 individuals called the 3 Pashas.
But the point I wanna make here about
the or what's understood,
as the Armenian genocide, brothers and sisters, is
that this
is a
it's a claim. It's an accusation that's levied
against the Ottomans
by Europeans who at the time were create
were carrying out industrial
scale massacres
all around the
world,
where indigenous people were being wiped out in
their millions,
in Australia,
in Congo,
in South America,
in North America.
Yet the same European powers politicized and weaponized
the uprisings, the Armenian uprisings
to basically make Khalifa Bulhamid look like a
regressive tyrant.
It also needs to be noted
that the Armenians were citizens of the Ottoman
state.
They were tax paying citizens of the Ottoman
state and had been for centuries.
They were offered the security and the stability.
Their property was looked after.
Right? Their religion was preserved by the Ottomans.
They were citizens of that state.
So when
evidence surfaced
of collusion and collaboration with the enemies of
the state, then it now needs to be
understood from the perspective of treason.
Alright.
And Europe at the time used the Armenian
issue like they did with other issues
to present to the rest of the the
continent that Khalif Abdulhamid
was a backward, regressive,
bloodthirsty tyrant.
When all Khalif Abd al Hamid was doing
was dealing with an internal issue
of potentially treason. And he quelled the uprisings,
because he saw it as
there were Armenian revolutionaries that were collaborating with
Russia,
a country that they were at war with.
In 18/97,
we saw the loss of Crete
after the Ottomans defeated Greece.
The Ottomans defeated Greece,
but they lost Crete. They lost Crete because
the European powers collectively decided that it wouldn't
be fair demographically to have an Ottoman ruler
over Crete. It made more sense to have
a Greek prince. So they've defeated the Greeks
but had to give Crete up.
We also saw
Bulgaria joining Eastern Rumelia,
an independent autonomous province.
And with all these things happening,
with the loss of large swathes of lands,
right, and essentially bullying
from all the European powers, that pushed Khalif
Abdul Hamid, the Ottoman state, to gravitate towards
Germany
as a European ally.
And so we saw
in 18,
99, the commissioning of the Berlin Baghdad railway.
This was a railway which would was basically
gonna go from Istanbul
to Syria to Baghdad.
It was commissioned, it was funded, and it
was built by German engineers.
We also saw
after
the,
you know, the gravitation towards Germany,
German senior military personnel and financial advisers
taken a more greater hands on role in
Ottoman state affairs
to modernize them, to reform the army.
Because according to Khalif Abdur Hamid,
these issues weren't
to do with religion, philosophy, epistemology, morals, or
values.
Right? And he's correcting this. To modernize an
army has very little to do with,
your understanding of man life and universe.
Right? You're modernizing an army. And if there's
another empire, another country that has a better
army and they're willing to share that experience
and to help modernize that, then that's not
a problem. And the same with economic fiscal
policies
that they had German advisers come on board
and basically tell them how to better manage
their financial affairs.
What Khalifa Abdulhamid did have a problem with
was taking
social values and morals
from the Europeans,
which he felt
were in contradiction to Islam.
And his predecessors
from the 9 early 19th century onwards, for
whatever reasons, most of which were sincere,
was simply seeking answers
to a state
which was essentially in decline.
Right?
But perhaps one of the biggest achievements
of Khalif Abdulhamid's life
was the establishment of the building of the
Hejaz Railway.
The Hejaz Railway,
which was it started building in 1900 and
it reached Madinah in 190 8.
It was a huge
symbol
of what Khalif Abdul Hamid
represented as a ruler.
Now many European historians would say that, oh,
it was just like any other railway line.
It was just a means of transportation to
move resources, military resources, and things from one
part of the empire to another part of
the empire. But this is untrue.
Khalifa Abdul Hamid
what he wanted to do with the Hejaz
Railway,
he understood
that the Balkans was fracturing.
He understood that parts of North Africa
were being occupied by the Europeans, but the
lands which still remained strongly under
Ottoman control
were the heartlands of historic
Islam, Asham,
Makkah Madinah.
And he wanted
to strengthen
the ties between these regions, as well as
increasing revenue and commerce in these respective areas,
as well as making life easier for the
pilgrims when they were traveling
to make Hajj, because many many of the
Hujjaj were dying
because of the perilous journey from wherever they
were coming from, from part of the the
state.
And
as I would mention later,
the Hijaz railway
was a great symbol of the pan Islamic
mindset of Khalif Abdul Hamid.
That when he realized that he wasn't getting
the assistance and the answer, well, he didn't
even want the answers from Europe.
But when he realized that he was literally
surrounded
by powers who were literally just waiting, counting
days months
to finish the ottoman's day off, he sought
to
restrengthen
his, the Ottoman,
relationship
with those regions that fell under its domain
and beyond
and beyond.
In 1905, there was an assassination attempt,
by Armenian revolutionaries.
Alhamdulillah
Khalif Abdulhamid delayed his public appearance
by 2 or 3 minutes,
and a car bomb went off which martyred
26 people, but he wasn't killed.
And in 190 8,
right at the end of his rule,
there was a Young Turk Revolution,
which,
reintroduced the
the constitution of 18/76.
And I actually just realized I forgot what
happened. In 18/76,
when he oversaw the constitution,
2 years later, after losing the war to
Russia,
Khalif Abd al Hamid got rid of that
constitution.
So in 18/78,
he disbanded the Ottoman parliament and the Ottoman
constitution
because he felt that it was counterproductive
to the kind of vision
that he had in mind for the Ottoman
state and the Muslim world in generally.
So the Ottoman constitution of 18/76
lasted for 2 years, and then the Young
Turk Revolution
in 190
8,
succeeded
and bought back
the constitution,
and historically is known as the second constitutional
era.
So with that in mind, Khalif Abdulk Hamid
found himself
towards the end of his reign
exactly like it was at the beginning of
his reign,
where he was a
constitutional
monarchy
with a parliament
who held him to account. That's not to
say that he wasn't being held to account,
brothers and sisters. He was, but through a
different mechanism.
But now you had this parliament, this Ottoman
parliament,
which would essentially dictate,
the laws of the state
and decreasing significantly the legislative authority of Khalif
Abdul Hamid.
In 19 09,
there was a counterrevolution,
an attempted counter coup, which was unsuccessful.
Now European historians and Kamalis and secularist historians
will say that this countercoup was actually carried
out
by
illiberal,
conservative elements of the Ottoman military
who didn't want to modernize or reform the
Ottoman state, and they wanted to reinstate Khalifa
Abdul Hamid as the overall
dictator of the Ottoman state. I have a
massive problem with this kind of language and
this kind of terminology, brothers and sisters. I'll
tell you why that is.
It's because it perceives, not just Ottoman history,
but Islamic history from a framework, from a
paradigm which is alien to our tradition.
Right?
And it applies and superimposes
certain experiences in language and frameworks, which is
absolutely applicable and correct for European and Christian,
history
to the Islamic history.
Right?
Yes. There was a counter coup, which is
unsuccessful,
and it was carried out by elements that
were loyal to Khalif Abdul Hamid, but loyal
to Khalif Abdul Hamid because they believed
that the
reinstating
of the constitution was taking the Ottoman state
towards the wrong direction.
But they were unsuccessful.
And as a result of their failure,
Khalif Abdul Hamid, in 1909,
he was dethroned,
exiled,
and replaced by his brother
Murad the 5th of Rashad,
who from that point onward just became a
ceremonial
figure for the Ottoman state.
Khalifa Abdul Hamid
was indeed
not just the last great sultan,
he was one of the last great khalifa
of Islam.
Because from that point
onward, there was no rulers, there was no
Islamic or Muslim rulers who had any real
authority or independence. Or their ruling and their
governance and their authority
was not independent
to that of external powers.
Now some of you may be wondering, if
Khalif Abdul Hamid is supposed to be such
a great historical figure,
why was the entire timeline filled with losses
and losses and losses?
That's because brothers and sisters, we have to
appreciate, and I mentioned this earlier in the
talk, the context in which he came to
power.
What did Khalif Abdul Hamid inherit?
He inherited a state which was in huge
debt.
He inherited a state
which
was under constant threat
from surrounding European powers. And I'm not just
talking about a perceived threat. I'm talking about
literally every other day,
there was some kind of encroachment on Ottoman
sovereignty
by European powers.
Whether it be in North Africa, in the
Balkans, or Southeastern Europe, there was a constant
daily threat
of some kind of liberties that were being
taken as a result of the weakness of
the state. Now for those of you who
want a more kind of elaborated,
overview of the Ottoman history, I did give
a talk at Sheffield University.
You can just Google it, Ottoman history, Sheffield
University, ISOC. It should come up.
And he inherited
huge debt and huge reparations.
And these were reparations that were signed by
his predecessors.
Right? After the Crimean War, there was a
war called the Crimean War where Britain and
France helped the Ottomans fight Russia again for
their own geopolitical interest.
After winning that war with the help of
Britain and France, there were massive interest based
reparations,
which Khalif Abdul Hamid inherited
and yet to manage that.
So there was an external threat from European
powers. There was the issue of debt, and
there was the internal issue
of secular reformists
who wanted to overthrow his authority,
who want to undermine the Islamic vision that
he had, and were constantly
seeking answers from Europe.
That is what he inherited.
And considering that that's what he inherited,
what what he achieved a lot.
There is a near consensus
amongst all historians, Muslim, non Muslim, secular, Muslim,
whatever you wanna call it. Yeah. There is
a near consensus
that had it not been for the rule
of Khalifa Abdul Hamid, the Ottoman state wouldn't
have survived beyond 1900.
That because of the radical policies that he
implemented
during his reign,
the the Ottoman state managed to survive for
another 50 years. There is a near consensus
amongst historians regarding this.
And what were his achievements?
His achievements was that and I'm gonna list
a few of them. They number many, and
they require their own respective elaborations.
I'm just gonna go over some of them.
Some of the economic policies that he implemented
were radical from the perspective that his predecessors
had disproportionately
focused state funds on things like building palaces
and building unnecessary masajid when the entire state
and empire was full of masajid.
Khalifa Abdulhami stopped that.
Yes. He built some masajids,
Right? But he stopped this kind of excessive
beautification
on mass of mosques across the the empire.
What he instead did was that he would
put up Islamic symbols,
the names of Allah, the names of Muhammad,
the 4 Khalifa,
and stamps and seals.
He put the green flag with the 3
cresents which represented the Ottoman Khilafa. He put
these kind of small symbols up everywhere instead
of building grandiose mosques
and palaces, which is something his predecessors did
a lot.
He
also implemented
major educational reforms.
Under Khalif Abd al Hamid, we saw universities
and madrasas,
law schools and medicine schools,
medical schools,
propping up all over the state.
Why? Because he understood
the importance of both the Deeni education
in the form of madrasas
and
what is known as the kind of secular
education.
And he realized that for revival and and
for the preservation of Muslim identity
and for the future of the Ottoman generations,
that the tarbia, the morals, the principles,
and the values of Islam had to be
instilled in both these educational,
academic institutions.
We also saw,
of course,
the Hejaz Railway, which I mentioned.
Now the Hejaz rate railway
line was massive.
It was massive because
Khalif Abdul Hamid sought the financial assistance
from Muslims beyond the Ottoman state.
The Muslims of India
donated the equivalent of today 100 and 1,000
of pounds
towards the building of the Hijaz railway.
Khalif Abdul Hamid is also on record to
have supported
some of the early darulululum
seminaries of India.
The Shia ruler of Persia,
he even gave some money towards the Hejaz
railway.
So the point I'm trying to make is
that he got as much support
outside of the Ottoman state as he did
inside.
And it is known that Khalifa Abdul Hamid
had a strong diplomatic
relationship with the Muslims of the Philippines, of
Mauritania,
of China,
who all supported
the Hijaz railway
and gave their money
towards this cause, Fisabiullah.
Never in Ottoman history
do you hear of an Ottoman ruler
seeking assistance and a call for unity beyond
the runs of his domain.
This is something that was very unique to
Khalifa Abdul Hamid.
He also
allowed
the proliferation
of a number of Sufi tariqas
in the Ottoman state. And one may be
wondering, well, what's that got to do with
anything? The reason why that is is because
prior to Khalifa al Hamid,
a number of Sufi tariqas,
right, they would
get charged money,
by the state for their lodges,
for their tech case,
and for their kind of building that they
used to have for their dhikr sessions. Right.
Khalif Abdul Hamid, not only did he not
charge them
any money, he allowed them to
grow
across society where they had a very influential
role. Again, that's linked back to the educational
reforms.
Right. Tacit is linked to it because
where
Khalif Abdul Hamid was seen at the
the the Muslim youth of the Ottoman state
were getting the academic,
the academic,
education from secular,
subjects or from the madrassas, the sufi tariqas
to him
symbolized
the
spiritual enrichment, the spiritual,
aspect that was needed for the preservation of
Muslim identity.
And all of these things, brothers and sisters,
put together
represented
Khalif Abdulhamid's
resistance and persistence.
His persistence
in seeking
an alternative
answer for revival away from Europe
and his resistance to major pressures, externally and
internally,
to seek
answers from other than Islam.
All these these all these things represented that.
And if we are to be honest to
ourselves
and
answer this basic question,
why is the life of Khalifa Bulhamid important
to us?
Why are we here in 2019
in Sheffield at 10 to 7 discussing this
man's life?
It's because
his struggles and the struggles he experienced
and the sociopolitical
reality and environment which he found himself in
is very similar to the challenges that we
are facing today.
In the Muslim majority world,
there are so many countries
that are either occupied
or they are marred and and and with
wars
and invasions.
In the west, are we not facing an
intellectual struggle
against
redefining normative aspects of our deen?
Isn't there a coordinated effort where 1,000,000 of
pounds are being put into
to redefine aspects of our religion where there
has been a near consensus for 1400 years
on on many of these issues? All of
a sudden,
in the 21st century, these things are now
up for discussion and for debate.
Are we not being told constantly
that aspects of Islam needs to reform, aspects
of Islam needs to modernize, aspects of Islam
need to get with it, That it's regressive,
it's backward, it's medieval. It has no it
has no
relevance
in the modern in the modern time.
These are the same calls and the same
pressure which Khalifa Bilhamid
faced in his time.
It's not one of our issues
collectively as an Ummah,
the issue of Asabih and nationalism.
That we have 57 plus Muslim countries, Muslim
majority secular nation states,
that none are willing to assist another when
when there when there's issues happening in their
in their neighboring countries.
Whether that be the issue of Kashmir
and Pakistan or East Turkestan and Pakistan, Bangladesh
and, the issue in Myanmar,
the Arab States and Palestine and Syria,
what's happening in Central African Republic and Somalia
and other places just seems to be
general apathy.
Not from the Ummah,
certainly from the leadership.
And one of the causes of this is
nationalism.
I have to look after my country's affairs
first, and it's not even that. That's the
truth.
The political elite
that currently rule over the Muslim world today,
they don't even care about their own people.
Let's be frank about it.
They're there to oversee
the preservation of certain geopolitical
interests that usually even belong to Russia, China,
or the United States.
But nationalism is that disease.
Instead of blaming everyone else, if you look
at it introspectively,
we've allowed nationalism to seek the minds and
hearts
of our souls.
And, of course, there's the external threat.
We can't even deny the external threat.
For those of you who are following current
affairs, what's happening to the Muslims in India
recently,
right, with the with the, Citizens amendments act,
where we've been in East Turkestan, we need
2,000,000 Muslims in concentration camps,
or in Kashmir,
Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic.
There's there's not a place
where there's no
problems that we're
facing.
To conclude,
and I guess if there's one thing we
can take from the life of Khalif Abdulhamid,
is that he was a man
who came at a time
where
he identified an issue
and he identified the solution.
He understood that the Muslim majority world, not
just the Ottoman world, just not the Ottoman
state, even beyond, was fractured
and disunited
because it didn't have something or someone to
rally around and unite upon.
Not something that had real substance and longevity.
And he understood and he identified
that the only thing that people can unite
upon
is Islam.
This is something that's within our text, within
the Quran and Sunnah, constantly there.
Right?
The brotherhood of Islam
and the justice in which it offers its
citizens.
Right? This is not to say, brothers and
sisters, I wanna clarify this also.
Islamic civilization was not a utopia.
Even when the
prophet ruled Madinah and khulafa wa shideen, it
was not a utopia.
We never claimed utopia for our civilization
or our history. There were many problems.
But the point here is that Khalifa Abdul
Hamid understood
that to unify
the people and the citizens of his state
and beyond,
he would have to re exert
the importance,
the Islamic importance of his role as the
Khalifa
and the institution of the Khalifa
as something for the Ummah to get behind
both internally and externally
at a time when that concept was eroding
away.
That's not to say that his predecessors again
did not understand the notion of a caliph
or Islamic hild. They did. They did.
That's why I said that Sultan and Khalifa
was interchangeable. It's it's essentially meant the same
thing. But Khalifa Abdul Hamid understood that
this notion
had to get reexerted,
the Ummah had to get reeducated
about its importance
for everyone to get behind him and get
behind the revival
of the last standing Islamic empire of that
time.
But it was the Qadr of Allah that
obviously it wasn't meant to be.
And of course, due to his reign and
due to the policies that he implemented,
the Ottoman state did survive for another 30,
40 years. Right?
But it is very common
to hear,
derogatory
propaganda against Khalifa Abu Dhabi. Very common.
Right. There are pubs in the UK
that, you know, it's called the Turks Head
or the Saracens Head or the the the
you know, you actually have pubs, by the
way, called the Turks Head. I've never been
to Aladawi. I heard that they exist.
Alright. And the logo
in these pubs called the Turks Head, Wallahi,
is exactly the face of Khalifa Abdul Hamid
with vampire fangs and things like this. The
bastardization
of Khalifa Abdul Hamid was something that was
widespread.
Right?
And quite frankly,
whether people wanna accuse him of tyranny, of
being a dictator,
of being an oppressor, or being someone who's
illiberal and wanting to resist modernization and reform
all that,
I'm gonna quite frankly say to them
that perhaps that may be true according to
your epistemology,
according to what you deem to be was
the right thing for the revival of the
Ottoman state.
But quite frankly, the reason why Khalifa al
Hamid is championed
from East Turkestan,
from India, from Assam, to put many parts
of Europe today
is because he represented
what revival should have been.
But one would argue perhaps it was too
little too late.
It was
the decree of Allah that the Ottoman state
was going to lose World War 1, and
it was wasn't gonna survive beyond 1924.
Right? But the point is, if and when
we hear
these kind of propaganda
against Khalif Abd al Hamid and even against
the Ottomans, who weren't perfect, by the way.
For those of you who have the time,
if you listen to my talk that I
gave in Sheffield not too long ago, I
said it was not a utopian state. They
had many
issues, especially towards the latter period.
But the point here is
that they always centered
their position in the world
as an Islamic authority.
One that wanted to look after the affairs
of Muslims and the security of Islam and
all the citizens,
of and the people of the book that
fell within its domains.
So quite frankly, we reject
these propaganda lies about orientalists
and western Europeans and komalists
who accused Khalif Abd al Hamid of so
many things. Right?
The truth be told,
when they say that he was someone who
resist modernization,
what they mean by this is that he
resisted a particular kind of modernization.
When they say that Khalif Abdul Hamid was
illiberal,
it's because you he wasn't liberal enough for
you.
Right?
And I think to conclude, one of the
things that we need to do collectively
is to own our narrative.
Right? To overcome
an understandable
inferiority
complex,
which has
come into the minds of many Muslims
as a result of the war on terror,
as a result of the endless wars and
propaganda
against Islam and Muslims,
the institutional Islamophobia that we're all experiencing and
happening for the last 19 years, to slowly
but surely overcome that.
Because Khalif Abdul Hamid, he could have easily
easily
just let the French and British come in.
He could have easily just adopted
everything
from the Tanzimat
and what the young Turks wanted, but he
didn't. He resisted
it. He resisted.
And he was to a big degree, he
was successful.
So we need to start owning our own
narratives, brothers and sisters.
When we look at the future of the
Muslim world,
the political destiny,
the self determination,
the concept of revival,
these things have to be done on our
own terms,
according to our tradition,
not something that's been externally imposed upon us.