Shadee Elmasry – War in Syria with Sami Hamdi – NBF 405
AI: Summary ©
The Sufyan Society discusses the upcoming events in Syria, including Omar Q centers and the HDF, while acknowledging the upcoming attacks on Iranian-led territory. They stress the importance of following principles and not criticizing anyone. The conflict between the US and Iran is discussed, with the return of American troops to Syria being a positive for the region. The speakers stress the importance of following principles and not criticizing anyone.
AI: Summary ©
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious,
the Most Merciful, all praise is due to
Allah, and peace and blessings be upon the
Messenger of Allah and upon his family and
companions and whoever is around.
Welcome everybody to the Sufyan Society's Nothing But
Facts live stream.
Omar, let me see the image please.
Here, you turn this on.
Keep clicking away, as only a Moroccan can
do.
We're here today on a very interesting subject
that we're going to be covering today.
Let's go.
Keep it green, you're good to go.
Of course, in the past week, in the
past few days, the Syrian revolution has occurred
and in which, I don't know if we
can say there were heavy casualties, but of
course it did garner a lot of attention.
The Pakistan protests had actually probably, I think,
more casualties.
Nonetheless, I want to begin with a couple
of themes.
Number one, the importance of concern for the
Ummah.
And you know that Nothing But Facts, we
talk about kalam, basically theology, current theological issues,
debates and discussions.
But we're also, we cover the Awliya.
We study the people of Allah and their
stories, which we haven't done in a long
time, but we read from the Risalat of
Qushayriyyah.
But also we're concerned with the affairs of
the Ummah and we promote activism.
We promote action.
We're not the type of people of tasawwuf
that just sit around with a misbah and
food and mawalid.
I'm just not for that, to be honest
with you.
I'm for that 10%, okay, 15%.
But we need action.
We need ilm, amal, haraka, haraka baraka.
That's what we need.
And a lot of our counterparts throughout the
world, I have to say, to be honest
with you, they don't do that.
And I want to say that I don't
really believe in that.
Honestly, a lot of our counterparts, their action
is not something that's really on the list.
And maybe, I can't blame them, maybe they
literally can't.
Like they literally cannot.
In some situations, in some cases, there's no
majal for them.
But when I look around, I say, hold
on, why are other people taking action?
Why are other groups active?
Haraka baraka, that's what we believe in, and
that's what we need.
So for the people who share our aqidah
and madhhab and maslak in the deen, and
manhaj in the deen, not all of their
modes of actions do we all agree on.
I'm definitely for action in any way, shape,
and form.
And I'm for not fearing backlash, for having
courage.
What separates winners from losers, successful from unsuccessful?
And I don't want to say men from
boys, but that's an expression.
But under pressure, how do you react?
And are you willing to go against the
grain?
That's the question you have to ask.
Let's talk a little bit of principles on
the Syrian matter.
We have to have concern for the ummah,
there's no doubt about that.
And that's why I've been tweeting and retweeting
news surrounding on this issue for a long
time.
For a while now.
The last few days.
I wasn't on the first day, and I
saw a guy saying, Shajah Masri, silent!
Yeah, but I wasn't even on the phone.
I don't have my phone on me all
the time to tweet, tweet, tweet.
But as soon as I got on the
phone, and got on my computer.
Some days I'm not on the computer or
phone at all.
Neither.
You have to unplug sometimes.
And I don't care what the heck's happening
in the world.
I'm not a journalist to have to do
that.
I'll plug in when I plug in on
my own terms.
And when I did, I'm constantly putting out
news.
Concern for the ummah is the number one
thing we have to have.
Number two.
We have to make judgments based on knowledge.
Most of the stuff that's going on is
hearsay.
I can't take it and run.
And so it took me actually a while
to navigate the situation.
And I actually stepped on some mines.
And got caught up in some articles and
news sources.
Because that turned out to be unreliable.
You learn as you go on.
But you got to admit your mistakes.
So I delete those tweets.
Simple as that.
It's a mistake.
You think something's good.
You learn later on this person is biased.
And their presentation of facts is not reliable.
Okay.
You live and learn.
Right.
This is not Dean and shut up.
Where you have to actually be absolutely certain.
It's an analysis.
It's a political analysis.
And sometimes that person turns out not to
be what you thought.
So you undo it.
No problem.
I have no problem saying click delete.
Oh, you deleted it.
Yeah.
And?
And what is this like?
Aqidah here?
No.
It's political analysis.
Sometimes they're on point.
And sometimes not.
Secondly, we know that what Bashar al-Assad.
We know him.
And not only is Bashar.
He's an evil guy who's killed so many.
And it's actually Dean to be against this
guy.
It's Hukum Shah because it's absolutely certain what
he's done.
We have no doubt on what he's done.
And to be near this person is to
be near the oppressor.
And Allah said, forget being against people.
Okay.
All right.
Forget being against people.
Allah says.
Subhanallah.
What's the idea that I was caught on
this?
I can't believe for skipping me right now.
It is.
Do not lean towards them.
Do not support them.
Do not even lean in their direction.
Here means to seek their protection.
It means to support them.
And it even means to like have a
leaning towards them.
Of course, to support them and seek their
protection is the number one tafseer for that.
But even associating yourself, allying yourself in some
way, shape and anyway.
You're going to get hit with what they
get hit with.
So, the position on someone like Bashar al
-Assad.
I think it's a religious position.
Because it's not allegations against him.
It's actual absolute certain fact that's been for
years like that.
And therefore, to denounce him.
And to hate him.
Allah's messenger commands us to love for Allah
and hate for Allah.
So, some people you have to hate them.
And what does hate mean?
It means you utter no word of support,
no word of sympathy.
And you utter words of disavowal and condemnation
of this person.
And that's what you should have in your
heart.
So, that's known.
So, that's principle number one concern for the
Ummah.
Principle number two specifically on Bashar.
Principle number three.
The position on the rebels.
And are they even rebels?
Because the whole place is rebel.
It seems to be the whole country is
like a no man's land outside of Damascus.
But anyway, let's just if they're called rebels
for the sake of it.
Not all of rebellion is unlawful in the
Sharia.
We know that.
And we've had rebellions before in our Sharia.
So, we should all know that.
But these groups, if we pass a judgment
on them, it's got to be based on
knowledge.
And there should be no shame in somebody
saying, I don't have knowledge on them.
I hear a lot of hearsay.
Just because someone trustworthy tells me, listen, trust
me.
I know Shuyukh.
I know people on the ground.
This is what's going on.
That's not sufficient enough in such a huge
issue like this.
Because I just can't take, maybe I can
believe that.
But I can't take that and run as
if it's fact.
It's still hearsay.
There are way too many.
There are way too many.
He's saying Aleppo is not rebel.
What I mean, I mean that like metaphorically.
Meaning that there isn't a government that's solid
and stable that has been running the country
in the way of other countries.
That's what I mean by that.
Nonetheless, in any event.
In other words, there's hands in the pot.
Unlike other countries, the Russians have hands in
the pot.
Mossad has hands in the pot.
CIA has hands in the pot.
ISIS, Al-Qaeda, these different groups, HTS, all
these groups have hands in the pot.
That's what I'm saying.
It's not a clean cut crisp nation the
way others are where it's more controlled.
That's what I mean by that.
And I think we all know that's true.
How are we supposed to perform a judgment?
We can research.
We can study.
But ultimately at the end of the day,
is it going to be an absolute certain
fact of what's going on in the ground?
I feel that there's so many hands in
the pots.
So many hands in the pot.
So many claims.
So many counterclaims.
There are some people who treat it as
if it's absolute fact that these rebel groups
are righteous and pious.
And if you don't support them, it's as
if you're not supporting the people of Gaza.
Others, they roll their eyes, they laugh at
you, and they say we know of absolute
fact that they're Mossad pawns.
And the Mossad is playing puppets with them.
Between these two, you can't blame somebody who's
left in the middle and really not knowing
what to think.
But let me ask another question.
If we can form an opinion, fine and
good, but if you cannot, you're not harming
or benefiting anyone by not having an opinion
on a certain group.
Right?
So, oh, okay, we're divided.
Okay, what if we were unified?
Are we having an impact?
If we're unified, are we having an impact?
That's the question.
Opinions.
We were all unified on Gaza, and maybe
it had an impact on an election here
and there, but Netanyahu's doing what Netanyahu's doing.
And the whole world's opinion, the United Nations
taking the guy to court.
Or wanted to.
And no one, you know, nothing changed.
So let's not also overrate our opinion on
the matter.
Okay?
Let's not overrate that because that might not
necessarily.
Now, what do we do have?
We do have something in our hands.
All right.
Omar, do you have the GRT link?
You want me to send it to you?
Okay, let me send you the link because
we do have something in our hands.
And something that is an objective fact is
the idea that we are sending people through
GRT and some of our own guys.
Omar, are you going this year?
Or is it Salman this year?
GRT is one of the sponsors of this
livestream.
We work with them.
And let's put up the link for that.
And let's put the board on.
This is something we do have objective knowledge
of.
And it's an actionable item.
Tweeting has not changed the world, I don't
think.
Last I checked.
Right?
But this will change a life or two.
We're trying to hit 50K.
We're trying to go to 50K pounds.
British pounds.
We're at 6,000 right now.
If we can get this to 6,500
today, I'll be happy.
Because I don't put pressure.
It's just one pound here, two pounds there,
three pounds there.
And it's not going to me.
It's not coming in my hands even.
It's going to an official, accepted, licensed in
the UK charity called Global Relief Trust.
That's our number right now.
6,330.
Let's just get it to 6,500.
That's it.
And once we hit 50K and maybe even
before that we're one or two Safina Society
guys will be joining GRT.
To give you the evidence.
Although it's video.
The video of our guys handing out blankets,
hanging out this, handing out that.
Omar, why don't you even put the footage
of yourself from last year?
Get that footage from WhatsApp of yourself from
last year.
Giving stuff out.
To show the community, show the world this
is not an empty thing.
That's a scam.
This is legit.
Alhamdulillah.
Happy to say.
Completely and totally.
If it wasn't, if I didn't have the
cutsy evidence of Omar himself, this guy who's
behind the screen in Syria.
Face reveal.
You might get married.
In Syria, handing stuff out.
And I, we know this for a fact.
I wouldn't be so comfortable.
Right.
But we have that information.
We have that cutsy evidence.
You know epistemology is so important.
Epistemology is what.
No, no, no.
Shrink it more.
Oh, they're larger.
Okay, because we want to see.
We want to see Omar.
All right, go.
Click.
Bismillah.
There he is folks.
That's our guy.
I see him with my own two eyes.
Okay.
Cutsy evidence that he's on the ground.
What city was that Omar?
Syria.
Near Halab folks.
Move the mouse.
Yeah, look at that.
Tent city like people living their lives like
that.
And we're here sitting and enjoying our pizza.
This is right out of Halab.
And we're here sitting enjoying our thin crust.
New Jersey pizza brought to us by our
Moroccan friend.
Yes, seen from Toronto.
And we're enjoying this hot pizza every single
day.
Whenever we want.
Okay.
Mr. Coolio.
He has a suggestion for Omar for a
wife.
Okay.
Omar is already.
You know, he already has four wives, right?
Yeah.
You know what they are now?
Whole month.
Those are.
That's what Omar is married to these days.
You know, Omar.
If the, if the came, he wouldn't know.
He's literally under a rock.
You know, when the Taliban gets under a
rock.
When a student of knowledge is literally under
a rock.
Omar is now under.
And I'm accepting of it because he's, it's
temporary.
And he's a Taliban.
So today we have a special guest.
One of the foremost political analysts in our
community.
And he has a lot of information.
We're going to discuss today.
I'm going to give him the mic first
to bring, to give what he wants to
tell us.
And then I have some questions on what's
going on.
And what information we have.
So let's bring our guest on today.
Welcome Sammy Hamdi to the Safina society.
Nothing but facts.
Live stream.
Thank you for having me.
I hope you will.
Hope everything's good in your Jersey.
Very good.
Very good.
And where are you filming out of?
Are you in London?
I'm in Dallas at the moment.
You might as well move to the United
States at this point.
Look, we had so much to talk about
from the abandoned Biden.
That turned to abandoned Harris.
That turned to Kareem Harris at the polls.
But we have other stuff that we want
to talk about today.
Why don't you begin telling us and telling
our viewers.
Your thoughts, immediate thoughts on Syria.
If you have any.
I'm sure you do.
I think that first and foremost, I think
the offensive by the armed groups in Idlib,
the opposition groups.
I know people are referring to them as
rebels against Bashar al-Assad.
I think that it came as a surprise
for everyone, including the Russians, including Assad himself.
And there are some reports even suggesting it
came as a surprise for Turkey too.
And I think the speed at which that
they've been able to take Aleppo.
And now they're on the outskirts of Hama
and there's reports suggesting they might take Hama
too.
And there's even talks now that perhaps they
might even after Hama go towards Damascus.
There's a flurry of diplomatic activity in the
region.
Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince who
hadn't been to the UAE since 2021.
There are some tensions between him and the
UAE.
He flew in the midst of the news
to Abu Dhabi to meet with Mohammed bin
Zayed.
And it's news that bin Zayed of the
UAE had met with the Americans to tell
them, you shouldn't let Assad fall.
If Assad falls, it might cause a domino
effect in the region.
I think that this attack essentially has taken
everybody by surprise.
But I think that those who are watching
Syria are not expressing surprise so much as
with regards to the offensive, but perhaps with
the gains itself.
Because two years ago, Jolani, the head of
the armed groups, the head of the HDS
actually gave a speech or a khutbah in
which he said, we're almost ready militarily to
begin an advance that's taking forward.
And it's important to put this offensive into
context.
Everybody looking at Syria or analyzing Syria was
arguing that Assad, all he had left was
to take Idlib.
There was this suggestion that he had won,
this suggestion that that's it.
The Syrians just have to accept it.
They just have to live with it.
And that therefore they had no longer had
any agency and that it's about Turkey, Russia,
Assad and the like.
I think what's become abundantly clear in the
past week is that Syrians do actually still
have agency and people do have agency.
And I think that when you consider how,
what the situation looked five months ago where
Erdogan, the Turkish president was saying to Assad,
come to Turkey, let's sit down, let's talk,
let's discuss.
The idea being that the Turks were looking
for an opportunity to make peace so they
could ship out the refugees from Istanbul or
from Turkey that have become a source of
economic crises, according to nationalist Turks.
I think when you look at Erdogan going
from, I want to talk to Assad and
sit down with Bashar al-Assad, and then
the Russians bombing Idlib relentlessly in preparation for
an offensive by Assad on Idlib, there's a
complete turnaround of the situation, which suggests that
the Syrians do have agency.
I think these cities are being liberated.
I know that's a controversial term for some
people, but certainly they are being liberated from
Assad strongholds.
And to be honest, nobody is sure how
far it will go.
And I think that certainly it's upended the
system in a way whereby now I think
the regimes in the region are watching and
praying that Assad doesn't fall.
And that doesn't apply just to one particular
spectrum.
It applies across the whole spectrum where even
those who said they were against Assad are
now concerned that if Assad falls, it might
actually cause a domino effect that could transform
the entire region.
And Sham does have a special place in
Islamic history.
Whatever happens in a Sham affects the rest
of the Ummah, affects the potential of the
rest of the Ummah, the opportunities in the
rest of the Ummah and liberation of Sham
may lead to the liberation of Palestine.
But at this moment it's unclear how far
it will go.
Tell me the liberation itself as you're going
to, we're going to use that term.
Is it occurring through one group or it
is a conglomerate of different people and groups?
There are three main groups that are against
Assad in Syria.
The first of them, which is the group
that's leading this particular offensive, is Hayat Tahir
al-Sham, the HTS.
HTS led by a man called Jolani.
Once upon a time he declared his allegiance
to Al-Qaeda, then separated from them and
went to war with them and then eradicated
them from Idlib.
The forces that he commands are an amalgamation
of Syrians who fled from other territories and
came to Idlib itself.
They don't belong to a particular faction.
Some reports suggest there are 27 different factions
under Hayat Tahir al-Sham, under those groups
that operate underneath it, of various different ideologies
and the like.
And I think that amalgamation is what has
allowed those of the Christians and the Druze
and some of these other religious sects to
come out on social media and say that
we haven't been harmed by HTS and we
actually feel quite good now that they've come
and taken this place itself.
But in any case, you have the HTS.
You also have the SNA, what's called the
Syrian National Army.
This was a group set up by Turkey
in 2017.
Turkey wanted to establish a force, an auxiliary
force that it could use in Syria.
That wasn't composed necessarily of Turks, because if
Turks die in Syria, it causes a domestic
problem.
But if other ethnicities die in Syria, then
it's OK.
It's more expendable.
So this SNA is eventually, or is not
ideologically aligned, but has more acted as a
mercenary force by which it has gone after
some so-called ISIS areas and essentially done
whatever Turkey wants it to do in the
region.
And the third group that's against Assad, or
rather that flip-flaps between Assad and the
other rebel groups, is the Syrian Democratic Forces,
SDF, which are the Kurdish separatists, those who
are aligned with the PKK in Syria, those
aligned with the YPG.
It was a rebranding because the Americans felt
that if Assad was going to stay in
power, we don't want him to rule all
of Syria.
We don't want the rebels to conquer Syria.
So let's sort of prepare for a division
of Syria.
We leave the rebels in the northwest, we
leave Assad in the south, and we leave
the Kurdish entity, an independent Kurdish entity, in
the northeast.
We don't want Islamist Kurdish entities.
A lot of those are actually working with
HTS.
We prefer secular Marxist-leftist Kurds, very similar
to the PKK.
They're in the northeast themselves.
As it stands, the Heyat Tahir al-Sham
are the ones who have allegedly launched this
attack on their own.
The report suggests that Turkey was uncomfortable with
this attack, and Turkey actually on a number
of occasions, whenever HTS have gone out on
their own, Turkey have initially supported them and
then withdrawn that support.
And that's why I think some people are
concerned about this.
Many will remember, I think it was 2017,
2016, when Heyat Tahir al-Sham went to
a place called Saraqib.
The Turkish drones went with them to support
them.
But when Heyat Tahir al-Sham looked like
they would take it, then Turkey withdrew the
drones suddenly, and Hezbollah was able to come
in from Lebanon and wipe the floor with
those forces that entered Saraqib.
So it's unclear to what extent the Turks
are supporting Heyat Tahir al-Sham.
What suggests that the Turks are interested in
supporting Heyat Tahir al-Sham, at least for
the short term, at least until what we
see now, is that the SNA, the Syrian
National Army, which was built by Turkey in
Syria, they have been deployed to Tarrafat, they've
been deployed to some of these areas over
here, suggesting Erdogan, even if it turns out
to be true that he didn't support the
original offensive, he wants to take advantage of
this momentum in order to boost his negotiating
position on the table with the Russians and
with Bashar al-Assad.
Remember for Erdogan, Erdogan wants to start closing
a lot of the files to focus on
his economy, which is why he reconciled with
Saudi, reconciled with UAE, trying to reconcile with
the Russians, trying to keep the peace with
the Israelis, even as his people go ballistic
over what's happening in Gaza, trying to give
statements here but keeping the trade going, trying
to make more statements and suspending some trade,
but keeping the oil going through the Jehan
pipeline through Turkey itself.
Erdogan is trying to hold the stick from
the middle to say, I don't want any
problems, I don't want any hassle, I want
to reconcile with everybody because this economy could
ruin my legacy.
But I do think that Erdogan, in the
deployment of the SNA, the Syrian National Army,
be wary of the names they suggest entities
other than what they actually are, but in
any case, the Syrian National Army that Turkey
built has been deployed, it is marching, which
suggests there's still some support there.
Those are the three main groups.
The final point worth mentioning is that the
Syrian Democratic Forces, the separatist Kurdish groups, they
are the ones who have the most to
lose as these rebels advance, primarily because they
were promised by the Americans, and they've been
working very closely with the Americans, that they
would be given autonomy in the regions.
But it seems that HTS and SNA are
targeting those areas where the SDF are as
part of their preparations to march on Damascus
itself.
And I think there have been rumors over
the past day or so where there have
been some flare-ups in the whole Kurdish
-Arab issue that HTS are trying to reconcile
by sending Kurds from their own group, you
know, Muslim Kurds, to those areas to reassure
the local Kurdish populations that look, this isn't
a sectarian thing, it's not an ethnic thing.
Jolani's number two came out and gave a
khutbah where he said the Armenians and Christians
and Kurds and whoever are guaranteed their rights,
guaranteed their cause, similar to what we saw
when the Palestinians went and marched.
So those are the main groups fighting, but
everything is still in flux.
Russia now is bombing Idlib.
There's talk that some militias, pro-Iran militias
in Iraq, are trying to cross the border
to go in and rescue Bashar al-Assad.
It's a bit of a mess, but those
are the main groups at this moment in
time fighting.
Who runs the Syrian National Army?
The Syrian National Army predominantly, the consensus is
that it is controlled by Turkey.
Turkey orders where it goes, where it doesn't
go, where it mobilizes, where it doesn't mobilize
itself.
Without making it sound like it's very pragmatic,
Turkey did have a legitimate reason to set
it up, which was that at the time
before it was set up, HTS, remember, is
listed as a terrorist organization.
And as a result, whenever Erdogan would go
and lobby abroad for support for the Syrians
against Assad, he would always be met by
the Europeans and the Americans who would tell
him, we're not supporting a terrorist group.
We're not supporting Jolani.
He used to be with Al-Qaeda.
Even if he left them, we're not supporting
him.
So Erdogan's plan was, and this is why
it's not as Machiavellian as it sounds, Erdogan's
plan was, why don't I create an alternative
entity that is not on a terrorist list,
that's not composed of people that the Americans
don't like, and we can make this the
Syrian National Army, let's remove the legitimacy from
Bashar al-Assad, and this way the Syrian
opposition will have a leg to stand on
internationally because they need international support in order
to be able to fight with Bashar al
-Assad.
Where Turkey had a problem was, when they
established the Syrian National Army, Hayy al-Tahiyy
al-Sham were able to impose themselves in
Idlib and in other areas in a way
the Syrian National Army could not.
And despite certain clashes between the Syrian National
Army and Hayy al-Tahiyy al-Sham, Erdogan
eventually came to the conclusion that we'll keep
the SNA, the Syrian National Army as a
group, but work with HTS and try to
keep the peace between them and try to
have this sort of broad coalition between the
two itself.
SNA is considered Turkey's arm, and this is
why when people are talking about where does
Turkey actually stand, was it taken by surprise,
did it support the initiative?
The deployment of the SNA is what gives
you an indication that even if Erdogan may
not have wanted this offensive in the beginning,
certainly let's see how far it goes and
let's support them.
HTS, al-Qaeda links, talk to us about
that.
So Jolani in about 2016, 2017, the years
might be off maybe by one or two,
he sets up this Hayy al-Tahiyy al
-Sham, bear in mind the Free Syrian Army
after 2014, 2015, the people who defected from
the Syrian Army after the revolution and the
Syrians who got together to form behind the
Free Syrian Army, when they were marching on
Damascus, Hezbollah crossed over from Lebanon at the
request of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei,
they crossed over, they hit the Free Syrian
Army from the back and they essentially managed
to break the back of the Free Syrian
Army, which meant that the, I don't want
to use this term, but I'll use it
just because it's the way it's used in
mainstream, the more moderate forces had their backs
broken, which allowed more extreme, I don't like
to use this language, but what specifically more
extreme forces to emerge.
Jolani had a small group, Hayy al-Tahiyy
al-Sham, and at that time ISIS, Al
-Qaeda, all these other, it was a free
for all Syria basically, and everybody announcing their
own groups here and there.
Hayy al-Tahiyy al-Sham was a small
group, so it decided let's try to form
a broad coalition, and amongst those to which
it declared allegiance to or coalition with, was
Al-Qaeda.
When it became a bit toxic and they
fell out with Al-Qaeda, it was Jolani
who led the force against Al-Qaeda to
wipe them out from that particular area itself,
and he separated from them in 2016, in
2017, but that has stuck with him, that
sort of tainted the manner in which people
tend to work with him in and of
itself.
So people are repeating it, certainly again especially
the pro-Assad lot that Jolani was also
Al-Qaeda and the like, but it is
worth noting the reason Al-Qaeda don't operate
in Syria anymore in the way that they
used to, or even ISIS or the small
groups that call themselves ISIS or the like,
is because Jolani is the one who got
rid of them.
So yeah, they used to have ties with
Al-Qaeda, but not anymore.
I think they've rebranded to something much different,
and I think when you look at the
factions that make up Hayat al-Tahir al
-Sham, they are much more diverse than they
used to be in the past, and I
think that shows a reflection upon Jolani, and
this is just analysis, not a statement of
support for anyone.
I think it reflects a reflection upon Jolani,
that if I'm going to go and march
with these forces to take Syria, I need
it to look Syrian, I need it to
look inclusive and more encompassing, and I think
that's what we're seeing today.
Who now runs Al-Qaeda?
Al-Qaeda now is not particularly a prominent
institution.
I'm not sure who's running at this moment
in time.
Their leaders keep getting assassinated one by one,
but they're a negligible presence.
What I fear is that what we often
see is the Al-Qaeda and ISIS card
is often thrown at the people whenever they
want to topple dictators or regimes.
It's used as a card or argument through
which to sort of taint the brush of
the Syrians who are marching on Aleppo and
on Hama.
I'm not implying that's what the question implied,
but it's a very valid question to ask,
100%.
But I do think that their role now
is negligible, which is why I'm not sure
who the leader is.
Neither are many of the Syrians themselves.
But I do think we will hear much
more about them as the Syrians advance because
the reality is Assad was able to garner
international support to stay in power by arguing
that the other side were terrorists and the
Al-Qaeda and ISIS were among them.
And this is what hurt the Syrian revolution
a lot.
When the Syrian revolution began and it started
to be armed, Bandar bin Sultan, who was
the head of the Saudi intelligence, had a
policy of giving weapons to anybody who would
fight Bashar al-Assad.
And some of those weapons did find their
way into the hands of some terrorist groups.
And I think that when people were saying
that, look, it doesn't affect the morality of
the Syrian revolution, it did make it hard
for those who sympathize with the revolution to
be very all in with regards to the
revolution itself.
And you saw it when the Free Syrian
Army broke apart later on.
It was these more extreme groups that sort
of emerged into the limelight and emerged to
the fore of what happened, etc.
I think this time that won't happen.
I think this time is different because a
lot of these groups have been taken out.
What I fear, however, is that as Assad
stayed in power by arguing the other side
were terrorists and therefore there will be an
increased focus on al-Qaeda and ISIS, even
though their de facto effect is negligible and
non-existent, I think they will be inflated
in the coming few days to justify Assad
bringing in troops from the Iranians.
Iran's foreign minister today said that if Assad
makes a request for Iranian troops, we will
send them immediately.
We're seeing Russia coming in and preparing, doing
some military drills off the Mediterranean coast, sort
of suggesting that there is this sort of
PR narrative being pushed to prepare for a
new offensive against these Syrian rebels, against the
Syrians.
And that's why I fear that focusing on
al-Qaeda and ISIS might actually be something
that might hurt those who are marching in
Aleppo and Hama.
We used to hear Jabhat al-Nusra, that
name.
What happened to them?
Who are they now?
Jabhat al-Nusra rebranded to Hayat Tahiyyat al
-Sham.
Jabhat al-Nusra, when Joulani allied with al
-Qaeda, he did so under the brand of
Jabhat al-Nusra.
And as part of the rebranding, after the
cutting ties with al-Qaeda and the like,
they became Hayat Tahiyyat al-Sham, which is
a much better name.
Hayat, you know, a council for the liberation
of Syria.
And I think that kind of name allowed
other groups to come and join in himself.
It's not to say his rule has been
perfect.
There have been quite a few for those
who follow Bilal Abdelkarim, you know, the brother
from New York or from America who lives
in Syria itself.
He's done a lot of documentation about some
of the abuses under Joulani's rule in Idlib.
But overall, I think Hayat Tahiyyat al-Sham
and the way that they've managed Idlib itself
has been much more inclusive than it has
been in the past.
Mossad involvement.
Everyone is, a lot of people are talking
about this being a Mossad, an Israeli play
for an endgame that involves dividing up Syria
completely into three parts.
How can we ever be, have any certain
knowledge on these claims?
What do you know about that?
I think that if you look at where
Israel stands, Israel does not want a strong
Syria.
It doesn't want Assad to be entirely in
control, but doesn't want the rebels to take
over Syria either.
So I think that it is legitimate to
say that Israel would want to see Assad
in trouble.
But it is also legitimate to say that
that has no bearing on the Syrians' desire
for freedom.
Because what Israel wants is that there is
a stalemate between the rebels and Bashar al
-Assad.
And given that it was too in favor
of Assad, it is true that there may
be a case to be made that the
Israelis would like to see the rebels push
Assad back to a 50-50.
So if someone wants to argue that Mossad
is watching the rebel advance on Aleppo and
on Hama and doesn't mind that advance, there
is an argument to be made for that.
But I don't think that that affects the
Syrian legitimacy in terms of demanding the liberation
of Damascus.
Because I think that what the UAE are
pitching to the Americans and the Israelis is
that, yes, Assad is being pushed back, but
you don't want Assad to fall.
And I think where Israel is concerned is,
OK, they're marching, but a bit too rapidly
for my liking.
They're marching a bit too fast, and Assad
is falling a bit too easily for my
liking.
So right now I'm happy to watch Assad
lose, but if they march on Damascus, I
might intervene to rescue Assad.
Israel's interest is not in the rebels or
in Bashar al-Assad.
It's in the stalemate itself.
And that's why I think that when people
say that Assad was the bastion against the
Israelis and Israel wants to see Assad fall,
I don't think the Israelis want to see
Assad fall at all.
They want to see him weak.
They don't want to see him fall.
I don't think that Saudi Arabia or UAE,
Israel's allies in the region, at least UAE,
which has normalized ties and the views expressed
on my own don't reflect anybody else.
But in any case, the idea that they
don't want to see Assad fall as well
is because they're aware if Assad falls, it
will cause a domino effect that will hurt
the regimes and hurt Israel, too.
And that's why I don't think necessarily Mossad
is working with the Syrian rebels.
I think more that Israel has an immediate
interest in seeing Assad weakened, but no interest
in seeing him defeated.
And I think that's where people sometimes get
confused.
They assume that support for the Syrian rebels
means you're supporting the Israelis.
No, that's not true.
Supporting the liberation of Syria is what the
Israelis are terrified, Israelis are terrified of.
And I do think that when you look
at the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, and again,
this is speculation, but I think the timing
of the ceasefire and the humiliating terms that
Hezbollah accepted, which is the idea of allowing
the Israelis to enter Lebanon whenever they wish,
terms that they weren't willing to accept beforehand.
I think it does have a lot to
do with the idea that Hezbollah realized Syria
is in trouble, and Syria is the greater
priority than Gaza.
The idea of establishing that Shia crescent that
goes from Iran to Lebanon is the greater
priority.
So make a deal with the Israelis and
go and save Syria.
And I do think that Erdogan, he didn't
act on Gaza, but he's acting on Syria,
I think because from Erdogan's perspective, and indeed
Saudi, and indeed many in the region, Iran
is currently perceived as the greater threat because
of what it did in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
and Yemen.
And ignore what that might mean when you
put Iran and Israel in the same bracket.
The reason people say that is, and this
is the point, people often say that Syria
is in a mess because Israel and the
Americans and the Western powers conspired against Syria.
This is a half-truth.
It's a half-truth because after the 1967
war and 1973, the Americans and the Israelis
believed that there needed to be a dismantling
of the Iraqi army, the Syrian army, and
the Egyptian army.
Americans began to donate heavily to the Egyptian
army and to train them in order to
keep them focused more on their people than
on outside, and they succeeded in that.
Iraqi army, they went in, they brought down
Saddam Hussein, and they destroyed the Iraqi army,
and now you've seen it's all militias that
are roaming around in Iraq itself.
And in Syria, indeed, I do think that
the Israelis and the Americans want to see
the Syrian army destroyed.
That's a half-truth.
The other side of the truth is that
none of the Israeli or U.S. machinations
are possible in Syria without the oppression of
the Assad family.
Ibn Khaldun says, العدل أساس الملك Justice is
the foundation of all dominion.
والظلم مؤذن بخراب العمران Oppression is what destroys
the civilization.
We have famous stories in Islamic history.
Umar ibn Abdulaziz was sent a letter by
his governor who said to him, I've got
unruly tribes in my area.
I need you to send more forces for
me to Øصنها, to fortify it and keep
it under control.
Umar ibn Abdulaziz responded and said, You don't
need more forces.
Øصنها بالعدل Fortify it with justice.
Fortify it by giving people their legitimate desires.
And that's why it's a half-truth that
Israel and America are conspiring against Syria.
It's a half-truth that Israel doesn't like
Assad.
It's a half-truth that Israel, perhaps, is
happy to see Assad reeling, even if it
doesn't want him defeated.
But the other side of the truth is
that it's the zulm in Syria itself that
allowed the window for the international powers to
come out.
And I give you an example in not
so recent time.
In a recent time, 2016, when the army
tried to coup on Erdogan, why were the
army unable to do a coup on Erdogan?
Because the people took to the streets.
They took to the bridges.
They took to the streets.
And they said, We will not allow you
to topple Erdogan because he built the southern
cities.
He renovated them.
He built the roads.
He built the hospitals.
He built.
There was a famous pole after the earthquakes
in eastern Turkey.
Who do you blame for the destruction of
the buildings?
They said, Erdogan.
Who do you trust to rebuild it?
Erdogan.
Erdogan built a record whereby the people genuinely
saw him as somebody who builds.
Ignore whatever grievances we have over his foreign
policy.
Assad's dhulm is what led Syria and ripped
Syria apart.
Because dhulm moodum bi kharab al-Oman.
And that's why when people say we need
Assad to stay in power to facilitate Palestinian
liberation, I argue differently.
We need justice in Syria to liberate Palestine.
Assad has failed in delivering that justice.
That oppression needs to go quickly so that
we can create an environment of some justice
or reconciliation so we can focus on liberation
of Palestine.
Which is why Salah al-Ayyubi goes to
Syria and Egypt first before he's able to
go and liberate Al-Aqsa afterwards.
I mean, we can also ask the question.
We just had war in Gaza and Assad
had Syria.
Where was the help?
Right.
We literally had a live demonstration over two
years, almost two years now.
And the impact was negligible.
Right.
So that argument is going to be weak,
that we need him to help with Israel.
No, entirely.
It's very true.
And also, when you look at Assad's position,
the reality is that, you know, there are
reports coming out suggesting that the deal that
the Americans want to offer Assad is abandon
the Iranians and we'll come in and rescue
your regime as well.
Assad is able to be useful to all
of the international powers.
He's able to shift and align.
If Iranians are angry with him, he goes
to the Russians.
Russians are angry with him.
He's able to recognize Bin Salman.
Bin Salman is angry with him.
He's able to talk to the Americans and
say, I need you to fight against terrorism.
And this is why people who are saying
that we need Bashar al-Assad, the reality
is they are accepting for themselves what they
would not be accepting for others what they
would not accept for themselves.
And here is the tragic irony.
And here I talk about those from the
Shia who support Bashar al-Assad.
The Shia tell the story of Sayyidina Hussain
going against Yazid, who they say is a
dictator and a tyrant.
And they say this story about somebody who
valued the freedom and justice of the Muslims
so much that he sacrificed himself against the
brutal dictator Yazid.
How is it that in Syria they flipped
it the opposite way?
With those who are much more similar to
Sayyidina Hussain going out and marching for the
sake of justice, for freedom, for righteousness.
How have they mistook Bashar for Hussain and
Yazid and made him the rebels when in
reality the story logically should be implemented in
the opposite way.
And that's why I'm not a sectarian in
terms of calling, you know, this is against
anti-Shia.
I'm saying to those who believe in the
Shia thought, if you look carefully at your
books, if you look carefully at your story,
you will find that Ali ibn Abi Talib
and Hussain and al-Hassan.
All of those from Ahl al-Bayt, in
my opinion, their stories resemble much more closely
the Syrians fighting against Assad than Assad fighting
against the Syrians themselves.
And that's why I think even as we
talk to, you know, the Shia groups and
the like, it's important that we talk about
it from the door of dawah that guys,
you know, Assad is not as good as
you think it is.
And I think a lot of it and
I finish on this point.
I think a lot of the support for
Bashar al-Assad that comes from the Shia
is out of fear of what Sunnis will
do to them afterwards, out of fear of
some sort of vengeance.
It's almost Zionist in the sense of we're
not going to leave Israel because these Palestinians
come in, they will do this to us,
they will do that.
It's like when you talk to a Jew,
I sympathize with the Palestinians, but imagine what
they will do to us because of what
we did to them.
And that's why I think that a lot
of the hysteria in Shia support for Bashar
al-Assad can be rectified, can be pushed
back against with a bit of dawah, using
even some of their own books to highlight
that what they celebrate is in the Syrian
rebels and what they hate, what they preach,
what they hate is in Bashar al-Assad.
That's a great point.
And also Assad, he's not even managing his
own country, let alone helping and facing a
huge enemy like Israel.
He's an incompetent dictator.
Hafez al-Assad was a competent evil dictator.
No one messed around in Syria except him.
Only – no one oppressed in Syria except
him.
Today everyone's meddling in Syria.
There are so many hands in Syria just
indicating his pure incompetence as an evil dictator.
He's a sloppy, evil dictator that can't even
manage his own home and his own country.
There's a youth that's in Syria, and he
tweets by the name of Tawseef Sharif.
And he tweeted recently today saying that the
powers that be – I'll let you define
who that is – are now trying to
carve up Syria into a Sunni portion, a
Kurdish portion, and a Shia portion.
Tell us, number one – I have three
questions here – the Sunnis – I mean
the powers that be, who are they?
Who would be the leaders of these three?
So when he says Sunni, what does that
mean?
When he says Shia, does that mean Assad?
What does that mean exactly?
And then number three, your thoughts on the
actual truthfulness or accuracy, I should say, of
the report.
I think that, first of all, the idea
that the Israelis are happy with what's happening
– and this links directly to your question
– the argument is that as a result
of Iran being weakened in Lebanon and Iran
being weakened because of its support for Gaza,
that means the Israelis are now capitalizing to
remove Iranian influence in Syria.
And that's, again, a half-truth.
The other half-truth is that the reason
Syria was unable to act against Gaza or
against Israel in favor of Gaza is because
Iranian militias are the only forces that are
keeping Assad going, and Russian airstrikes are the
only forces keeping Assad going.
It's not the Syrian army.
Which is why Assad, in his bid to
stay in power, essentially made the state impotent,
as you said.
Because the state is impotent, there is this
suggestion that given that there can be no
military victory in Syria because the Russians won't
allow the rebels to go to Damascus –
this is according to the ones who are
doing the plan – the Russians are saying,
we don't want the rebels to enter Damascus.
We're willing to entertain a deal to split
Syria, but we don't want the rebels in
Damascus itself.
The Iranians are saying, we won't allow the
rebels in Damascus itself because we want that
bridge that goes from Tehran through Iraq, through
Syria, all the way to Lebanon, because we
believe in this Shiite crescent that we're making.
Which is why Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian general
killed by Trump in 2019, you'll see Syrians
online on Twitter, they make references to green
buses, and those who haven't followed Syria won't
know what they're talking about.
The green buses were buses that Qasem Soleimani
used to load Sunnis on from the southern
villages and transport them north and bring Shia
from the north and make them live in
their homes in the south in order to
demographically change those areas.
Because he believed that if I brought –
and that's why when you go to Damascus,
you will see a lot of Farsi on
the streets, you'll see Latam now on the
streets in the way you did before.
Iran really pushed demographic changes.
A lot of what Israel did in Palestine,
Iranians took a lot from that playbook, the
idea of displacing and then bringing people from
India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Shia in these places and
putting them in those places itself.
Because of these demographic changes, it's been set
up whereby there are many Shia now in
the south, there are Sunnis now in the
northwest, and there are Kurds in the northeast.
The American plan initially was given that the
south has now gone to the Iranians, we've
been outplayed by the Iranians, there's all these
demographic changes, we need the Kurds as a
bulwark so we still have a state.
The same way the Americans did in Iraq.
In Iraq they went in, they were outplayed
by the Iranians who set up all these
Shia militias and the like.
And Obama when he wanted to do a
nuclear deal because the American people no longer
had an appetite for war, Obama said to
the Iranians, I'll make you a deal, we'll
do a nuclear deal, we'll share power in
Iraq, I'll let your militias become part of
the Iraqi army.
And meanwhile the Americans in the northern area
where the Kurds are, America established a stronghold
there that would always antagonize the central government
in Baghdad.
The Kurds were not allowed to become independent
because then they lose leverage in Baghdad, the
Americans lose leverage, but they were given almost
complete autonomy to do what they wish.
So the Americans want to set up like
the same way they did in Iraq, a
Kurdistan in the north, they want to set
up a Kurdistan in northeastern Syria which is
not independent but autonomous.
So it's independent enough to run itself but
remains autonomous so it can impact Damascus.
So for example in Iraq you'll know that
the president has to be Kurdish, the vice
president has to be Sunni, the head of
parliament is Shia.
They want to do a similar thing whereby
in Damascus you have the Kurdish portion, the
Shia portion, Sunni portion.
So for the south Iran, northeast America, and
northwest the Sunnis reference Turkey.
The idea of Erdogan supporting Hezbollah, supporting these
rebel groups, those who went to Idlib, you'll
carve that area out, that might be its
own nation or its own autonomous region.
The Turks, there will be proxies for Turkey,
northeast proxy for the US, and south proxy
for the Iranians.
Russia is the only one uncomfortable with it
because Russia believes that although it rescued Assad
by bombing and the like, the Alawi connection,
the Shia connection is stronger than the pragmatic
connection.
And therefore the Iranians are the ones who
will be on the ground and benefiting the
most.
Which is why Russia prefers to keep a
stalemate in Syria where it doesn't split but
it doesn't unite until it's able to establish
its military bases on the Mediterranean and these
areas.
And the Israelis, I think that they're unsure
what scenario they want.
Because even if you have a divided Syria,
suppose you have a Sunni north and a
Shia south that decide to unite, they assert
their masters, assert and decide to go after
the Israelis.
It's very difficult that Sunni Shia unity might
actually come about and the Americans will have
to attack them from behind by the Kurds.
What happened if there's a Dawa to those
leftist Marxist Kurds?
Because in Turkey, for example, you have half
the Kurds religious, half the Kurds leftist.
What happens if there's Dawa and they suddenly
become religious too?
They will have a greater affinity for those
groups and then Syria unites on its own
after splitting it into three.
There are many scenarios at play.
But the reference that Turkey was making is
this idea that Turkey does not believe the
rebels can go and take Damascus and therefore
their support is limited to perhaps the outskirts
of Damascus and Turkey will agree on a
negotiating table, give me this part of Syria
and these are the proxies I'll put there.
The Iranians will say we're tired.
We've been smashed in Lebanon by the Israelis
and under sanctions and Trump might come at
us very hard and we want to cement
our gains in Yemen through the Houthis, cement
our gains in Iraq and the like.
So we're willing to make a truce.
Give us the southern portion of Syria and
they put the story to go.
She a demographic now that the Iranians brought
in.
We'll put our proxy there and the Americans
will say have it.
Turkey's a NATO ally.
We can work with the Turks.
Iran, we can make a deal with them.
And then Trump will say to the Americans,
I brought peace to the region and northeast.
We have the Kurds.
If any one of the two play up,
we will mobilize the Kurds against you and
discipline you and keep that separation here and
there.
And that's why I know it's I don't
want to be the one to put the
dampener as it stands.
It may well be that is the more
likely scenario.
And I think some of the Syrians might
say they could say that it's better than
being under Bashar Assad.
But we wait to see how fast or
how how far these rebels can go.
I think that the Iranians, if Bashar al
-Assad is if it's untenable to use Bashar
al-Assad, they can use others as well.
Iran always has a roster of leaders it
can use.
In Iraq, for example, it had Nouri al
-Maliki, Haider al-Abadi, Muqtada al-Sadr, Adil
Abdel Mahdi.
It had all of these various different individuals
that it could use.
Same trend, same issue, but just different faces.
I think in Syria it's been harder because
Bashar al-Assad, the Assad family has been
so entrenched.
And also the legitimacy of Iranian presence in
Syria was built on the idea that the
Syrian president invited us.
And as a as a recognized government, we
are the ones legitimate who are here helping
him against a rebel group.
So it may well be that the Iranians
keep Bashar al-Assad, not because they like
him, but because technically internationally, he's still the
president of Syria and Iran can play the
idea of international law.
And even when you look at the language,
we're still talking about the displaced Syrians as
rebels and Assad almost as the Syrian state.
And I think that language needs to change
a bit, which is why, you know, in
my opinion, I think that at some point
we need to start calling Assad the rebel
because it's Assad who rebelled against the Syrian
people.
The Syrians had very basic demands.
They said, we don't want to live in
oppression.
For those who've been to Syria, I tell
you, interesting, Dr. Shadi, I remember in 2008,
we went to play.
I went to Soas University.
Actually, you went to Soas too, yeah.
I played for the football team.
So in the summer break, we raised money
in the university, sent us to play against
different universities in Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.
I didn't go to Syria and Lebanon at
the time.
My father was lambasting them on TV and
he said, don't put yourself under Assad's risk.
But I remember we had to have a
briefing before we went, where the British embassy
would tell us, if you go to Syria,
do not talk politics.
Don't talk to the Syrians about politics.
And remember, the walls have ears.
And I remember the students who were with
us, you know, my co-students, before they
went to Syria, I was like to them,
guys, I think you should take that advice
seriously.
But of course, they were Soas students, you
know them, rather than, you know, like occupying
their own buildings and stuff.
So the story goes, they went to play
against Damascus University.
So they're having dinner in the canteen.
And then they're talking to one Syrian youth.
And they managed to get him to speak
passionately about the reality of Syria, that this
government is a dictatorship, it's corrupt, etc.
The next day, they couldn't find him.
And to this day, no one knows where
he is.
He disappeared just for talking to those students.
And I think some people tend to underestimate
what life in Syria was like.
When people say that it was good before,
what they're not saying is, it was good
when I kept my head down.
It was good when I was humiliated.
It was good when I had no dignity.
It was good when I didn't ask for
things when I just settled for what was
given to me.
It was good when I lived like cattle
when I lived like sheep.
But when I wanted to assert the dignity
that Allah gave me, when I wanted to
assert my dignity, I look at this mess
that I've caused.
I think it's very wary when people talk
about nostalgia for times that looked stable, but
actually were not peaceful.
They were stable, but they weren't peaceful, because
you talk about something and you get carried
away.
And that's why I go back to this
point.
It's like there are some masheikh in America,
prominent ones, we don't need to mention them
here, who used to say the Syrians were
wrong to rebel, they were wrong to go
against Bashar al-Assad.
But my problem with that narrative is, you
imply that the Syrians had a choice.
The Syrians were living in Qahar, they were
living in zulm.
And I don't think that the one who
causes fitna is the one who stands against
zulm.
I think fitna is the one who causes
zulm.
The reason why the dictators have held on
to power so long is because the quietism
that allowed them to get away with literally
murder meant that they went so far that
now that they've gone far, only an extreme
reaction can push them back.
And that's why I think that if you
really care about the ummah and you care
about stability, you care about peace, then uphold
what is right and forbid what is evil
the moment that you see it.
Don't let it grow the way you're seeing
it in a land with holy sites.
Don't let it grow.
Don't be quiet now because it will get
to a stage where you will end up
like Syria, where Assad will mobilize the whole
state.
Not because he just because he wants to
stay in power because he's been taught he's
in what's been normalized is if I use
brute force, these people go quiet.
If I use brute force, these people don't
do nothing.
They're just content to live.
And that's why I argue that and I
finish on this point.
Beware of justifying zulm under the pretext of
avoiding fitna.
For Allah hates zulm more than zulm or
zulumat yawm al qiyamah.
Zulm is the thing that Allah hates the
most, which is why Ibn Taymiyyah said that
Allah will give victory or prosperity.
Allah will give victory to a just state,
even if it doesn't believe, but will destroy
an unjust state, even if it believes.
For Allah can tolerate justice without Islam, but
will not tolerate Islam with injustice.
Allah doesn't want his name associated with injustice.
Allah hates it more than anything else.
And I think as an ummah, and I
think this applies in American context, sometimes in
our comfort, we assume we have the world
figured out.
We haven't been tested with that pressure.
And that's why I think we should be
wary of lecturing those Syrians who lived in
circumstances that I don't think any of us
would tolerate.
I mean some messes are actually good and
they're in the process of cleaning up.
Anyone who's cleaned anything in their house, you
know that the first phase of cleaning, it
looks like a disaster, but you're actually cleaning.
Even in matters correcting wrongs in the community,
it looks like a fitna.
You caused a ruckus and you upset a
lot of people, but you actually took out
something very bad for the community.
I'm very good at that.
I'm like a specialist.
And it's all about honestly people that don't
know how to handle pressure.
They don't know how to handle the incoming
that's going to come, but if you can
handle that, you can do a lot in
life.
And it seems to me a lot of
Muslims, especially our ilk, they just don't want
to come near any pressure.
They don't want to rock any boat, even
if the boat's going off a cliff and
is going down, don't rock it.
It's like the Titanic is sinking.
Don't rock the boat.
Well, rocking the boat may save our lives,
right?
So sometimes you need to handle some pressure
and you need to handle the reactions of
people.
And even on this point, even during the
whole campaign, you know, like to punish genocide
and punish Harris.
One of the things that I struggled with
was I could accept a rational argument for
why Democrats might listen to us better.
What I didn't accept was the argument that
AIPAC and these other sides, they're so strong.
So we should not rock the boat.
We should not shake the status quo because
of what they could do to you.
And my issue with it was it reminded
me of when Quraish came to Medina in
Badr.
And what did they say in Medina?
Some people, they said, They've all gathered against
you.
They're so powerful.
Are you stupid going against these people or
the like, you know, you're rocking the boat
and the like.
And they said, it is what it is.
And we go out.
And even those who, you know, and perhaps
in preparation, now we have a Trump administration
coming in and the like, or you have
a Trump administration coming in.
In any case, with Trump administration, there are
some who are saying, Sammy, you know, we,
okay, we punish genocide.
But what comes might actually be worse.
And we might, it may well be that
what comes next might be an Uhud moment.
Maybe, maybe I'm just saying because the series
is a guide for life generally.
But when the defeat of Uhud came, some
in Medina said if they hadn't gone out
and shaken the status quo, if they hadn't
gone out and actually defied them and just,
you know, kept their heads down and did
things in a different way, They would not
have suffered the fate that they suffered.
But what did Allah respond to these people?
He said, try and avoid those consequences.
And that's why I always say to, you
know, amongst my own friends, or they say
to me and these others, sometimes we think
we say something from Iman, but it resembles
the hypocrites more than it resembles the sahaba.
We think, and I know it comes from
a good place.
But when you read the Quran, you realize,
wait, that sounds far more than what the
hypocrites in Medina said and what sahaba said.
I think that applies here when we talk
about the fitna issue as well.
Those types of people, Yanni, you're free to
be, I would say, maybe cowardly, but don't
lead them.
We can't have you people as leaders, like
we need people who have courage.
And it's not for me to tell people
to go have uprisings.
Right.
But it's also not for me to say,
hey, these Syrian people want liberation of their
country.
They want to live freely again and they
want to live well.
It's not for me to tell them, no,
go home and don't cause fitna.
Right.
And so let's go back to this three
part division.
So Turkey would manage the Sunni quarter, so
-called.
Right.
Who would they put in charge, you think?
The suggestion in the question is that Turkey
has the power to put someone in charge.
I think Turkey would make an agreement with
those who are on the ground and try
to influence proceedings on the ground, because I
think that it's important we don't take the
agency away from the Syrians.
I genuinely think that Jolani acted on his
own and Turkey is playing catch up, that
they work together, but it's a difficult relationship.
It's not a relation of I order you
when you do this.
It's more these are my interests.
These are my interests.
You need me, but you need me, too.
How can we work together?
Because there's an open enemy there.
We won't fight each other openly, but, you
know, you need to respect me.
You need to respect me.
But on this.
So I think that it's it's not about
Turkey putting someone.
I think Turkey will do what it's been
doing for the past 10 years, making relationships
with different groups, trying to organize them into
a coalition, respecting the local dynamics.
But occasionally saying this is our preference here.
This is our preference there with a bit
of with a bit of lash with a
bit of lashing out from, you know, a
bit of lashing out from the groups here
and there, you know, love, hate relationship, things
like that.
So I think that Turkey, as it stands,
Jolani will most likely be in charge of
that particular area in and of itself, unless
there is some sort of skirmish between them
and the Syrian National Army.
But I don't see that happening.
I don't think Turkey will allow the SNA
to clash with Jolani, SNA being the group
that the Turks, you know, established Syrian National
Army.
I think they will want to keep the
peace and keep that there itself.
But it's unclear if Erdogan will accept the
partition, by the way.
I think Erdogan would prefer a united Syria
because a partitioned Syria makes it harder to
get the refugees out of Turkey, which is
one of the key things that he wants
to achieve itself.
And also Erdogan, I think, can find room
to make agreements with Assad and with the
Iranians themselves.
I actually think a united Syria is more
likely than a divided Syria because a divided
Syria brings its own issues.
But to answer your question directly, I think
the Turks will keep Jolani there.
OK, so that means the SNA and the
HTS would essentially unify.
Potentially.
I mean, sometimes, you know, it's some of
the darker chapters of the liberation movements in
our Ummah against colonization.
They are united against the colonizer and then
kill the living daylights out of each other
after the colonizer leaves without any egging on
from the colonizers.
And, you know, it's the part of the
story that I tend to skip over when
I talk about the last few years.
But it may well be that instead of
uniting, they've established a new state.
They've, you know, Assad no longer has power
there.
The Americans have gone off to the northeast
of Syria with the Kurds.
Iran is staying in the south.
They're just Turkey there, which is unable to
impose itself.
And Turkey will recognize the winner.
Let's fight it out.
And, you know, Turkey will recognize the winner
itself.
You know, I know it's not that I
want to predict bad scenarios, but I do
think that it's much harder to unite than
it is to fight each other and try
to, you know, settle the scores and the
like itself.
So that's why I think the division might
lead to more fighting than than keeping it
unified.
We have a common enemy.
The Kurds, are they purely secular Kurds?
Because Sunni, Shiite, these are religious groups.
Kurdish is a nationalist group, but Kurds are
Sunnis.
So are these are you talking about secular
Kurds?
So the SDF or Syrian Democratic Forces, they
are leftist Marxist Kurds.
Erdogan used to dominate in the Kurdish areas
in the elections in eastern Turkey because his
Islamic rhetoric and Muslim identity meant that most
of the Kurds or a significant chunk of
the Kurds who are religious identified more with
Islam than the nationalist identity that the PKK
were professing and the like.
The relationship actually broke between a lot of
the Kurdish groups and Erdogan when Erdogan became
more nationalist.
They said we can relate to Islam.
We can't relate to Turkish nationalism.
And I think that's why Erdogan had a
different relationship with them here.
When we mentioned the separatist Kurdish groups, we're
talking about the leftists, you know, people who
aren't necessarily particularly religious and don't necessarily see
a role for Islam there.
Which is why I'm in Idlib amongst the
Hezbollah and the Syrian National Army.
There are a lot of Kurds, a lot
of religious Kurds, Kurds who cannot identify with
the leftist nationalist identity and still believe in
the Ummah.
And I think people sometimes neglecting Kurdish history
that when the Ottoman Empire fell, the first
group to rise to fight Ataturk to reestablish
Islam, not a national state, were the Kurds.
They fought to reestablish Islam with the help
of some Arabs and these other places as
well.
So I think that when we talk about
the Kurds, we're talking about the separatist minority
portion that America has given them disproportionate support,
loads of weapons, loads of support, loads of
ammunition.
This group can't exist without the Americans in
the same way that Assad can't exist without
the Iranians.
That can't be said, though, for the Sunni
groups in the northwest who enjoy relatively to
some extent popular support, not necessarily because of
who they are, but because of their willingness
to fight Bashar al-Assad.
So the Kurdish groups, I think that or
the separatist Kurdish groups, separatist Kurdish groups who
tend to be Marxist.
The irony is that America, which hates communism,
is supporting the communists in Syria.
But I think that if they establish a
state, it will be because of the American
military base, not because of the power that
they have indigenously.
OK.
People's everyone's eyes off of Gaza right now.
What is happening right now?
There probably could be, you know, things happening.
Nobody's paying attention.
Tell us about that.
What is the status going on in Gaza
and to the Palestinians right now?
I think Netanyahu is making an attempt now
to get settlers into northern Gaza.
And I think there are reports that some
settlers have made some attempts to establish some
homes there, but they've been scuppered by the
local resistance in Gaza itself.
Israel is still bombing, but I think there
is a move or talks to try to
achieve some sort of ceasefire.
And I think that the reason why I
say this is not because of anything the
Israelis said.
If you saw Trump's tweet where he said
that, you know, if they don't release the
hostages by 20th of January, all * will
will come upon.
I don't think Trump is saying that I
will actually bring all *.
I think that Trump maybe has information that
Biden is going to negotiate a ceasefire agreement
to take credit before he leaves so he
doesn't go out as Genocide Joe.
And Trump wants to set up a narrative
whereby they were so scared of me, they
decided to negotiate a ceasefire beforehand.
I actually think the Israelis are the ones
who are in trouble.
They haven't been able to annex any land.
They haven't been they haven't made much advancement
in Lebanon.
Yes, they smashed a lot of Hezbollah leadership,
but they are unable to actually take a
lot of remember a lot of Palestinians in
southern Lebanon itself, one allowing the Israelis to
advance and Lebanese as well.
So we don't take credit away from them
on the West Bank.
The Israelis are struggling.
Biden doesn't want them to take the West
Bank because part of Saudi Arabia's conditions for
normalization is the recognition of a Palestinian state.
However tiny that state might be.
And even if it's de facto under Israeli
control, I think Gaza is still being bombed.
The humanitarian situation is really terrible.
And I think that a lot of the
reason why it's slipping out the news is
not because of Syria.
It's because we're still in the process as
Muslims of building infrastructure whereby we can actually
push narratives and actually keep these narratives in
the news itself.
Gaza did not become mainstream news because of
mainstream media.
It became mainstream news because ordinary people were
talking about it.
And I think it's the duty of podcasts
like yours, and I'm not saying you're not
doing it.
You are doing it, whether it's thinking Muslim,
whether it's Yaqeen, whether it's all these others
as well, to continue to make sure that
if we talk about Syria in the morning,
we're talking about Gaza in the afternoon, and
we're talking about Sudan in the evening.
We are becoming, you know, the portals through
which people are learning about what's happening in
the Ummah, not on the basis that we
believe the West is going to deliver the
solution, but that we have agency to impact
decisions that are taking place on the ground
itself.
And I think that with regards to Gaza,
if that public pressure helped to force shifts
in global public opinion, and indeed in the
decision-making process of many policymakers, it makes
sense that we should keep the light on
Gaza itself.
And if it's any consolation to those who
are listening, the liberation of Syria is connected
to the liberation of Gaza itself.
I think one of the reasons that a
lot of the states couldn't go to Gaza's
aid, and to be brutally honest about this,
is that we still haven't resolved the internal
differences.
And I don't mean between politics.
I mean, in the way the region is
carved up and the way the region is
mobilizing.
The reality is Syria is mobilized between, you
know, the Iranian militias.
Lebanon is mobilized by the Iranian militias.
And this isn't sectarian talk.
This is the reality of what's taking place.
As said in the Iranians, and I always
say this, in Iraq when the Americans went
in, they agreed with the Iranians and the
Shia became the heads of government and heads
of interior ministry, heads of security.
They had a chance to show us what
the governance looks like.
They had a chance to try to give
prosperity, to try to develop and the like.
Instead, all we saw was, you know, the
banners of Ya Hussein and Ya Fatima and
sectarian killings.
It's not the Sunni being sectarian.
It's the Sunni saying, Ya Ikhwati Shia, please
stop with the massacres in Syria.
Please stop with the massacres in Yemen.
Please stop with the massacres in Lebanon.
Please stop coming with the Iranians and slaughtering
our population and doing demographic change.
We want to focus on Gaza, but you
keep hitting us from behind, not the Shia,
but the Iranians.
You keep hitting us from behind.
You keep digging those knives in, and we're
bleeding profusely because you claim to be killing
us in the name of some 1,400
-year-old in Yarmouk in 2014 when Hezbollah
surrounded it.
When they were bombing the daylights out of
Sunni in Yarmouk, they were saying this is
revenge for what Yazid did to Hussein.
Ya Ikhwi, what did I have to do
with what Yazid did to Hussein?
And that's why I'm saying that beware of
being dragged into sectarian talk from the angle
of being told to neglect the Syrians for
the sake of Gaza.
We are one Ummah.
The liberation of Syria affects the liberation of
Gaza.
So I would say for those who are
worried that Gaza is falling out of the
news, I would say focus on Syria, focus
on Gaza, and don't feel too bad about
it because Syria may lead to the liberation
of Gaza itself.
And those who are following Gaza, the Gazans
are talking as well, and inshallah we'll see
you hear good news from both fronts soon,
inshallah.
Which journalists, which sources, Twitter accounts, websites, what
have you?
I think that Twitter is wonderful in terms
of ascertaining the trends from the different sides,
and the commonalities will tell you what facts
are taking place on the ground.
For example, if a pro-Iranian tells you
that forces are marching out of Damascus and
heading towards Aleppo, it means there's a crisis
in Aleppo.
Even if you're reading on the other side
that we've liberated Aleppo, it shows you that
something is happening there in Aleppo itself.
I think that politics can often be understood
by trends.
What does Turkey want?
That doesn't change overnight.
That's a consistent trend over the past 10
years.
Read what Turks are saying, read what Syrians
are saying, read what Assadists are saying, read
what the Iranians are saying, read what UAE
are saying, read what bin Salman is saying,
read what the Saudis are saying.
You will find the commonalities and the thread,
and you can put it on a whiteboard,
and you'll be able to see what's happening
in terms of where the interests lie and
where things are going itself.
If you want briefs or general just overviews,
you don't have the time.
The reality is that you've got things like
the other journalists or outlets, whether it's the
New Arab, whether it's even reading things like
the New York Times.
I know that there's a lot of misinformation
there, but it tells you how the Americans
are viewing what's happening too.
I often think the issue is not sources.
The issue is the lens through which you
interpret the information that you're getting.
And I think a lot of that has
to do with memories of the Ummah.
And the reason why I say this is
that if you sit with Syrians and hear
their stories, you mentioned Hafez al-Assad.
Chances are you got those stories from Syrians
and sitting with them, and they poured their
memories into your head, and they gave you
a glimpse of what the world looks like
through their eyes.
The more you inherit those lenses, the more
you're able to interpret the information that comes
out.
Ten different people can pour out the same
information.
Ten will interpret it differently based on the
lens that they have.
Learn the history of Syria and the memories
of Syria.
You'll interpret Syrian news easily.
If you don't have those memories, you'll apply
a memory that's unique to a different country
to a country where it has no relevance.
Like the people who say that in Bangladesh
we're worried what happened in Egypt will happen
in Bangladesh.
There are two different memories.
You say that because you don't know the
Bangladeshi memory.
Inherit those memories and you'll find the moving
pieces might not be the same moving pieces
in Egypt.
I know that sounds vague.
It's much easier when you have like a
clear case example.
But with regards to Syria, follow those who
are supporting this push towards Aleppo.
Follow the Assadists, see what they're saying.
The more they panic, the more they're actually
in trouble.
Follow what the Iranians are saying when they
say that if Syria asks us for troops,
we will send troops.
That means that they're preparing for something.
Follow what the Russians are saying.
For example, one of the spokesmen said that
it's Assad's fault because he refused to agree
with the negotiations, which tells you the Russians
are frustrated, which means they might allow the
rebels to get to the outskirts of Damascus,
but not into Damascus itself.
All of these give various hints here and
there.
And don't forget, Allah created an ummah, not
an individual.
We have to keep talking to each other,
bouncing the ideas off each other, because often
you find you have half the information and
Sheikh Shady has the other half of the
information.
Bring them together, it becomes whole.
Talk to each other because politics ultimately is
the science of human relations.
It's a human science, so it's humans who
should be the sources.
And just go out and see, and I
think that's the best way to do it.
Wonderful answer.
Last question.
Let's come back to the United States for
a second.
Going forward, there was a lot of momentum,
but now that the election is over, that
momentum has got to stay.
I had an idea that, in terms of
American elections, one of the quickest ways to
figure out which one should be voted out
is just look at the AIPAC numbers for
each candidate, right?
Any race that's going on, whoever has more
AIPAC money, vote for the other guy.
Go the other way.
What do you think of that strategy?
And I think it's something people should plan
for the next two years.
I actually think, and I just throw this
idea out there, in January and February, there
are delegate elections for the Democrat Party.
And I think that Democrats, in this period
of reflection, it's worth sending people to engage
in that debate.
People that you can trust in the community.
The delegate is the one who goes to
the party, they talk about policy, and they're
like, they may have no influence on the
eventual policy, but they can ensure that the
debate continues, because if they're pushed to do
something that is against their values, they can
just resign.
But it's worth being in that space, not
to support them, but to ensure that, because
I saw today that one of Harris's campaign
managers is trying to downplay the role of
Gaza.
Bernie Sanders didn't, neither did Rohana, neither did
the Hill, neither did AOC.
They're all saying that Gaza played a major
role.
Why not get a few delegates to go
into that Democrat Party when they have their
period of reflection, and say, guys, if you
ever want to win an election again, you
can't.
And bear in mind, Michael Moore, who was
telling Muslims that don't punish Harris because of
Gaza, because Trump will be worse.
Michael Moore has an article from two days
ago.
He says, I am telling the Democrats today
that maybe we should no longer be seen
to be too close to the Zionists.
I don't know if you've seen it.
Wow.
He said, I'm telling the Democrats that it
might be a liability to be seen to
be too close to the Zionists.
This is happening in a period of reflection.
Why don't you send in a few delegates
to tell them Michael Moore's right.
Michael Moore's right.
Michael Moore says it.
And that's why I think that that could
be the next year.
And then the midterm elections, when they come,
we do the shared strategy.
We say, guys, where AIPAC is, go the
opposite way.
Just put that power in.
By the time the third year comes and
elections are around the corner, presidential elections, I
think the parties will treat you very differently.
And I even with those who endorse Trump.
It is worth going to Trump and telling
him, Trump, you said it yourself.
You won this election because of the way
we swung some of those swing states for
you.
Now, you have a chance to keep it.
The Republican Party has a chance to keep
some of those votes.
But there's going to need to be some
sort of concessions here and there.
There's nothing wrong with Dawa.
I'm not talking about concessions to values that
we don't like here.
I'm just talking about Dawa that we supported
you here.
We want this.
There's nothing wrong with doing it, even if
it doesn't succeed.
That doesn't defeat the purpose of Dawa in
its essence, in terms of being participants in
that debate.
Because if we could convince 10 million Americans
to sit out the election.
Remember, Trump didn't increase his vote.
Trump got 74 million in 2020, 75 million
in 2024.
In 2020, Biden got 81 million.
Harris got 71 million in 2024.
Which means Trump didn't win.
Democrats lost.
What made those 10 million stay at home?
Don Lemon and other journalists went and asked
them.
They said, I didn't want to vote for
a fascist or a genocider.
Where did they get genocider from?
Who told them they were genociders?
It was Dawa.
It was literally Dawa in the full meaning
of the word.
I don't call it political Dawa.
I don't call it spiritual Dawa.
It was Dawa in its full meaning of
the word.
Why not push that Dawa further forward?
And I agree.
I think that's a very good strategy.
And I think there are a few people,
you know, moving around on the ground, you
know, trying to organize stuff here and there.
I'm just a guest, you know, a foreigner
who's just providing analysis here and there.
I don't have no involvement.
You asked the question.
I just answered.
The strategy has got to be simple, right?
And someone's got to be punished.
We're not going to have anyone doing bidding
for us.
But we can knock people out if we're
swing boats in different states.
You're in Dallas right now.
Does that mean you're doing a U.S.
tour?
Are you going to come to Jersey?
I'm going to Michigan.
And then I have a final.
And then I'm supposed to go Atlanta, Houston,
and then head off back to London.
Oh, okay.
How did we miss out on this tour
that we didn't have?
I'm waiting for you to come to London.
You need to come to London.
I'll come to London.
It's about the U.S. experience.
And I'm waiting for you in London.
I will come to London then.
I will come and we'll get an auditorium
and we'll have two chairs and we'll talk.
Inshallah.
Thank you so much for everything.
Jazakallah Khairan.
Thanks for coming on.
Barakallah Fiqh as usual.
And may Allah give you success in your
tour.
All right, there you have it.
That was a really good analysis.
And we're going to keep our eyes on
whether Syria will be divvied up into these
three groups as Tawqeer Sharif, who is a
British—I don't know if he's—he doesn't live in
England anymore, but he lives in Syria.
And I just discovered his—people sending me his
Twitter account.
And because he's in Syria, that tends to
lend some legitimacy to what he's saying.
Sunnis in the north, northwest.
Kurds in the northeast, I think, if I
got that right.
And Shia in the south, which is more
like Iran, America, Turkey.
Those are going to be the ones, the
proxy.
And you want to see when someone's weak,
see how many people are pulling strings.
Like in a household, if you got the
mother-in-law pulling strings, and then you
got the friend pulling strings, and then the
dad pulling strings, and meanwhile the husband is
there, he's just—it's got chaos in his house.
He's a weak man.
Same thing is happening in Syria.
Everyone's got a hand.
So there is a dictator, and then there's
the incompetent, pitiful, pathetic dictator, which is why—
the guy was an optometrist.
You know, I think he went to SOAS,
too.
Bashar al-Assad, I think he went to
like University of London.
Look at his back.
The guy's an optometrist.
The guy's an eye doctor.
You look at his face, he looks like
he should be an accountant, an insurance adjuster,
a dentist.
This is not a dictator.
No, this is not a strong man.
And clearly, you see his country now.
Everyone's got a hand in it.
And they're going to divvy up his country
under his own watch.
Bilal Abdelkarim.
I saw that.
I saw that.
And yes, maybe I will have him on
and have his opinion and have his— because
it's all pieces of information.
He's very dead against al-Jawlani.
According to his visit on Mad Mamluks, he
says al-Jawlani is not an Islamic approach.
But that's a judgment based on what he's
seen, Bilal Abdelkarim.
And I'll follow some more of his interviews
out there.
Yeah, it's one of the biggest streams we've
ever had.
And have we done something—we have an opportunity
to do something physical.
Yes, we can't go in and fight.
I would love to go in and fight.
I'm telling you that I want to—I love—you
have to have influence.
You have to have impact.
I don't like to just be a citizen
here having— Did not the Prophet ﷺ say,
change it with your hand?
When you see a munkir, change it with
your hand.
I just read this hadith and the sharh
of Nawawi on it.
You see a munkir, change it with your
hand.
That's, of course, if you have legal authority
to do so.
I'm going to stick the GRT thingy on
so we can see how we're doing there.
If you can't change it with your hand
because you have no legal authority, as we
do.
We don't.
You go and they're going to say you
joined a terrorist group, unless you actively give
up your citizenship.
That's an option.
Become stateless.
Tell the U.S., hey, U.S., could
you cancel my subscription to U.S. citizenship?
Right?
And be stateless like some of these British
guys are.
And go fight.
Right?
If you're going to do that.
But we don't—we can't advocate doing something illegal,
which is being a citizen and then being
part of these other groups.
But if you can't do that, change it
with your tongue.
If you can't do that, change it with
your heart.
What Imam al-Nawawi says, when the Prophet
says that is the weakest of faith, it
doesn't necessarily mean that that person's faith is
weak.
What he means is that that's the weakest
expression of faith, the weakest impact of the
mu'min.
And that's really where we are.
Where our impact is, who wants to have
a weak impact?
And I've said it earlier in the stream,
and I talked to my Shaykh about it
today in fiqh, and we were talking and
saying, why is it that our group doesn't
have any presence in this?
Our aqeedah, our manhaj in the four madhhabs
amongst the Asha'ira and amongst the people
of al-Ghazali and Tasawwuf who love these
things.
I don't see an Asha'iri brigade out
there.
Right?
I wish I did.
I had to tell you.
I mean, I don't want them to be
terrorists or doing anything illegal.
But, I mean, I don't like to be
impotent either.
Right?
But, by the way, he did say, you
know what?
There are.
You just don't know about them.
He told them about the Naqshbandis of Iraq.
They're the ones who did Fallujah.
We're not supposed to celebrate that because they
did it against the Americans.
But, you know, King George did far less.
And then George Washington, T.J., and all
these other guys, they went out there and
did the American Revolution.
For far less.
We're a culture of revolutions.
And, you know, in Asha'iri, we know
we have rules on revolution.
We know that.
Rebellion, there are limits.
But the American spirit alleged, supposedly, you know,
it's changed now.
The American spirit was, don't come near my
rights.
Don't come near my freedoms.
That was the American spirit.
Now I think the American spirit is, don't
come near my Wi-Fi.
Don't come near my *.
Don't come near my drugs.
Don't come near my abortion.
That's what the American spirit is now, right?
But don't you want agency?
Why do we sometimes treat Israel as if
it's an omnipotent force in the world?
You can't do anything.
The Zionists will shut you down.
Even when he said Michael Moore said, you
know, maybe the Democrats shouldn't be so close
with the Zionists, I thought the first reaction
was like, all right, that means Michael Moore
is going to have a scandal in two
weeks.
Some video is going to pop out of
Michael Moore doing something wrong, right?
That's the immediate knee-jerk reaction you get
because of this belief that these guys have
so much power and they're such an evil
empire and a dark force, you can't even
say anything.
You can't treat people like they're omnipotent.
And you'd rather go down putting up a
fight.
But I'm telling you, if it was some
way illegal, somewhere lawful, and then lawful in
whose world?
In Syria, is there a law that's legitimate
to be respected in Syria?
In Iraq, what's going on?
In Libya, what's going on?
I'm telling you, we need the Ash'ari
Brigade.
A-S-J, Ahlus Sunnah, and you know
what the J stands for.
Ash'ari Sufi Brigade.
Anyway, and let me tell you something else
too, something that I tweeted out.
As a policy, in these matters, the identity
is Muslim.
That's the number one identity that matters.
And when I mean Muslim, not as an
identity.
Let me rephrase that.
The agenda.
Islam.
In the broadest sphere.
If someone is directionally honoring Allah and His
Messenger and the Prophet and the Quran and
Islam, he may be of a whole other
marriage.
I don't care.
But if he's generally there, and he's opposed
with atheists, Marxists, Zionists, Israel, US, Russia, whatever
it is.
I mean, I can't say US.
Delete.
Highlight, delete that.
I've got to keep my citizenship for now.
But, yeah, we've got to stream.
I'm also selling the house.
But that's who I'm siding with.
I don't care if, like, locally in our
ummah, I don't talk to him.
You've got to have a brain.
You can't fight two wars at the same
time.
I can't go having an internal dispute that
I have with someone on aqeedah, on different
menhaj things, and take that to the arena
of international politics.
It makes no sense.
Tell me I'm wrong on this subject.
So in Egypt, I know they go crazy
when I say this, but I don't care.
In Egypt, I don't know the people down
there.
I don't have any beef with anybody in
Egypt.
I don't even know the people.
But the secularists and the ikhwan.
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.
The Taliban and the Americans.
Israel.
Gaza.
Hamas versus Israel.
I'm not part of any of these groups.
I probably may not even agree with any
of these groups on major things.
But at that moment, at this arena, that's
who I'm supporting that cause.
Generally, people who respect God and his prophet,
and honor Allah and his messenger, we can't
just dismiss that.
Yassin, why are you looking so hip today?
What's going on with you?
Who dressed you up today?
We got two Moroccan Yassins here.
We got two Moroccan Yassins here.
Mashallah.
He came back from California, and he's looking
like a hipster.
Completely.
But you see, that's sort of my leaning.
And I don't say I affiliate myself with
any group.
I don't believe in that.
But that's the approach that I'm trying to
say.
In Turkey, Erdogan versus the secularists.
So my heart is going to lean towards
that group.
I'm going to want them to see.
Even if I say they're terrible, right?
But are they as bad as kuffar?
Are they as bad as atheists and Marxists
and secularists and Ba'athists and all these
things?
Now, it's a principled approach.
So, yes, they may be pious Muslims, but
now they're acting impiously.
As Bilal Abdelkarim, I think you just said
his name was.
I saw his clip.
Says that, yeah, the HTS came with an
Islamic spirit.
But they oppressed a lot of people in
the jails.
Their prisoners are tortured.
And that's really the judgment.
The judgment isn't they treated an irrelevant minority
group well.
Or that they treated the kids well and
the streets.
Yeah, the kids don't harm you.
Your weakest link are the prisoners.
And Bilal Abdelkarim, he said that they treat
them terribly.
So the point being, it's principled.
If you're directionally in that position where you're
honoring God and his prophet, that's the group.
But if you start misbehaving, then I can't
support you.
Because he said earlier, and that's the position
we believe in.
If you're a believing people, but you're unjust.
And the unjust cannot be a soldier did
this.
No, the injustice has to be that which
is ordered from the top.
Organized injustices.
Or they're letting them go.
They're letting them do these things.
Then at that point, we retract our support.
It's as simple as that.
You retract it.
It's simply a matter of principles.
You abide by these principles.
But at the arena, in the world arena,
you're just going to go with that which
is closer to you.
Even if within our ummah, we have nothing
to do with each other.
Swallow your pride.
Be pragmatic.
Follow priorities.
And also blame yourself.
Why don't you have any players?
Right?
Why don't you have any people who are
with the aqeedah that you...
That's tough luck for you that you're doing.
Blame yourself.
Instead of sitting out and saying, Oh, he's
not from my menhaj, so I'm just not
going to support him at all.
Okay, so you're going to support the Ba
'athists, the Marxists, the secularists, the atheists, what
have you?
And none of that means that you support
everything that that group does.
None of it means that.
It just means in their battle between the
kufr or the evil, that you're going to
support one over the other.
And the qiyas on that is the companions
themselves who supported a Christian nation, which were
the Byzantines, over a pagan nation.
Obviously, they don't actually support 100%.
No, in this battle, they support.
In this face-off, that's who they supported.
So I take the same qiyas.
If right now there is a war between
Israel and Iran, I'm going to be with
Iran.
You could say nobody.
You could say stay out of everything.
That's an option too.
But no, I would go with Iran, right?
Then that's with so much difference between...
This is situational.
I'm not supporting them mutlaqan.
I'm not supporting them absolutely.
I'm not like with them.
But in this situation, just as the Prophet
sallallahu alayhi wa sallam supported.
And the Sahaba, I don't know if the
Prophet spoke on this, but we know that
the Sahaba were pulling for the Byzantines over
the Persians, Christians.
At least they're within the realm of prophets,
God, angels, heaven, *, versus the pagans who
are in a whole other world.
So that's the idea that you're going to
go with.
Americans, communists.
I will go with the Americans.
Communists are complete Marxist atheists, and the way
they treated Muslims was far worse.
They just had no problem wiping everyone out.
And then belief in God, setting up any
churches, anything was completely out of the question
for them.
It was something they fought openly.
Whereas the Western civilization, yeah, they got their
issues.
But at least their approach towards these things
was not as aggressive.
They weren't officially atheists.
And that's the difference.
So if someone wants to refute that, if
you want to refute that, it's a matter
of opinion.
And I've shared this opinion with many scholars,
and they said, yeah, it's called the fiqh
of priorities.
And it doesn't mean, you know, retweet doesn't
equal endorsement.
On this moment, at this moment in time,
this is who I'm going with.
At this moment in time.
And you can stay silent too.
Ladies and gentlemen, we've got to stop.
Unfortunately, we have to go.
We've got class.
If you want to take classes with me
and with other scholars, I'm not even a
scholar.
But I can say I'm a teacher, and
I'm teaching some fundamentals here of aqidah, fundamentals
of fiqh, fundamentals of tasawwuf, fundamentals of uloom
al-hadith and uloom al-Qur'an.
That's what I teach.
Been doing that for many, many years.
And I am a student of knowledge.
I'm a student of three different shuyukh at
this moment of time.
And I encourage everyone to live and die
as a teacher and a student.
As soon as you learn something, teach it.
And never stop studying.
But you can go to arcview.org.
arcview.org and sign up.
And alhamdulillah, we did reach our goal, and
we passed the 6,500 pounds that we
wanted to reach.
We got it to 6,700 pounds.
6,700 pounds is going to the winter
drive in Syria.
Brothers and sisters, ladies and gentlemen, Jazakum Allah
khairan.
Subhanaka Allahumma wa bihamdik.
Nashhadu an la ilaha illa anta.
Nastaghfiru quran tubu ilayk.
Wa al-asr.
Inna al-insana lafee khusr.
Illa allatheena aamanu wa aamilu al-salihat.
Wa tawassu bil-haq.
Wa tawassu bil-sabr.
Wassalamu alaikum.
Allah.
Allah.
Allah.
Allah.
Allah.