Sami Hamdi – Israelis in Riyadh Why the Saudis want to Normalise
AI: Summary ©
The speakers discuss the history and cultural differences between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, including the US-led invasion of Saudi Arabia and the deceptive actions of bin Salman's government. They emphasize the importance of peace and protecting partnerships with Israeli public, as well as the return of the Jewish population to their lands and the influence of the Eastern LEDs on the culture. They also mention political and political dynamics surrounding peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
AI: Summary ©
Israel believes that if Saudi Arabia normalizes the Islamic
element of the issue gets put to bed. But isn't the Saudi Israeli
relationship de facto normalized? Iggy Azalea sings her song in
which she says, God, bring your prophets and bow down to the
Goddess. Doesn't it tell us that the Saudis and Bin Salman do have
some level of strategic autonomy. It's not coming from a position of
strength as much as it's coming from a position of somebody a
friend who's upset and saying, You don't love me anymore. I want you
to love me again. And if you don't love me, I'm going to go and marry
somebody else.
The so called Abraham Accords, delivered by the Trump
administration and embraced by Biden, has solidified Israel's
position in the Middle East. To date, normalization has been
enthusiastically embraced by the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco,
but the United States knows that the prize is Saudi Arabia. In
recent weeks, the mood music has been positive for the Americans.
It is suggested a deal may be concluded very soon, with the de
facto Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman, holding out for
concessions before he signs on the dotted line.
Our guest this week Isami humdi. He is the managing director of the
international interest, a global risk and intelligence company. He
advises governments on the geopolitical dynamics of Europe
and the MENA region, and has significant expertise in advising
companies on commercial issues related to volatile political
regions. Sami is also featured as a commentator for Al Jazeera, Sky
News, BBC, TRT world and other news outlets. Sami Hamdi, Assalamu
alaikum, warahmatullahi, and welcome back to the thinking. For
having me again. It's wonderful to have you with us and Sami. What
was the response to the last interview we had a few months
back? I think the responses were varied. I think overwhelmingly,
what was the most positive response was that people started
to actually look into what's happening in Saudi Arabia. I think
the most prevalent response was that, for many people, they didn't
have any idea that a lot of this was taking place, or if they did,
they didn't know the extent to which it was taking place, or even
the role in the government in promoting that. And I think where
it was quite successful, and particularly successful behind the
lahiwali, I think, is that it's created that debate and that space
for discussion to take place, something that I think that the
Saudi authorities were very careful to avoid allowing to take
place. So I think now that the ordinary Muslim is aware of a lot
of what's taking place, I think that's been the most positive
reaction. As always. We always have the polarized reactions,
those who say that it's not good to cause instability in the last
remaining stable Muslim country, and you have those who are
positive that believe at least that there's still hope, there's
still optimism in terms of addressing a lot of the issues
that the Ummah faces today. That latter argument, how do you
respond to, you know the Muslim who says, Look, I go to Umrah, I
go to Hajj. I don't really have much influence in the Muslim
world. What relationship does it have with me? Why should I be
bothered about what's going on at the very high levels of state and
government power in Saudi Arabia? The Europeans used to say that
they came for the for the communist and I did nothing. Then
they came for another element, and then I did nothing, and then they
came for me, and nobody else did anything either. I think it's
about being aware of how these trends are slowly encroaching in
that today it doesn't affect you. Tomorrow, it will affect you the
freedom with which you practice your religion today, tomorrow,
there will be restrictions on it if you're staying either and
you're not doing much about it at all. I think for the ordinary
person who goes to Amara, who goes to Mecca and Medina, I think a lot
of it is mainly about intention more than actual action, primarily
because the ability to do Umrah, the ability to go to Mecca,
Medina, the numbers that continue to go show that Islam still
matters. Shows that the conscience is still alive. Show that it's
very difficult to restrict and limit that idea of an Islamic
identity. I do think that symbolism still matters. So for
those people who say that I can't do much, I think going there and
continuing to raise the flag of Islam, raising awareness, even if
it doesn't mean sharing the content, but at least being aware
and telling people about it. I think all that has a relevance. I
don't think anybody who goes to Saudi should feel guilty. I don't
think anybody who goes to Mecca Medina for the purpose of doing
Ramana should feel guilty. Because I think that the reverse
alternative is that nobody goes to Mecca and Medina. And I don't
think that's what Allah subhanaw taala Salem wanted people to do.
So I think the direct answer to your question, even though it
sounds like it's a fluffy answer. The direct answer is to be aware.
Means that at least, when you see a wave that eventually starts
emerging that pushes back, you know, to jump onto that wave and
help to amplify it. Even if you don't have the ability to start
the wave, when the wave comes, you can be part of it through the
means that Allah has given. Yeah, that's an interest. So how
important?
And is it that political awareness should exist within the Muslim
woman? Because political awareness does sound fluffy. It sounds like
it's pretty inane. You know, you're not going to do very much
with it, but it's just knowledge. How important it is. Is it to have
this thinking about where the Muslim ummah is and her rulers are
in the mindset of Muslims around the world. I think the reality is
that when you look at the way societies are made, everybody has
a set of skills, a unique set of skills that perhaps different from
each other. And the reason being, I think that in Allah's hekma,
he's made it so that everybody's dependent on each other. The
reason I say that is because you will have some people who are very
accurate in terms of predicting what's going to happen
politically, and they may be horrible at business, and you have
somebody who can make gold out of anything, but in terms of
politics, he's politically not astute. He's unaware to how to
read the trends and the like. I think it's less about being
politically aware in terms of the intricacies of the detail, and at
least being aware of where the waves and the trends are going
towards, to not be blind to what is happening before you, because
to be aware of what is happening before you, it then imposes the
duty of enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil. And I
want to give an example of this, in that if you look at the most
powerful and potent force against evil or against these kind of
measures. It's often popular protests. It's often people taking
to the streets. It's often people denouncing they don't necessarily
need to know the nuances, but they can clearly identify when
something bad is about to happen, whether it's with regards to
protests we see against normalization of ties with Israel,
which is what we're seeing today, whether it's protest we see in
defense of the Prophet Muhammad, sallAllahu, Sallam and his honor
when he's being insulted in France, or whether it's the
protest that we see across the Muslim world against the burning
of the Quran, for example, we've seen Denmark now they're about to
introduce a law of two years punishment for anybody who burns
the Quran. We've that's as a result of the public pressure and
the public protest. So even if you don't understand the nuances or
the intricacies. I think every human being is able to identify
what is right and what is wrong, and then after that, it's about,
what do you have within your means to help, to push back against that
if you don't have the time, do you have the resource to give to
somebody else who does have the time? If, for example, you have
the popular social media outlet, can you speak out and raise
awareness if you're somebody who has the ear of a policymaker, can
you sit down with them and tell them the next time you meet
Blinken, this is how you can perhaps convince him to alter some
of the policies in terms of the way they're doing. Everybody has a
unique set of skills, and I think that it's about how to deploy
that. But the direct answer to your question is you don't need to
understand the intricacies, but everybody can clearly identify
what is right or wrong. Now, today, we're here to talk about
the process of normalization with Israel, which is underway, which
has actually progressed very rapidly over the last 567, years.
So us, Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, announced this
normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel. He announced
that these talks were underway, and Jake Sullivan, the National
Security Advisor, has held talks in Riyadh with Mohammed bin
Salman. So it seems that there is a diplomatic push underway with
each side
possessing differing objectives. So let's start with the Israeli
side. Why does Israel want so badly. Why do they want to
normalize relations with Saudi Arabia? This is a bit difficult to
to say in a way that is clear, primarily because I think the
easiest way to do so is to put yourself in the position of the
apartheid regime in Israel. And I don't want to put myself in that
position, but I think it's the easiest way to explain it. Yeah,
let's imagine we are the apartheid regime in Israel. Let's imagine we
are the Israeli policy makers. In 1948 we deployed our our
population to oust these Palestinians from their homes.
Those who didn't leave, we shot them. We took their land, we took
their homes, we established ourselves when they set up tents a
few kilometers away. We went to the tents. We drove them out even
further. We built homes on those territories as well. When they
fled even further into other cities as well, we successfully
managed to go in and turf them even more when the Arab states got
angry and they tried to invade and Egypt, Syria and the like, we
managed to survive the war. We managed to take the Golan Heights,
which is a very important strategic area. It is said that
the Golan Heights, against an army of 20,000 can be defended with
less than 5000 troops. They took the Golan Heights from this from
the Syrian authorities as well. They won that war. When Egypt came
back again, they only managed to take the Sinai, Sinai province, or
peninsula. They didn't manage to make any real gains with regards
to pushing you back or pushing your lands as a result, since 1967
since 1973 you've been a king. Faisal did an oil embargo. He
plunged the world into an economic crisis in Australia, in the US or
the like. But even then, you were still able to expand even more,
expand even further. You signed a peace treaty with the Egyptians.
You signed a peace treaty with the Jordanians. They're not coming
across your border.
Anymore. Meanwhile, those tents that have been established a few
kilometers further, you went back and you drove them out even
further. You establish your settlements. Oslo Accords come in
1993
you've divided the West Bank area into areas A, B and C, and B and
C. You have significant control and influence over those
particular territories. You can see that militarily, you've
expanded, but you don't have official recognition of that from
the parties that have promised to wage war on you in order to drive
you back. You're still protected by the Americans. You're still
protected by the Europeans. And it's in this context, 1996 the
Qataris come knocking on the door. They say to you, please go to the
Americans and tell the Americans to stop Saudi and UAE from
invading us, because I Hamid bin Khalifa have done a coup on my
father, and the Saudis and the UAE want to bring him back. I'm ready
to establish ties with you. If you can get the Americans to stop the
invasion, the Americans and the French intervene. They stop the
invasion. Qatar sends up an Israeli diplomatic office. Morocco
sets up an Israeli diplomatic office as well, in 2000 it's
reversed, but still, now you're moving towards political
recognition of your occupation of territory that you illegally took
and that the Arabs and the Muslim world once promised they would go
to war to restore the rights of their Palestinians brothers.
Suddenly, we've gone now from imposing yourself militarily to
securing political recognition of that territory. But Morocco is not
Saudi Arabia. Qatar is not Saudi Arabia. Qatar is the country
defended solely by the El ODE military base by the Americans.
Morocco is only interested in normalization because of the
Western Sahara issue. So you move forward, and now you have suddenly
the UAE come knocking saying they want normalization of ties with
Israel, because they're upset with the Qataris. They're angry at the
way Qatar tried to wield the Arab Spring against the monarchies.
They're angry that Qatar suddenly wanted to become this headquarters
of this wider movement that would have come at the expense of the
UAE and Saudi Arabia. So the UAE says to the Israel, I want to get
to Washington. Let me normalize ties. Israel's Donald Trump sees
an opportunity. Israel gets happy they have political recognition,
but this is only the UAE, and the UAE is aware that Israel doesn't
take seriously the normalization of a country that is the size of
the UAE. So UAE says, I will bring along Bahrain with us as well, and
then I will bring Sudan. It goes to Sudan, where the UAE has
brokered a transition agreement between the army and between these
liberal parties that want to rule without elections. And the UAE
says that, as part of helping to avoid the Sudanese vote for
parties because they won't vote for you, normalize ties with
Israel that will get the Americans to be happy with you. They'll give
you money. You can solve the economic crisis, and the Sudanese
will be happy with you. So UAE brings Sudan along, the UAE brings
Bahrain along. And then the UAE goes to the Moroccans and says,
maybe the Western Sahara issue, they can resolve it. You can go to
Tel Aviv and normalize Morocco. Says, I'm going to normalize ties
with Tel Aviv instead. So the UAE has brought Bahrain, it's brought
Sudan. It's brought Morocco. So for the Israelis, if you're
sitting there, you're seeing this momentum, this wave in that I
forcibly took these lands. I ousted these Palestinians from
these lands, their 1.9 billion population in the world promised
to oust me militarily. They've been unable to do so. I've been in
this situation where I have to militarily defend against them.
But now those who promised war against me are now officially
recognizing my territory before they were saying 1967 borders. Now
they talk about recognizing every area that I control at this moment
in time. The reason Saudi Arabia is so important in this regard is
because, even though the UAE has normalized ties, Sudan is a weak
country at the moment, Bahrain is a weak country at the moment,
often considered, and Bahrainis will forgive me for this, often
considered a Saudi proxy, for those who want to understand what
I mean. Again, I know anecdotes a bad form. I remember somebody in
the comments wrote, If he knows it's bad form, why does he use
them? But because it helps to give context. Those of you who've been
to the King AbdulAziz Museum in Riyadh,
if you enter there is a picture of King AbdulAziz sitting next to
someone. If you don't know the history immediately, you won't
recognize immediately it's the king of Bahrain, or emir of
Bahrain. The guide who took me way back, we're talking about 2010
1011
said to me, Sami, look at this picture and tell me if you notice
anything. So I'm looking at the picture, and it's King AbdulAziz
sitting with the Amir of Bahrain, and they look like brothers, and
they're sitting with each other. No, no. Sami, look carefully. And
I'm looking at the picture and they're sitting in their tribals.
Sami, look Come on. You should be notice something. I said, I have
no idea what I'm looking at. Tell me he said the king of Bahrain is
sitting lower than the King of Saudi Arabia because we are the
big brother in this region. That's the context of Bahrain is often
seen as a proxy. But for the Israelis, going back to the point
UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, Morocco only normalized because of
Western Sahara. Sudan only normalized for money. Bahrain is.
Proxy UAE is not really Saudi Arabia, but Saudi Arabia the land
of Mecca and Medina, given that the Muslim world kept saying it's
an Islamic cause, that the Palestinians have an Islamic right
to liberation, that Muslims, whether they're Arab or not, to
resonate with the Palestinian cause, that it is the Islamic
symbolism that means that the Palestinian issue, despite 1948
and the Nakba, still to this day, every Palestinian, or if you go to
the mosques, they make dua for Palestine. The Israelis believe,
whether rightly or wrongly, is irrelevant, that if they can get
the land of the Holy Mosques, the land of the Prophet Muhammad
Sallallahu, alas, the land of Makkah and Medina to come out and
say, we recognize the legitimacy of Israel over the lands that it
has taken from the Palestinians. Then the Israelis will turn around
and say, look, the followers of your Quran, the followers of Islam
have said that we are legitimate, that these lands we took, we
didn't take them illegally, that they've recognized us now. And
Israel believes that if Saudi Arabia normalizes the Islamic
element of the issue gets put to bed. I think they're wrong in
this, but they believe that Saudi Arabia would be the end of this
idea of Islamic Palestinian cause. But isn't the Saudi Israeli
relationship de facto normalized? There is this access between Saudi
Arabia and Israel in the region, and the two countries enjoy very
strong diplomatic relations. So why formalize it? What's the
difference between the de facto relationship and having something
formal? I disagree with the notion that they have strong diplomatic
ties or that the ties are, in fact, the de facto I think if
you're talking about Bin Salman's era the Saudi Crown Prince,
certainly, there's been an unprecedented drive towards
normalization in that. I mean, we've seen that Israeli teams are
now able to enter Saudi Arabia with Israeli passports to
participate in sports events such as the Dakar Rally, which in 2021
we saw the Israeli flag and the national anthem being raised at
the eSports international event, or eSports World Cup only a few
months ago. We're recording this in August, 2023
but we saw the Israeli national anthem being played. We saw
Israeli official delegations, or unofficial delegations in Medina
recording themselves saying they're planting the tree again in
Medina. That doesn't happen without government consent. We've
seen Israeli we saw Netanyahu leak that he had gone to Saudi Arabia
in 2021 of 1020 to meet with Muhammad bin Salman. The Israeli
officials denied. The Israeli government denied it, or Netanyahu
his government Saudi the bin Salman's office denied it. But
Benny Gantz, in a speech, said the ones who leaked the details of the
of the secret flight have acted irresponsibly. Members of
Netanyahu party went to the radio confirming that Netanyahu had met
Mohammed bin Salman as well. In bin Salman's time, we've seen this
unprecedented push, but I don't think it was the case of de facto,
strong diplomatic ties before bin Salman. And I think one of the
greatest proofs of this is even by the admission of The Washington
Post. If you look at there is an article from 2001 2002 about the
moment when Saudi and US relations were about to break, which is when
the Second Intifada took place in 2000 and Bush came out with a
speech. Again, this is the Washington Post article talking.
We all know the story, but there's no problem repeating it in that
King Abdullah. The story goes, King Abdullah is sitting in his
palace, and he's watching the TV,
and he's watching George Bush give his speech, in which George Bush
suggests that the blame for the Intifada is on the Palestinians,
not the Israelis. And the Washington Post, based on the
sources from the Saudi officials say King Abdullah, quote, went
bananas, and he immediately ordered his ambassador to register
a protest to Bush and he canceled the bilateral military meetings
that were supposed to take place with the US. The Bush
administration was led to believe in this events that took place
afterwards that the Saudi King was on the verge of cutting relations
with the US. King Abdullah informed Bush King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, that this is the turning point in Saudi
US relations, that we will cut ties with you because of this
outrage that you've done with regards to the issue of Palestine
and Israel and yes, Al Arafat is on record as actually stating that
King Abdullah's rage is what led to the concessions that the US
made later in order to secure the peace after the Intifada. The
reason why I mentioned that story is because what leads to Saudi
Arabia softening its approach from that hard lashing out by King
Abdullah in 2000 1002 is not the Americans or the Israelis. It's
Osama bin Laden. It's al Qaeda who end up taking those planes and
bombing the Twin Towers and hitting the Twin Towers in a way
that sends that gives America the perfect excuse to start
considering invading the region and invading countries in the
region, which they ended up doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, that
single move made by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Completely flipped the leverage that the Muslim world had on the
Americans on its head. What ended up happening was the Americans
went from being terrified that the Saudis were going to cut ties to
suddenly entertaining the prospect of invading Saudi Arabia. There is
a leaked recording that the Qataris have not denied by the cut
former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim in 2003
in which he states, Hamad bin Jason that he sat with American
officials, and they discussed how to split Saudi into five different
states, and that the pretext for invading Saudi would be the
support of terrorism as a result of what Al Qaeda did on 911 that
after Iraq, the if anyone listening to the recording, Hamad
bin Jason says that after Iraq, Saudi Arabia is next. And if you
consider where the planes took off with regards to attacking Iraq,
they took off from Qatar. They took off from the UAE. In other
words, that the US would not invade solely with its own troops.
It would be able to depend upon Qatar and depend on the UAE in its
invasion of Saudi Arabia. What we saw was King Abdullah, or Saudis
suddenly reeling. What Bin Laden did was where King Abdullah had
the Americans reeling to rescue the relations with Saudi what Bin
Laden did was he had the Saudis reeling to try to prevent any
imminent invasion. When people say that Saudi supported the invasion
of Iraq, Saudi did it because they knew that if they didn't do it,
they were next, and that it would be Muslim states supporting that
US invasion of Saudi Arabia. And when we see Saudi from 2003
onwards, having a stance in which we believe we would have liked it
to be stronger, I think people also need to put into context that
the damage that bin led and did and that Al Qaida did was not just
in terms of its terrorist activities with regards to killing
Muslims, or indeed it was in the way in which they obliterated the
leverage that many of these Muslim states who, when they were able to
exert it in favor of Palestine, they were no longer able to do so,
because suddenly the language no longer became one of Oslo or
Palestine Israel. It became one of war on terrorism with us or
against us. Those in Afghanistan know exactly when you look at the
invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Afghanistan was not
because the Taliban were harboring al Qaeda or the like the invasion
of Afghanistan. If anybody who reads the extracts of the relation
between the Taliban and the bin Laden can see that the Taliban did
not like al Qaeda, that the head of the Taliban did not like Osama
bin Laden, that he considered him a burden, that he didn't like the
activities that he was doing in Afghanistan. That didn't matter to
the Americans, even though they knew it, they still invaded
Afghanistan. So when people consider people listening, will
think, would Americans really have invaded Saudi Arabia? The belief
in Saudi was the Americans would have invaded, that the Qataris
would have welcomed splitting Saudi into five states, that the
UAE would have allowed planes to take off from the UAE. And in
fact, before bin Salman comes to power, one of the arguments that
the UAE uses to help the Americans agree to bin Salman coming to
power is by insisting that bin Salman is coming to power to
dispel the ideologies in Saudi Arabia that are at the root of
extremism. In other words, UAE is using the same argument that the
Americans were contemplating using against Saudi Arabia to get
American support, suggesting UAE would have gone along with this
argument as well. So when we're looking at going back to your
question, the de facto relations between Saudi and Israel, I don't
I think if there were de facto relations, and certainly there was
communications, the Israelis were under no illusions that these
relations were because the Saudis disliked them, resented them, and
only out of necessity. But in bin Salman's time, there is the
assumption that bin Salman is truly considering normalization,
that we're seeing this unprecedented move. So I would say
that in terms of what would be different, what would be different
is that Saudi Arabia would go from a country that was reluctantly
talking to Israel because its terror has an existential threat
breathing down its neck as a result of bin Laden's actions. The
what would be formalized is a new age of thinking from Bin Salman,
which is that Israel is here to stay. None of us are bothered to
go and rescue Palestine. There are benefits to be gained from this.
This normalization of ties would be one, not one that is done for
just personal interest, but one that truly changes the landscape
and entrenches Israel as an entity. Now we hear from the
Saudis, but there is a commitment to the Palestinians. If a deal is
to be signed with with Israel,
how do we tie that into Netanyahu governments lurch to the right? We
know that the former Mossad chief likened his coalition partners to
the Ku Klux Klan. How do we connect or reconcile the fact that
Netanyahu has domestic problems and Saudi Arabia are pushing for
some form of Palestinian rights in exchange for normalization?
Who narrated.
That the Prophet said in the man Amal every act has an intention,
and to every man that which he intended. Bin Salman's pursuit
actually, let's start with this way. At the time that we're
recording, late August, 2023
there are huge protests taking place in the Libyan capital,
Tripoli. Why? Because the Libyan Foreign Minister, the Israeli
Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, announced the day before this
interview, that he had met with the Libyan Foreign Minister in
Rome, and that the topic of normalization, of course, was
discussed. So the Libyans are furious with this. Libyans, of
course, are renowned in their history for supporting the
Palestinian cause.
Associated Press report that the CIA directors, William Burns met
with the Prime Minister, Abdel Hamid, and that normalization was
also discussed. But what Associated Press reports, or what
analysts are reporting, is that the babe said to them that even if
I am not against normalization, I am worried about the public
backlash. I would need something to help me tackle the public
backlash. The reason why I say this is because the Palestinian
concessions, or the concessions for Palestine that bin Salman is
pursuing is in this context, if I normalize with you, if I Muhammad
bin Salman, normalize with you, there's going to be a huge
backlash from the Muslim world. I am not the UAE. I am Saudi Arabia.
I am the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina. If I
normalize with you, you have to give me something through which
that I can go to Muhammad Jalal and to Sam al Hamdi and to
everybody else in this room and say to them, Look, I normalize
with Israel, but look what I got for the Palestinians and Anthony
Blinken. Two days before this interview, actually tweeted, oh,
sorry, the Times of Israel published an article in which
Blinken reports that Blinken has told the Israelis that bin Salman
needs something to show to the Muslim world. There has to be
concessions on the issue of Palestine in order to ensure that
Saudi can normalize ties with Israel, Blinken concurs that bin
Salman needs something on the issue of Palestine to go to the
Muslim world and say, yes, I've normalized with Israel, but look
at what I achieved for the Palestinians. That's why, when
Netanyahu was asked by Bloomberg, and he was asked to but if you're
not willing to give concessions for Palestine, how can you expect
any normalization to take place? And Netanyahu smirks and say, and
says, really, I think you should know Palestine is not mentioned as
often on the table as you think it is, like these negotiations with
the Saudis as in his you need to have a reality check. They're not
chasing us over the Palestinian issue. They're chasing us over
other particular issues. So I think that Saudi is sincere in
securing concessions for Palestine, but not because of
Palestine more, because if bin Salman normalizes ties with Israel
and doesn't get anything in return, he's terrified that
there's going to be a huge backlash inside Saudi Arabia,
which is why many people believe that normalization might not
actually take place in the short term. When the UAE were
normalizing ties with Israel, the UAE was saying that if we
normalize ties with Israel, Netanyahu will halt the expansion
into the West Bank. So they weren't even talking about
recognizing the state. They were saying, We're normalizing and
we're going to leverage that normalization in order to halt the
expansion into the West Bank. And the expansion was halted, but it
was temporarily halted. What Trump did was he went to Netanyahu and
said, Listen, you
in the American term,
UAE, an Arab state is about to normalize ties with you. They're
ready to do so Netanyahu. This is a huge win for us. Halt it, and
maybe you can continue later on. So Netanyahu halts, and then less
than a year later, he starts going in and raiding Jenin again to try
to expand once more. But the point here being is that when we're
talking about the issue of Palestine, Saudi Arabia recently
announced a an ambassador to Palestine, I think one of the
first in a long time to Palestine. I think the Israelis were caught
off guard. Yes, the Israelis were upset about it. Yes, the Israelis
have insisted that they won't allow the ambassador to set up in
East Jerusalem. Yes, the ambassador will stay in Jordan,
yes,
but that does the Israelis are not angry that bin Salman is forcing
the Palestine issue. They're angry that bin Salman is putting his
foot down and saying normalization is dependent upon these
concessions and Netanyahu. This isn't about Palestine. This is
about me. If you're asking me to compromise my position, I need to.
I need something to show the Muslim world. And Netanyahu, his
response is, ya bin Salman, I'm giving you unfettered access to
Washington. I'm giving you unfettered access to Congress. I'm
giving you your rehabilitation into Washington. That should be
enough. Don't talk to me about the Palestinian issues and Netanyahu,
his primary issue is that if he does give concessions to the to on
the issue of Palestine, if he does say to bin Salman, Okay, I'll stop
expanding into the West Bank, his allies will get angry. Just today,
on my way here to this interview, I'm reading that Netanyahu, his
ally in the radio, is saying we will not give any concessions on
Palestine.
It's, it's, it's absolutely a red line. And I think this is where
the normalization could be jeopardized. But I think that what
bin Salman is doing is that he has this plan B, which is, even if I
don't do official normalization, I don't want to antagonize the
Israelis. So even if we don't agree on official normalization,
your your sports teams are coming to Saudi we're engaging on key
issues. We're talking about Iran, we're talking about, you know, how
to bring our security apparatus closer together. So maybe these de
facto ties are just the way it is. And I think that for Netanyahu and
Biden, given that there's a time frame to secure it before the next
elections, it may well be bin Salman says that, look, if I can't
find a way to present this to the Muslim world guys, I've proved my
sincerity with the de facto ties. But you guys need to consider
something for me and you appreciate my situation, Sami, are
you potentially exaggerating the opprobrium that comes from the
Muslim world, the anger on the streets of the Muslim world
towards normalization we've already had UAE, Bahrain, Morocco,
Sudan, normalize with Israel, notwithstanding what you said
about Libya, and maybe Libya is an exception after the Arab Spring,
maybe there's just an acceptance now that these rulers will do what
they want, and there's nothing really that the man on the street,
the ordinary woman or man on the street, can do anything about the
problems, the challenges that come from these oppressive dictators
and authoritarian rulers, when Morocco normalized ties with
Israel, the way the Moroccans managed to temper the public
backlash was by tying it to an issue that almost every Moroccan
is unanimous about. Many Moroccans will compare their issue to the
Palestinian issue and the like, which is the Western Sahara. The
Moroccans believe that the Western Sahara is a holy cause. It belongs
to Morocco. It's a transgression of Moroccan territory and
integrity, that the Western Sahara still does not belong to Morocco,
and that the Algerians are violating the Moroccans by helping
the Polisario Front against the Moroccans, and that it is a legacy
of colonialism that they cannot fathom. Still has not been
resolved. What the Moroccans did, or the Moroccan government did,
was that it made absolutely clear to its people, we are not
normalizing with Israel because we, like the Israelis, we are
normalizing with Israel because they are promising to deliver the
Western Sahara. This is about pragmatism, not idealism, and we
already reversed ties with Israel in 2000 in the Second Intifada,
when we reversed the opening of the Israeli office. We can easily
do it again after the Western Sahara. And that's why the
Israelis refused to help Morocco on the Western Sahara, even after
normalization, and instead insisted that Morocco had to host
the Negev Forum, which is a forum of the normalized states in
Morocco. Morocco kept delaying and delaying and delaying because
Morocco wants to see Israel move first. But Israel are not fools.
Israel believed that Moroccans are playing them. So Israeli said, we
want to see you more. You really bury yourself in this
normalization before we do anything. And Morocco's response
was to threaten Israel with reversal of normalization of ties.
The Moroccans made it clear to the Israelis that given that there's
no action on Western Sahara, given that Biden, instead of moving
along with the Western Saharan, the recognition is going to the
Algerians and to promising them that he's going to do anything on
Western Sahara in our favor, we may as well normalize ties. And
Israel scrambled to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the
Western Sahara as a temporary stopgap to say to the Moroccans,
okay, okay, please don't reverse normalization, because we're
worried that if you do, Sudan will reverse and Bahrain will reverse,
or the like, Okay, we've heard the message. We'll talk to Biden, and
we'll see how to move along with the Western Sahara. The reason
that's relevant to your question is because the issue of the
argument to present to the Muslim world is very important. Muslims
know that Moroccans are against normalization of ties with Israel,
but when a Moroccan tells you it's not left I like the Israelis. I
want the issue of the Western Sahara. The pragmatism resonates
with something of the excuses that we make for Erdogan in Turkey, for
example, where Erdogan expands ties with the Israelis, but
nobody's under any illusions that he doesn't like the Israelis at
all. That's why this is even when the UAE normalized sizes Israel.
The UAE insists that it's doing so on behalf of the Palestinians and
that we stop the expansion the West Bank or the like. It's not
about whether the people will actually do it or not. It's about
the perception amongst these regimes that this could
potentially result in a huge fire and a huge backlash. What bin
Salman lacks is an excuse like the Western Sahara is an excuse like
Sudan, which is the lifting of the burden of the sanctions. When
Sudan normalized ties, the Sudanese who supported it or who
made excuses for it, said, listen, Israel knows that we don't like
it. Israel knows that we've normalized for financial
assistance, which is why the Americans didn't release financial
assistance even after normalization of ties, even after
removal of Islam from the Constitution, because the
Americans felt this was not a sincere normalization. What the
Sudanese argue is we normalize ties with Israel for financial
assistance. The Moroccan say we know.
Normalized for Western Sahara, the UAE tells its people that, look,
Qatar did it first, and also we prevented the expansion into the
West Bank, which is a very weak UAE has the weakest of the
arguments. Vincent man doesn't have an excuse like that. If bin
Salman is to normalize tomorrow, what excuse is he going to give to
the Muslim world? You're not a weak nation. You have money. Biden
is already chasing you. Your wielding influence, your projects
are starting to move, albeit very slowly and not in the manner that
you wanted it to. You're talking to Iran about the truth, so the
issues are expected to de escalate as well. What is the imminent
threat that you are facing that would result in normalization of
ties with Israel? And Bin Salman doesn't have that argument. So
whereas the Moroccan will sit in a cafe and argue with the intelli
Muhammad, I'm against normalization, but at least we're
doing it for Western Sahara, for the Saudis, they will have a very
difficult time in doing so. And I think that what bin Salman is
worried about is not that people will actually revolt, but that
they could, and that they would have a reason to do so, and that
the Saudi population is still at in a stage where you might have an
insurgency or the like, and the country will be plunged. And that
plan from 2003 to split country into five nations, the Americans
would gladly do it today if they have a chance. So let's then turn
to the Saudis, and what the Saudis want to get from it, if it's not
Palestine and concessions for Palestinians, what does Saudi
Arabia want to get? And I've read some papers on this matter, and it
seems that it comes down to three issues. Saudi Arabia wants from
the United States a NATO, like treaty, a Security Treaty on the
level of NATO. Secondly, a civilian nuclear program. They
want
the Americans to help them and to give them the go ahead to
establish their own civilian nuclear technology. And thirdly,
they want to purchase higher end weapons from the United States.
Now, before we look at these three objectives in greater depth, it's
a question I asked last time. Doesn't it show at least,
regardless of where Islam fits into this? And that's a heavy
statement, but regardless of that, for now, doesn't it tell us that
the Saudis and Bin Salman do have some level of strategic autonomy
that maybe evaded Saudi rulers in the past. They're able to use
normalization with Israel to leverage pretty important or
substantial changes in a relationship with the United
States.
I think that
a lot of it was answered in the last interview, but there's, but
there's a few things that I would add here, which is to flip the
suggestion that there is power in the strategic autonomy. There is
strategic autonomy in that they are chasing bin Salman as, and Bin
Salman is not as is not chasing normalization in the manner that
he was before. There is this disillusionment in Vincent man
that is not worth it at this moment in terms of the prize
that's coming joining the bricks, for example. The other day, you
know that surely is a slap in the face of the Americans, but you're
aligning yourself much more closely with Russia and China, for
example. Yeah, but the Wall Street Journal has an article that
suggests that the Saudi officials have indicated that all of these
measures are simply to coax or threaten the Americans into
actually coming back to this relationship and saying sorry and
providing that security once more. It's not coming from a position of
strength as much as it's coming from a position of somebody a
friend who's upset and saying, You don't love me anymore, I want you
to love me again. And if you don't love me, I'm going to go and marry
somebody else instead. It's more from that perspective instead,
because one of the things that's quite as interesting in the Wall
Street Journal is the Saudis have suggested that the news that the
Chinese will build the nuclear facility, that the Saudis actually
have, the Koreans lined up to build it, and that the news of the
Chinese is to get the Americans to have a bit of fear and concern, so
the Americans will rush in and say, Don't go to the Chinese. And
that's why I think it was quite fascinating that even with the
BRICS invitation, the UAE released a statement saying we're joining
in 2024 while the Saudi said we're going to look at the invitation
and assess its merits and then decide whether we want to join
bricks or not. And there's only one reason they would do that,
which is to send a message to the Americans that guys, I really
don't want to be doing this. I really don't want to be going to
the Chinese. My vision 2030 was never supposed to look like
Shanghai. It's supposed to look like Miami. As bin Salman said in
his documentary, I want you guys, you're treating me bad. I want us
to have a good relationship, but you guys need to get over your own
obstacles first. And the reason why I say that, with regards to
whether he's using normalization, what is he using normalization
for? Put yourself in Saudi's position. You are surrounded by
Iran, Iranian, Iranian backed militias in the north, Iran to the
east and Houthis to the south. The Iranians have made you
rehabilitate Assad into the Arab League. The Iranians have made you
give concessions to the Houthis. The Iranians have made you
reinvest in Iraq, knowing the money is going to go to the
benefits of their militias and probably find its way back to
Tehran. The Iranians have made you consider reinvesting in Syria so
that they can start getting the economic benefit from Iran and
when the Iranian foreign minister do.
Goes to Riyadh to sit with you, and you say to the Iranian foreign
minister, okay, come on. I gave you all these concessions. Now. Do
we have a truce? The Iranians say, Wait, we have some more. We want
to talk about hakladura. We want to talk about the dura gas field
right now, you and the Kuwaitis are sharing it. We believe that
you should step aside. We have 40% of the gas field, and the Kuwaitis
who only introduced the Saudis to the gas field as a partner in 2001
or 2000 for political and security purposes. In other words, to push
back against the Iranians, the Kuwaitis are no longer sure the
Saudis have their back, because the suggestion now is that bin
Salman is turning a blind eye to the Iranian ship that's now
exploring gas and with and taking gas out, because bin Salman
doesn't want to upset the Iranians and risk a re eruption of conflict
in which the missiles start attacking the Abdic oil facility,
or start targeting the royal palace area, or start targeting
Jeddah in Formula One, those missiles that made bin Salman go
to Sana'a in the first place, or send his ambassador to Sana'a in
the first place, to give the concessions to the Houthis in the
First place when we talk about strategic autonomy. The reason bin
Salman is seeking a NATO style involvement is because bin Salman
says to himself, look, the Americans are not committed to my
security. The Americans want to strike a deal with Iran. The
Americans prefer the Iranians over us, especially the Democrats. I
want to force the Americans into conflict with Iran by making a
NATO style agreement in which, if one of the allies is attacked,
America is obliged legally to go and attack the country that and
that's why the Americans don't want to give a NATO style
agreement with the Saudis, because they know the aim is to attack
Iran. So when you're talking about strategic autonomy, strategic
autonomy implies that bin Salman is in a position where he's
asserting strength. But a lot of the pursuit of normalization is
coming from a position of weakness where Ben Salman exerted strategic
autonomy. Was in oil when he squeezed Biden on the oil on the
gas prices and made Biden come to Jeddah. But normalization doesn't
fit into this spirit of strength. Normalization is Vincent. Man
saying to himself, how can I get the Americans to take a strong
stance against Iran? How can I get the Americans to protect me from
an imminent threat that time struggling to handle how can I get
the Americans to protect me from a potential UAE Iran Alliance from
Qatar, which I still don't trust completely, even though the
relations are improving, I feel quite isolated. So I want the
Israelis to commit to my security. I want the Israelis to be the
check through which I go to Washington and get them to protect
me in the same way that Hama bin Jassim and I said this in the last
interview. But I encourage people to listen to it, to this Hamad bin
Jassim interview, 2018 November. 2018 France, 24 where Hama bin
Jassim is very blunt. He says, When Arabs go to Israel or talk to
the Israelis, it's not because they like the Israeli. Bin Salman
does not like the Israelis. It's because they believe that Israel
is the key to the Congress and the White House. If you notice, in the
terms that you stated in your question,
Bin Salman is normalizing ties with Israel, but in the terms that
you stated, Israel is not offering anything tangible. It's about NATO
security, American weapons, American defense. Bin Salman is
talking to the Israelis to get the Americans to come and protect him
instead. And that's why I think that for the Israelis, they're the
ones pressuring the Americans to come to some sort of agreement.
And that's why Netanyahu, when he says that Palestine is not the
issue here, because Netanyahu knows why bin Salman is sitting
opposite him. He knows that the Saudis are talking to him because
they want Washington. So Netanyahu is sitting there and saying to the
Americans, Ben Salman wants security. They'll tell him he
wants Palestine. Hey, give him enough weapons. He'll give up
Palestine. Give him the NATO style agreement. He'll give up
Palestine. You Blinken is telling me about Palestine. Give
concessions for Bin Salman. Blinken, you've misread the
situation. What he wants us to raise the stakes. Instead of 20
weapons, give him 100 instead of NATO style agreement, give him
three new military bases. And he'll forget Palestine in an
instant. And he'll tell the Muslim world that Iran is threatening me.
Iran has surrounded me. Iran has its militias firing at me. I have
no choice but to get the Americans in, but to normalize ties with
Israel. And it's not that I like the Israelis, is that I needed
them to get the Americans. You guys accepted it for Qatar. When
Qatar did it, you had no problem, because Qatar's media kept
promoting Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamism and the like.
Sincerely, I'm not saying Qatar did it necessarily for
Machiavellian reasons. I think small state politics is very
complex and difficult. I'm not making excuses, but I'm saying
that it's tough. I always say that everyone's a genius on the bench.
When you when you're sitting in the substitutes and you're
watching the game being played, it's very different from when
you're playing center midfield on a pitch, and you know, it's harder
to see the passes that you're supposed to do. But the point here
being is bin Salman will say you accepted it for Qatar, UAE. Many
mashay are making excuses for the UAE issue, including mashaykh that
we respect and value. Many mashayi are making excuses for Morocco.
And the king of Morocco is considered the Senate of the
Prophet Muhammad Sallallahu, Sallam Shah.
He couldn't go wrong as well. Surely you can make an excuse for
Saudi Arabia. And I think that the other argument that bin Salman
could present is one that's quite prevalent, which is, at least I
can go to Mecca Medina, at least I can do Amra. At least the holy
sites are protected. At least I can get the easy visa to go to
Amra. At least I can still go pray in the mosque. Yes, there are
raves or the like, but at least if I want to practice Islam, I can
practice it, and Vincent man might be able to pull it off with this
marketing PR, while the Palestinians are left to fend for
themselves. So where do you place Saudi Arabia on on the following
spectrum, and I received a lot of emails and comments on your
previous discussion with us. So on the one side, you've got Saudi
Arabia as the puppet client state of United States. And then on the
ever extreme you've got, you know, the master planner, the strategic
planner, Muhammad bin Salman, and you know how he's leveraging the
relationship between China and America. And there is some cunning
plan there. Now you dismiss both sides, it seems to me. So where do
you then place Saudi Arabia on this spectrum, I think that bin
Salman is demonstrating very capable statesmanship and
strategic autonomy in the way that he makes the most of this very bad
situation. You may have now been able to buy your way into hajj and
umrah with that statement, possibly, but to be honest, let's
put it quite bluntly. Bin Salman, we said he's surrounded by Iran.
Yes, he's normalizing with ties, because he wants security. That
suggests that security wise, he's struggling when Erdogan went to
visit him, if you notice that Turks celebrated the deals with
the UAE because they were about investing in industries. But with
Saudi, it was only about drones and barracks. All Saudi was
interested in was security and weaponry. They wanted to be able
to deploy those drones. Because they believed it under security
threat. All that indicates has been Salman is outsourcing
security, and you don't do that unless you're in unconvinced by
your own capabilities, and you believe that you're under an
imminent threat, which is the threat that's coming from Iran.
And he's talking to the Iranians. Because of this imminent threat
coming from Iran, it's hard to argue that this is a position of
strength where strategic autonomy comes in, and where I separate it
from the idea of strength. Strategic autonomy suggests
strength. What I mean by strategic autonomy is being able to play the
options that are at your disposal, which is to be able to use oil to
accelerate the rise in gas prices that makes Biden come to you in
Jeddah and give you a fist bump and essentially try to say to you,
I'm sorry for calling you a pariah. I beg you, please raise
production so you can bring the oil price down. What I mean by
strategic autonomy is that, given the Americans, despite Biden
saying sorry, the American companies are still not coming.
Biden still shows his disdain on his face, that Biden still drags
his heels on key things that you're looking for, that Biden is
still negotiating with the Iranians under the table, that
Robert Malley, the envoy, is still engaging with the Iranians to try
to find a deal that's going to come at your expense, given that
you've pressured Biden enough to get him to calm down, but not
enough for him to actually make the concessions. You invite Xi
Jinping to Riyadh, you go to BRICs. You say, I will go to
BRICs. And not only will I go to BRICS, I will make it so that us
and the UAE and the Iranians, who I'm talking to the major oil
powers BRICS will now command a huge influence over oil policy
that before was in your hands or in the hands of OPEC, over which
you had significant influence, before the Americans still haven't
reacted yet. So we see min Salman, you strategic autonomy to pull
those levers. We've seen, if you look at Chinese investments over
the past six months, we're august 2023 we're talking january 22 to
August 1023 there's been a huge influx of Chinese investments, but
in very limited sectors. It's in construction of energy facilities.
It's in construction of things associated with energy, as opposed
to areas of vision, 2030, that bin Salman would prefer to reserve for
American companies and for American Vision when he manages to
convince Biden to change track or when Trump becomes president. He's
hoping Trump becomes president. And Trump says, You know what?
Forget morals and values. Companies just go. There's huge
money to be made. He's giving out checks of millions. He wanted to
buy killing mbappe from Paris and Jama for 1 billion euros, 700,000
you salary package, and 300,000 to Pakistan Jama. He's giving
lucrative wages Americans footballers. Why don't you leave
the MLS and go play in Saudi Pro League instead. In other words,
it's less about strength and more the strategic autonomy being one
of Vincent man is not bowing his head to the Americans. He's
refusing. He's fighting with the means that he has. Whether he's
succeeding or not, is a different issue, and that's why I
differentiate with strength, even in the response I gave to you last
time, Vincent man is genius in deploying that strategic autonomy,
in getting the UK to send him an invitation, and having the UK
policymakers saying we don't know if he'll come to us, because we
don't know if we're strategically relevant anymore. That is power.
When bin Salman is now, everybody is chasing him. That is power.
But if you look at the details of that power,
they're not chasing bin Salman because they like vision 2030, or
because they believe in it. They're chasing him because
they're seeing the checks being given out from Riyadh. Is that
strength? I don't know. Is that strategic autonomy? Yes. Is
normalization for NATO style? Strategic autonomy? Yes. Is it
strength? I don't know. Is squeezing or Biden for oil
strategic autonomy? Yes. Is it power? Yes. But is it strength in
that Biden now is suddenly reversing all of the disdain and
the like that deters companies from going to Saudi Arabia. Has he
reversed that? No. Is that strength? I don't know, and that's
why I want to strike this particular distinction bin Salman,
if I had to describe it, it's somebody who came to power made a
series of blunders, and has learned very quickly from those
blunders. So whereas he started at zero and then found himself a
negative, He's working his way back. Certainly, Saudi today is a
power that cannot be ignored. The talks with China are serious, but
not serious enough to threaten the Americans. Saudis are still using
China simply to poke the Americans or the like. Saudi still sees
itself as a mid power competing in between the two, but I think and
Saudis will be upset to hear this. I think that Vincent man sees in
Erdogan a model through which you can have relations with both, not
be as strong as both cooperate with both and still exert
strategic autonomy that allows you to assert your interest. And I
think one of the things that's quite fascinating is the US is no
longer the hegemon in this world, a lot of events are happening
where the US has to scramble. And I think bin Salman, in this
context, is taking advantage of options available for him.
Certainly, he's demonstrating a a masterful manner in deploying
strategic autonomy, whether that constitutes strength, I wouldn't
be able to see I get that. So what does the United States then want
from Saudi Arabia? And I read a really interesting piece by Thomas
Friedman, who doesn't always get it right, but he talks about one
of the so back to the normalization discussion. One of
the, one of the requirements from the United States is this China
relationship, including, there is again some discussion about
the possibility of the clear of the oil payments being made in the
Chinese yuan between Saudi Arabia and China, rather than in the
dollar, which is, of course, the standard in the world. So thus
bypassing the dollar and possibly moving in the direction of de
dollarization. And the United States wants an end to that type
of thinking.
What's your what's your view on that?
I think that
the US is certainly rattled by the idea that China could become an
alternative to the US. I think that people are getting over
excited about the idea of China actually replacing the US. Take a
map of the military bases in the region, and you'll see a but it
becomes abundantly clear China is not replacing the US anytime soon.
The US has military bases in key points. It's true that the Chinese
are starting to build in Djibouti and other places as well, but the
US still remains the dominant military power in the region. I
think that the US are certainly rattled about the prospect that
the Chinese could replace them at a time in which the US is no
longer as eager for military interventions as it was before.
There's a huge debate in the US now about, why do we send our boys
abroad to fight conflicts that have nothing to do with us? You've
seen that, I think Vivek, I'm not sure how to pronounce. I don't
want to offend Swami, for example, who's made his whole campaign, or
a lot of his campaign, about, why should we go to Ukraine when we
stand nothing to gain for nothing. Why? In his words, in the
Republican debate, he said, Why do we say? I didn't watch the whole
of it. I didn't watch it three hours, but I watched the
highlights. Why should we send money to Ukraine when we should be
sending it to our southern border on these invasions. Talk about the
migrants and the like. But the point here being is that the
Americans are in a very deep soul searching debate as to their role
in the in the global order today, as to whether the power that they
were able to exert not by ideas and values but by military force,
whether they should deploy that military force. And I think a lot
of that has to do with them becoming under the false illusion
that they became powerful by their values, as opposed to they became
powerful by their very brutal military force that they deployed
to full effect with the nuclear bombs in Vietnam and the like. But
the point here being is that
the US are certainly rattled by it, but the US also believe that
bin Salman is lashing out, that he's upset with them, that he's
angry with them, that this is a mess, a lot of it of their own
making. And that's going to sound crude if we think about what
happened to Khashoggi and some of these others, but I'm talking just
crude politics, amoral politics, as in, devoid of morality. The US
believed that it was unnecessary to alienate bin Salman to that
extent that Biden maybe perhaps shouldn't have rushed to call him
a.
Araya that for all of Saudis woes, they are just difficult allies
that are necessary in order to achieve American objectives in the
region, and that bin Salman is therefore lashing out, and that
bin Salman has given us enough signs that he wants to restore
this relationship and repair it, and that the obstacle to it is us.
We need to overcome our high horse, and we need to come down of
it and sort of go to bin Salman and try to make amends. The reason
I say that is because it is this attitude that means the Americans
are convinced that bin Salman will very readily wind down relations
with China if they offer him what bin Salman is looking for, if they
protect him from Iran. Leverage. US may not give Saudi the NATO
style agreement, but the US have understood the demand, not about
that. Saudi actually wants it, but the Saudi wants greater commitment
to push back against the Iranians, and the Americans truly believe
less so with the UAE, but certainly more with Saudi Arabia,
that if Vincent men can be satisfied in this regard, in the
way the deal eventually comes out with the Houthis or the American
situation in Iraq. We've seen the Americans now reasserting
themselves in Iraq in the way that perhaps bin Salman, his bio
actors, might give him greater confidence that bin Salman might
say, You know what China can't give me more than what the
Americans give me anyway, investment is coming in from the
Americans vision 23 The reason I mentioned Miami is because it's
been said man's own words that he used in the documentary, when he
said, When you go to Miami and you come out, you have entertainment,
etc, we want to build something like Miami. He didn't say
Shanghai. Didn't say benjing, Beijing. He didn't say Cheng do.
He didn't say Chongqing. He didn't say any of these places. He said,
I want to build it like Miami. If Biden manages to send these trade
delegation, division 2030 I ask everybody who's listening, do you
think that bin Salman sitting next to Elon Musk and sitting next to
one of the or Alibaba or the Chinese businessmen or the like?
Do you think he will choose the Chinese over Elon Musk or over or
Amazon or the like? I hardly think so. And that's why I think that
for Bin Salman, it's true that China is taking budget
opportunity, but I thought it very significant that Xi Jinping did
not give a speech at the BRICS summit in which Saudi was invited.
Putin did not attend in person. That may have been because of
Ukraine, but I think there's it also. It's also testament to how
Russia and China view this expansion, which is that, look,
BRICS is not an effective organization the way OPEC is. It's
still a very loose Alliance. We don't have many internal
structures, per se
that Saudi Arabia, given we're not wholehearted, we don't believe
they're wholeheartedly committed to us and UAE. Why should the
Chinese Premier give a speech celebrating their introduction?
Why? And the politicization of the expansion was clear in the way
Algeria was rejected. Algeria has more credentials to join BRICS
than any of but it appears that UAE and its allies join UAE,
Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, almost as if Xi Jinping is saying, look,
there's a potential here for being an alternative and growth in these
ties. But I still think that the Saudis would throw me out the
window in an instant, if the Americans come back with a full
package, if the Republicans come and say, we're ready to commit to
you wholeheartedly. And I still think the Saudis are at a stage
where, and that's why I mentioned about the investments of the
Chinese investment. If you see where they're going, they're not
going in sectors that are irreversible. They're not going in
sectors where China can entrench itself in Saudi Arabia, those
industries are off limits to the Chinese. It looks like bin Salman
is giving the Chinese enough for them to at least keep the bait,
but not enough for the Americans to say this is a genuine turn, and
the US genuinely believe Vincent man will turn his back on China if
they give him what he wants. So Sami, can I ask you about then the
US, place or position in the Middle East today? And it's a
common talking point now in in Western political circles, but
there's been a retreat from the Middle East, from the Obama times
onwards, and America no longer focuses on the Middle East, and
its focus now is is almost wholly on the Far East, in China and the
rise of China.
Where do you or how do you rate America's place currently in that
region? I think it's unprecedentedly weak. I think the
US is no longer the major power that it once was. It's certainly
the major power in terms it's still number one, but it's not
number one in the way that it was running away with the game like it
was before. I think the US is behind on many of the issues that
are taking place in the region. If you look at the Yemen file, it's
firmly in the Saudi hands. The US are playing catch up with regards
to Saudi on Yemen. And I think that's why the US envoy is always
having to shuttle back and forth to Muscat. He goes to Muscat to
talk to the Saudis as well, not just because he feels himself that
he's locked out of a lot of the issues that are taking place in
Yemen. If you look at Sudan, for example, it's not the US leading
the initiative, it's Saudi and the UAE now leading the initiative,
and the US sort of adapting here and there, listening, trying to
find its policy. I think when you look at Iraq, for example, we see
the Turks now coming in via the north, through the Kurdish areas,
and the US now having to adapt. If you look at Syria, is the US
struggling to adapt. I think that whereas before, the US had an iron
grip on a lot of these issues.
I think the US hold is not as strong as it once was, and that's
not because it's become weak. It's because the US came to this
conclusion that it could still bulldoze its view on everybody
else, and as a result, it upset too many allies at the same time.
Before Turkey would be upset, but Saudi would be happy. Before Saudi
would be upset, but Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, all these nations would be
happy. The US is in a position where Qatar is upset, UAE is
upset, Saudi is upset, Turkey is upset, Kuwait is upset. Bahrain is
upset. Egypt's upset. Algeria is upset, Morocco's upset, Libby's
upset. There's not a single nation in the region that is happy with
the US and all of these nations, instead of the US trying to
appease them, albeit it's doing it somewhat to Algeria and the like
all of these nations are, suddenly they went through a period where
they were sort of in no man's land. And then they said, Okay,
given the US is not taking collectively, taking us seriously,
let's pursue alternatives or try to come to agreements between
ourselves. And that's why I think that while bin Salman looks to the
US as the ideal partner, I think the exertion of autonomy that
we're seeing, albeit it's always existed, I think the manner we're
seeing it implemented today, has a lot to do with this idea that one
the US has a vision of the Middle East that contradicts the vision
of the allies. By that, I mean specifically that the US sees Iran
as the new US ally. It wants to deal with the Iranians. The
Democrats want Iran to become a US ally. They're ready to make
concessions to the Iranians and the Saudis and the UAE. Believe
that it's going to come at their expense, that the Americans have
come to this conclusion that the Arabs are not as good allies as
the Iranians are, that we back the Arabs and they still weren't able
to push back against Iran. Iran today is in Syria. It's in Iraq.
It's in Lebanon. It's in this in Yemen, when the Iranians want to
spoil something, they can easily do it through Hezbollah, through
Houthis, through hash the Shabi. There is a video that went viral
of a refugee in Norway who did a video bragging about how he fought
with the Hashd, the shabby in Iraq, on Syrian territory, against
those who wanted to rise up against the Assad,
another example of the links that Iran has between these different
nations, the Americans say, Look, if you can't beat them, join them.
We had historical relations with Iran. We were good friends with
the Shah. Khomeini came and ruined it. There's no reason why we can't
establish new relations with Iran. And it's this particular note that
makes the other allies in the Gulf say that if the Americans have
this vision that's against our interests, that's going to come at
our expense, why are we sitting here waiting for the Americans to
screw us over? Let's start pursuing alternatives. Let's talk
to China. Let's come to a truce with Iran, and then later we can
push back the Houthis and the others later on, and I think
that's why the Americans have become weak. In that one, the
Americans don't want to deploy military power anymore, because
domestically, the people aren't tolerating the continued deaths of
their soldiers abroad. They're asking questions, and it's become
a hot topic, but Obama talked about winding down. Trump said,
Why are we fighting wars that we have no interest in? Anybody who
reads the piece by James Jeffrey, the former US envoy to Syria, he
talks about his interactions with Trump, where the generals would
say, Syria is important for us interests, and Trump would say,
Why the * are we there? I don't understand why American troops
have to be in Syria. So you can see that it's not just the
Democrat issue. The democrats and the republicans are increasingly
saying that we why are we deploying military force abroad?
And that suggests that the Americans are no longer willing to
deploy their military power as they once were. And the second,
their political alternative is one that upsets everyone in the
region. So collectively, they're all starting to talk between
themselves and talk to China. And I think that's what I mean by
America is becoming weak. It's not weak because it lacks resources.
It's weak because it no longer has a desire, and its political vision
doesn't align with its allies, and it's alienated them all at once,
and now it finds itself in a difficult position. So Sami, let's
turn to Turkey. Despite what we're led to believe, Turkey has already
normalized relations with Israel. I mean, this is pre Erdogan, but
Erdogan has intensified that normalization process. So I
suppose my question is, why is it good for Erdogan, or at least, why
does Erdogan not get the level of animus or anger from the global
Muslim community for normalizing relations? Yet we accuse Mohammed
bin Salman of of cheating the Ummah by by this normalization
process. I think that's a valid criticism and a valid argument
that's often made, particularly with at a time in which Erdogan
has invited the Israeli president, who's gone to Ankara. He tried to
invite Netanyahu. Netanyahu didn't go because he was in hospital. He
needed he had an issue with his heart, because Erdogan is trying
to discussing a new pipeline. Certainly there is this expansion
of ties and trade between Turkey and Israel, which does suggest the
idea, why is it halal for Erdogan and haram for Mohammed bin Salman?
I think the reality has more to do with one, how Palestinians
perceive the reasons why Erdogan is doing it.
Versus how people perceive Muhammad bin Salman, or the
reasons Muhammad bin Salman is doing it. And I think one of the
things that's worth noting here is if you look at the way Netanyahu
approaches normalization with the UAE or with Saudi Arabia, compared
to how he approaches Erdogan, there is a clear difference with
the UAE. He approaches it as if he truly believes there is a
friendship that is blossoming. He believes that the UAE are sincere
in promoting normalization. And there is this sense that they are
becoming friends with one another, if not Netanyahu, then at least
the Israelis and the UAE. There is a sense that Netanyahu, when he
talks about the Saudis, he, for example, came out in a video
thanking the Saudis for allowing a Israeli plane to make an emergency
landing in Jeddah. There is this sense that Netanyahu is seeking a
warm friendship with Muhammad bin Salman. But when it comes to
Erdogan, Netanyahu is very blood. Netanyahu says so the Israeli
Netanyahu says that Erdogan comes seeking my friendship when he's
weak, but calls me Hitler when he's strong. The in the
implication that Netanyahu is suggesting is that I know Erdogan
despises me. I know Erdogan would love to see Israel ruined. I know
that Erdogan would love to see the Palestinians retake Al Aqsa or the
like, and he's only coming to me because he lacks the strength to
do so. And I think that view, or that opinion amongst many of the
Muslims, is is what allows room for people to make excuses,
whether justified or unjustified. Is irrelevant to make excuses for
Erdogan because they believe that it's more a case of Erdogan lacks
the strength, rather than a genuine desire for Erdogan to
pursue ties with Israel. And I think that you can strike the
comparison in terms of you can see it even in the manner in which
they try to project their identities, the Turkish identity
and the Saudi identity in the Muslim world itself, which
suggests where their true convictions lie.
You can see, for example, in Turkey, we've seen that the
government, we're talking about government sponsored initiatives.
The government has funded series such as erturo, such as Al
Arsalan, such as Barbaros, such as urumi, such as all these other
different series that are designed to re imbue the Turkish identity
with some sort of Islam. At the time of recording, we're seeing a
heightened issue of racism towards Syrians or the like. But there is
an argument that I think is very legitimate and justified, which is
that the lashing out against Syrians is less an expression of
racism towards Syrian as much as it's a lashing out by secular
Turks of the way the Turkish identity is changing. And the
reason I say that is there is an equivalent video of an area, I
think it's kojali, or another place, where a Turkish woman is
shouting at a hijabi and demanding to know first, if she's Syrian or
Turk, and when the hijabi says she's a Turk, she still gets
lambasted and gets told, we don't dress like this here in Turkey,
suggesting that what these racists are really upset about is not the
Syrians being there, but that the fact that Syrians have found a
haven in Turkey, the fact that Muslims are becoming attracted to
Turkey is an indication that Erdogan has shifted the identity
of Turkey from one that is very nationalist and shifting it more
towards something that is Islamic, contrast that with what the Saudi
government is funded. Many people will have seen the video. If they
haven't seen it, they can just google Iggy Azalea in Riyadh. She
was in Riyadh at the time of recording, one week before the
time of recording on the 25th of August, she was in Riyadh at a
concert singing her lyrics. Iriav in Saudi Arabia, in the land of
the Two Holy Mosques, in the land of the Prophet Muhammad,
sallAllahu, alayhi wa sallam, who came with the wahi, who came with
Islam, who came with the deen. Iggy Azalea sings her song in
which she says, God, bring your prophets and bow down to the
Goddess. And she's dressed in a very raunchy way, and she's
twerking on stage or the like, but this is a government funded event,
and this is also part of vision 2030 we discussed some of the
other measures in the previous podcast. But when you look at what
identities these two are pushing, the identities or the symbolism,
or the priority of the symbolism indicates where the hearts truly
lie in that Erdogan may have dealings with Israel, and I'm not
justifying it. I'm somebody who regularly criticizes erdogan's
approach to Israel, and I think it's really sad, because, in my
opinion, the only reason Erdogan is doing it is because he fears
economic reprisals, meaning that the Turks might vote him out. What
Erdogan is more concerned about is the Turkish vote, and he believes
the Turks are willing to accept normalization in exchange for
economic benefit. I think that's where the crux of the issue. It's
less Israel than Erdogan, but the idea of the government supported
symbolism indicates where their hearts lie. So it's true that
Erdogan has ties with Israel. He's negotiated with Netanyahu
recently, when he invited Netanyahu, he invited Mahmoud
Abbas as well. The reason he invited Mahmoud Abbas was simply
to say, look, I'm inviting Netanyahu, but the Palestinians
have no problem with it. The reason Mahmoud Abbas went, despite
knowing he was a political tool used to justify Netanyahu his
visit, is because Mahmoud Abbas is aware that for all of erdogan's
antics with Israel, he remains popular amongst the Palestinians
because the Palestinians.
Believe that for all of erdogan's antics, underneath all of those
layers is a sincere desire to see the Palestinians succeed and the
like. So the direct answer to your question is the popular perception
is that Erdogan deals with Israel Quran. He hates doing it, but he's
forced to do so by political circumstances, even if we
criticize it. You cannot deny that he feels that hatred, whereas
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there is a sense whether it's correct or
not, that they're doing so because they genuinely don't care about
the Palestinians, and they're looking for some sort of political
benefit or gain. The final point that's worth mentioning is this,
which is that there are many similarities between Turkey and
Saudi's pursuit of normalization of ties with Israel in the sense
that they want to assert the strategic autonomy or strategic
power. But the reason why Turkey is so successful where Saudi
Arabia is not particularly when you think that Saudi over the
years, has written many checks for opposition movements. They've
hosted many opposition politicians in the past, they've done a lot.
The reason why is because, in addition to the resources that
they deploy, Erdogan Islamic soft power and it's undeniably Islamic,
there is no indication that suggests otherwise, even the Turks
who criticize and criticize him for this Islamic identity foreign
politics that allows him to intervene in Libya, intervene in
Azerbaijan, to Talk about intervening in Mali, in all these
Muslim areas, it's that soft power that means that even though Turkey
is weaker than France or the US in resources, it's able to fight at
the same weight or the same weight level, because the soft power it
evokes in those societies means there is a haven through which
Turkey can rapidly develop ties With Somalia, with Somalia, with
Somalian politicians, with a Somalian defense minister, with
Mali defense minister set up Turkish military bases because the
local population doesn't see Turkey as a colonizer in the way
they see the French as a colonizer. As a result of the
Islamic Brotherhood that Erdogan, at least publicly, preaches, how
much of this is Erdogan utilizing Islam cynically, and how much of
this is a sincere attempt to reorient Turkish policy towards
Islam. I note that during the period the frozen period of
relations between Egypt and Turkey, Erdogan courted many of
the Muslim Brotherhood members. Even those members began
studios and began broadcasts in Turkey. Once the relationship was
unfrozen, once the relationship had once again become strong and
warm and diplomatic, he clamped down on these and, in fact,
ordered many of these Islamic Brotherhood people to leave
Turkey. I mean, that seems like someone who is utilizing it's a
Islam, rather than someone who is sincerely trying to reorient
Turkey in an Islamic in an Islamic way. I think that when people
there are two ways to approach this. The first is people tend to
look at Erdogan from 2002 not from 1920s when the Turkish Republic
was established and the Ottoman caliphate fell. The reason why I
think there's a distinction between the two is because if you
look at it from when Erdogan started in 1003 there's a lot of
argument for pragmatism. When you look at it from 1920 then Erdogan
becomes the product of a widespread Muslim Islamic movement
that sought to drive out Ataturk's influence and push back against
the secular influence, to break those chains where military coups
would take place. On Adnan Menderes, who restored the event
to the Arabic language, on Erbakan, for example, who was
considered to be re islamizing the state. Erdogan is not the product
who came in a vacuum. He's a product of the jihad and the and
the efforts of all of these Muslim movements to deliver these Muslims
to power. And that's why I think that Erdogan being part of that
Erdogan is a symbol, albeit maybe a flawed symbol, of the Islamic
conviction of the Turkish society that sought to shake off with the
shackles of Ataturk. The second point that's worth noting is when
Turkey took in 5 million Syrian refugees. Every Turkish political
analyst said it is political suicide for Erdogan. Erdogan is
incurring the wrath of Saudi Arabia, of UAE. He's isolating
Turkey from those who have money at a time in which we've got
tensions with the US. It makes no political sense to take in these
people and take in these refugees, and Erdogan lost the Istanbul
Mayor election 2019 because of the refugees. He lost the Ankara Mayor
election because of the issue of the refugees, and still, he would
not budge on that policy. Not only that, he would insist that they
should not be called refugees. They should be called guests,
because he tried to strike the example of muhajirin and Ansar, of
those who came, I don't think you do that unless you have some sort
of conviction. Moreover, the way you see and you've done the
podcast as well, with thinking Muslim, about Western Muslims
going to make Hijra to Turkey, the reason they resonate with Turkey,
and why Western born Muslims are moving to Turkey is because they
see and resonate with the message.
That is coming out of Turkey, that Erdogan himself is facilitating
and pushing in that if we focus on the details of the policies, it's
true. You can be upset with a lot of Erdogan is doing, and
legitimately So, but you cannot deny the trend that is taking
place in terms of what's going forward, in terms of the crackdown
on the Muslim Brotherhood and I and it's very upsetting, primarily
as somebody born and raised in London, for example,
if it happened here, it wouldn't we. There is a judiciary. Rule of
Law. The government cannot intervene in these things. There
is free speech. I think there's something to celebrate with
regards to rule of law. But I think the way that Erdogan did it
was less about clamping down in the way we see Muhammad bin Salman
clamping down on a Twitter account with eight followers that put out
a few tweets, and now the owner of the account, or alleged owner, is
now going to be executed. I think this was more about Turkey going
to the Muslim brother and saying, Guys, I'm surrounded. The
Americans are pressuring me very hard. They almost supported 2016
coup on me. They're really pressuring me. Europe is
pressuring me. Russia is pressuring me. The Saudis and UAE
have cut off funding for my economy. My economy is crashing
because I made a mistake with regards to policies and interest
rates or the like, which is a legitimate mistake to make.
Erdogan made it. It is what it is. I have issues in Libya where I'm
being threatened. I can't control my allies very well. I've got
Russia upset with my central Asia policy. It sent its Jews to
Kazakhstan to rescue the regime, to send a message to all the other
regimes that you might be thinking of going towards Turkey, but I'm
king of this region. Yeah, Muslim Brotherhood. I need a breather. I
need the space. I'm stuck here. I need the hudaybi. I'm not
comparing it to odabia. I'm saying the argument that he might have
given. I need the hudaybi. I need and I'm really, really sorry about
this, and I don't want to do it, but I need you guys to be quiet. I
need you guys either to leave Istanbul or be quiet. And they
turned around and said, Okay, thank you for the good times. And
it is what it is. Okay? So we've talked about normalizing with
Israel. We've talked about Israel's perspective. We've talked
about the perspective of the United States and Saudi Arabia,
but of course, in this discussion, we haven't talked about the
Palestinians. And it is often the case today that when broadcasters,
when even Muslims, talk about Israel and Palestine, Palestinians
are left out of the picture. What are the Palestinians and their
desire to return back to their land and to rid their land of this
oppression that they currently face. Where do you place the
Palestinian cause? I think that talking about the Palestinians in
this dynamic, and you're right, and I accept the rebuke, and I
think anybody listening to this should accept the rebuke, and that
we haven't considered the Palestinians and where they lie in
all this. I think that first, it's important to talk about the
Palestinian Authority and to talk about the political parties that
are engaged in Palestine in and of themselves, primarily because,
according to the Wall Street Journal, Mohammed bin Salman is
going to receive a senior delegation of the Palestinian
Authority, in which he's expected to say to them, quite bluntly, I
want to normalize ties with Israel. I need you guys to
celebrate loudly. In exchange, I will give you millions in support.
I'll restore the funding that I stopped giving in 2021 when you
guys were, when they when, when everyone the normalization tide
was really being pushed. I will restore that money. I also need
you guys to take the arms off the other resistance groups that are
frustrating Netanyahu attempts at annexing the West Bank. But I will
line your pockets up with money, and I need you guys to celebrate
loudly. And I am also seeking the custodianship of the Al Aqsa
Mosque, to take it from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, so
that I become me Muhammad bin Salman who brings Iggy Azalea to
twerk Riyadh, who brings these raves to Jeddah, who brings these
red sea festivals, who allows alcohol at official Saudi
representation at the Cannes Film Festival, who is allowing all of
these raves and lowering loudspeakers the volume of
loudspeakers of the Quran, who is kicking out Imams who criticize my
entertainment policies and the like, who's executing people for
tweets I Mohammed bin Salman want to be the custodian of the holy
Mosque of Mecca Medina and of Al Aqsa as well. And the fact that
the Palestinian Authority is sending a senior delegation to
hear about this offer from Bin Salman, knowing full well that
he's doing it in order to normalize ties with Israel. Speaks
volumes as to the state of the Palestinian Authority and where
they feel they lie politically in their defense the Oslo Accords
that were signed in 1993 meant that the Palestinian Authority,
given it to a squeeze, felt that they should reign in the
resistance. In order to keep Israel off its back, Israel
decided to renege on its agreements and continue to keep
coming in in terms of trying to annex the West Bank. But I think
the Palestinians, in so far as a Palestinian authority are
concerned, are trying to they are going to be used by bin Salman as
the tool through which we talked about this earlier in the in this
conversation where Bin Salman will say, Muhammad Jalal, you're angry
with me about normalization, but Sahib and the one who is affected
by the cause, the Palestinian Authority themselves are
celebrating this normalization as something that is good, and your
Erdogan normalizes with ties with Israel and.
Way, it doesn't mean I'm doing it very badly. I think with Hamas,
they have a more difficult situation in that the priority of
normalization. Netanyahu will demand from Bin Salman that he
really presses the Palestinian Authority to take the weapons of
the resistance, to rein in those resistance movements, so that
Netanyahu can actually continue to annex the West Bank. We spoke
earlier how Netanyahu is unlikely to give up on his desire to annex
the West Bank. He may do like the UAE and that he delays it, but
he's intent on annexing it because he believes on gaining as much
territory as possible. I think, though, for the ordinary
Palestinians, I think they've lost a lot of faith already in the
organizations that are supposed to represent them, such as the
Palestinian Authority themselves. I also think that a lot of the
gains that have been made from the Palestinian Authority are from the
ordinary of gains on the Palestine cause are from the Palestinians
themselves. If you look at for example, the US today is debating,
why are we giving money to the Israelis? Why are we giving
funding to Netanyahu? Is a far right government. Americans are
now talking about things that would have been taboo just a few
years back, and that's as a result of the Palestinians and their
social media and showing the reality. And let me give you an
example I told you earlier about Iggy and Riyadh twerking. Those
who are listening to it will say, No, I need to find the source. But
when you see the video of it, there is this sense of shock that
this is happening in the Holy Mosques. In other words, hearing
about it and seeing it are two different things. The world's
population used to hear about the Palestinian cause that homes are
being demolished and the like. But when they saw it on Instagram,
when they saw it on social media, that's what evoked Nicholas
Kristof and these others to write in the New York Times and other
papers that we need to revise our relationship with Israel because
it's too vile. What we're seeing with regards to the social media
or the like, I do think that also, when we're looking at the
Palestinians in terms of the reality is they have no choice.
Their homes are being demolished. They're being kicked out of their
land. They're being forced into tents. They will continue to be
made into refugees. Those who visit Palestine will notice that
when they cross the Jordanian border, when they go to Al Aqsa,
when they go to Bethlehem or Nablus or Haifa, or some of these
other places, you can see the settler encampments growing. You
can see them everywhere. The reality is they're under a heavy
situation in which they have no choice but to continue pushing
back. So normalization may bring peace between Israel and Saudi
Arabia, but it won't bring peace for the Palestinians, suggesting
that what we're seeing instead is Saudi Arabia securing its gains
and running away from the cause, but the Palestinians left to fend
for themselves. The final point that's worth noting is this,
the Palestinians have been fighting for over 8090, years now
for their right to return to their land, to return to their homes,
not to take revenge on the Jewish population for their right to
their land and their homes and the right to a state in which they
coexist peacefully, unlike the Israelis, who are seeking a state
that is ethno nationalist, ethnocentric and the like, I do
think that where the Palestinians are succeeding is popping this
bubble. So for example, when Ben gvir, the you mentioned that you
called him the Ku Klux Klan earlier, and his views are very
much like the Klu khalan When he goes on TV and says to an Arab
journalist that my wife's right to walk through Sumeria and Jericho
is more important than your right to freedom when they're
complaining about the checkpoints and they're complaining about the
restricted freedom of movement, many Israeli liberals were shocked
by Ben gvir statement, but here's the question, why would you be
shocked about Ben gvir when all he did was describe the de facto
situation of Israel since 1948 all Ben gvir did. Ben vere did was
describe the system of apartheid that didn't come about with the
right wing government of Netanyahu that's been there since 1948 say,
Ehud olmer and all these other guys before they implemented this,
suggesting that in Israel, there is this sense of trance, or
hypnotic trends, where even the Israelis have been desensitized to
the reality of their apartheid regime. And the greatest proof of
that is these protests taking place against the judiciary in
that they're trying to protect their democracy, as they call it,
from Netanyahu interference of a judiciary that legalizes the
demolition of Palestinian homes, that legalizes the theft of
Palestinian lands, that turfs Palestinians from their homes and
gives the court says this is legitimate, showing that for them,
they see it as democratic, but they've been so desensitized to
apartheid that they cannot see the fallacy of calling their protest
pro democracy in that they don't come out To protest apartheid.
They come out to protest a judiciary that only affects them.
But the point here being is where the Palestinians are succeeding is
in dispelling this bubble, dispelling this hypnotic trends.
And I think that the Palestinians, even if the Palestinian Authority
is used in order to push the Saudis or welcome the Saudi
normalization, I think the Palestinians have no choice but to
continue as they are, and maybe a new leadership will emerge. Is
that okay? And one final question for you, Sammy, how important is
Palestine? How important is Al Quds for the Muslim ummah?
I think that first and foremost, Allah subhanahu wa himself in the
Quran in beginning of Surat al surat al israiman, Rahim
SubhanAllah.
Salabi, abdihila, min al masjid, Al haram, el mashil, aksalady,
Barak na hula Hu linuh, who was Samir al Basir. So the point here
being that when you look at, for example, Allah describing Al Aqsa
and saying barakna haulah, who that we have blessed the areas
around it, that Allah puts it in the same sentence as mashed al
haram in the Kaaba of the Kaaba itself. And we know that, for
example, that Allah, Subhanahu wa in many Ahadith, the prophet
Sallam has talked about the sanctity of the Kaaba, the Al Aqsa
being the place where the prophet, Muhammad, sallAllahu, Sallam
ascended the heavens, is the gateway to heaven, where he led
the prophets in prayers. I think that it's it the religious
sanctity is, is there also in the same Surah, Allah talks about, for
example, attain and musalki, taba wa Jana Hu Delli Beni, Israel. So
in the following areas, Allah links Al Aqsa to Musa Salam and to
Nur, suggesting it's been blessed since almost the dawn of time
itself. The second point that's worth noting is that Palestine or
Al Aqsa itself, it's not just important in terms of its standing
with regards to its the Isla and Maharaj, but also in the fact that
the Palestinians have been driven from their homes. If you notice,
when Allah describes the Sahaba of the Prophet Muhammad Sallallahu
sallam, he talks in diary him those who've been driven from
their homes. And Allah repeats it in many areas over and over,
suggesting in the sight of Allah, it's a crime of such a huge
gravity to be illegitimately driven from your homes. And we
know that the Prophet Muhammad Sallallahu Sallam in hot but Al
WADA in the final Hajj, when he gives a statement, he says in
nadima, aravakum Haram on Alaikum ka Hurmati, Yomi Kum hadafi,
shahari Kumar, defi beladikum hada that your wealth, honor and
property and blood is sacred upon each of you as the sacred nature
of this month of this land, suggesting that the idea of a
people, whether it's the Oilers or The Rohingya or the Palestinians
being driven from their homes, is sacred, like the sanctity of the
Kaaba in the holiest of months, in the holiest of pilgrimage itself,
Allah, describing just how horrible a crime it is to be
driven from your homes. And I think this is why there is this
element of resonance towards this oppression that's taking place in
Palestine, in that this idea that the Palestinian was living in
their home, and then the Jewish refugees who were put under the
holocaust by the Europeans, persecuted by the Europeans,
gassed by the Europeans, slaughtered by the Europeans in
the Inquisition, slaughtered by the Europeans, driven out of
Europe by the Europeans, came to Palestine to the Muslim lands,
where the Muslims said to them, we have a rich history of
coexistence. We have a rich history of living side by side. We
did it in Andalusia, which is objectively considered the epitome
of what coexistence looks like under Muslim rule. Come and live
side by side with us. The Muslims welcomed the Jewish population
into the lands, and the Zionist project convinced many of the
Jewish population at the time, not all of them, but many of them, to
lift a gun, go and turf the Palestinian out of their homes,
seize their land, seize their homes and put them into refugee
camps. The idea being that we took in people as a guest and agreed to
live with them side by side, and they decided instead to take the
house from underneath us and kick us all the way out. Not only that,
the reason Palestine means so much is because there is this glaring
shock that instead of the world coming to an agreement that this
is an apartheid regime that is set on oppressing the Palestinians, we
see instead in a coordinated approach from the international
community to legalize the illegality, to say, okay, Israel
may have taken these lands and stolen these lands and committed
ethnic cleansing and driven the Palestinians out, but because we
like them better than these backward Arab Muslims, let's
discuss not about how to get the Palestinians to return to their
lands. Let's talk about how much theft can we legalize as part of a
two state solution. We don't want coexistence. And the sad reality
is that even those who are sympathetic to the Palestinians
don't want to see rights of return, such as Bernie Sanders. He
was asked in an interview in Al Jazeera where He sympathized with
the Palestinians, even Dina thakururi says to him, but you
know, once the solution is all live together. And Bernie Sanders
says, no, no, no, that would mean the end of Israel. The point here
being is, and then the reason they don't want it is because they
believe that in a majority state where the Arabs are majority, the
premiership would go to the Palestinians, the presidency would
go to the Palestinians. So I think what it means more is
that as a people, not just Muslims, but ordinary people, in
the inclination towards justice, it's glaring. This is an apartheid
like you used to read about in South Africa. This is colonization
like you read about in the French books. When we used to read it as
children, we used to think, how did the world operate, where these
injustices were allowed to take place? And we see it with our own
eyes. What the reason Palestine means so much is one, because of
its religious sanctity, with regards to its status amongst the
prophets, and it's mentioned in the Quran. Two, because of the.
People being driven out of their homes, the idea being that they
should have the right to return to their homes. And three, this idea
that instead of the world concurring that they have a right
to return, the world is instead saying to the oppressed, while the
oppressor is taking more lands, while the oppressor continues to
kill the Palestinians and take more lands, the world is going to
the oppressed and telling them, listen, we're never going to let
you get your land back. We want you to accept to live in this
refugee camp, and we want you to allow this theft and legalize that
theft itself. I think that when it comes to the Palestinian cause,
the final thing that's worth mentioning is this Palestine
reflects the human consciousness of resistance, the fact that
despite everything that has happened, the nacaba, the ethnic
cleansing, the slaughtering or the like the Palestinians continue,
generation after generation fighting for their cause,
suggesting that the human spirit doesn't die. And I think one thing
that every Muslim should celebrate as well is this idea that the
Palestinian cause remains rooted in the Islamic conscience, because
it is everything to do with morality. When Aliyah is it?
Begovich, the Bosnian president, was asked, they said to him, you
keep preaching this democratic state where the Croats, Serbs and
Bosnians live together, this European tolerance of yours. And
Isabelle says, Wait a minute, this isn't a European tolerance. That
makes me call for this. This is an Islamic tolerance. The European
tolerance is the tolerance of two world wars, the Holocaust, the
acceptance of a Serbian genocide because you're scared of a Muslim
majoritarian state emerging in the heart of Europe. My tolerance
comes from Islam that tells me to respect al Kitab. And one of the
greatest pronouncements of this is that at the end of the Bosnian
war, when they asked Ezra begovich, what is the most
striking symbolism that strikes you, he said, notice how many
minarets the Croats and Serbs destroyed, I challenge you to find
a single church that the Muslims destroy, suggesting how, and this
is why I link it straight to the Palestinian cause the idea that it
reflects, it embodies, the morality and consciousness of the
Muslim ummah. That's why it means so much for the Muslims. That's
why it means so much. It's less about the idea of the muslimness
of Al Aqsa, and more about the idea of justice, and more by the
idea that Allah's law already achieved the coexistence it can be
achieved again in Jerusalem. And the final point I will say on this
is this in that there are many of the Jewish population. The reason
they fear a one state solution is because they fear revenge. But
Allah, subhana wa Taala in the Quran, when he told the Sahaba to
go and take their homes back, they said, he said, once you take your
homes back, let do not go beyond that. Take what is yours by right
and do not transgress. For Allah loves not the transgressors. The
Muslims are not driven by revenge when it comes to issue of
Palestine, they're driven by justice. Restore the right of
return, restore the land, restore the homes, and let's live on this
land together, because the way that Europe persecuted you is not
the way the Muslims persecuted you and Andalusia and bardan and these
other places, the Muslims are higher than that in terms of the
akhlaq, and that's why I think that when it comes to this issue
of Palestine, in and of itself, not only does the resistance
reflect the Islamic principles, But the goal that we're seeking to
achieve is one that is noble, one that is coexistence under Islamic
rule, because the Islamic rule is the one that guaranteed the
coexistence in a way Europe has never been able to demonstrate or
prove. Sami Hamdi, it's been great to have you with us once again.
Jazak Allah, care for your time. Thank you very much. JazakAllah,
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