Omar Usman – Upstream Dan Heath 3 Things I Learned

Omar Usman
AI: Summary ©
The speakers discuss the importance of prioritizing one's role in society and putting someone in charge of the system. They also touch on the COBRA effect, which is a bounty on cobras and is a temporary solution. The speakers emphasize the need for rewarding individuals for their actions and the importance of upstream thinking to avoid problems and address privacy concerns. They share examples of open office and hesitant behavior in meetings.
AI: Transcript ©
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In this video I'm sharing 3 things I

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learned from the book Upstream by Dan Heath.

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We've all heard that saying: an ounce of

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prevention is better than a pound of cure.

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Why then do we optimize to deliver pounds

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of cure? Upstream is a book about solving

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problems before they happen.

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The author starts off the book with a

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public health parable. He says that there's 2

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guys at a picnic, they're eating, and all

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of a sudden there's a kid drowning in

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the river. So they jump in, they're saving

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the kid. As they're saving the kid, another

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one comes

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by drowning. They save that one. They keep

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going and more and more kids are drowning.

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Finally, one of them gets up out of

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the river and starts walking off. The other

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guy looks at him and says, where are

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you going? And he goes,

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I'm gonna go upstream

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to find the jerk that keeps throwing these

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kids in the river.

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That is the metaphor

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for solving problems before they happen. And in

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this book, Dan Heath explores the reasons why

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we're sometimes blinded to to those types of

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problems

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and some strategies

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in order to tackle them. So in this

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video, I'm gonna focus on 3 specific things.

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The first

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is that heroism

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is a sign of systems failure. This is

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one that set off a huge light bulb

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for me. When we think about heroes, particularly

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in a work environment or professional environment,

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we think about someone that goes above and

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beyond the call of duty. We think about

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someone who comes in and saves the day.

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They work extra hard.

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They

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solve the problem. They avert disaster and all

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of these different things and then they're rewarded

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for it. They get kudos. They get congratulations.

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They get recognition.

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Sometimes,

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you know, being a hero gets someone promoted

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and helps them to move up. We celebrate

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the hero.

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The problem is that the fact that we

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rely on heroes to fix the problems that

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we have

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indicates that there is a systems failure at

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play.

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Why is it that we need a hero

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in the first place?

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Why is the system so broken that it

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keeps generating results that require the intervention

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of a hero to come in and fix

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it? And now that's a very tough question

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to deal with. And one of the in

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in the book, he calls this tunneling. He

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calls it a factor of problem blindness.

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Because when we're in hero mode, when we're

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in firefighter mode,

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we come in and there's so much going

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on that we have to do whatever we

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can to keep our heads above water. And

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so we come in and we deal with

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crisis after crisis.

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Major outage after major outage. And we're simply

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in the business of trying to solve problems,

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keep our heads afloat,

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put one foot in front of the other,

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you know, eat the elephant one bite at

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a time, all of those cliches that we

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talk about, and we celebrate the effort of

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the person doing it, but we don't stop

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and ask

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why did it happen in the first place

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and who is responsible for looking at it

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and helping to avert

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the need for the hero to begin with.

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And that's tough because that is a position

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that's not incentivized.

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It doesn't get the same recognition that a

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hero does. And so we need to find

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ways to pay attention to that role,

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incentivize that role, recognize that role, but ultimately

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put someone in charge of looking at that

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system

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and assessing

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what it is that we need to do

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in the bigger picture. The second thing I

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learned is that every system

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is perfectly designed to get the results that

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it gets.

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And this is something that applies whether it's

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a societal issue when we talk about things

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like systemic racism, systemic poverty,

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these really

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large complex social issues that are affecting us.

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And it's the same when we look at

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a company or a business or something like

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that. But every system that we have

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is designed to get the results that it

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gets. One very interesting example that Dan Heath

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shared in the book was that of Expedia,

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the online booking site. And he said that

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they had an issue where, you know, people

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were booking reservations and they weren't getting a

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notification back, and so they would call into

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the company to get a copy of their

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itinerary.

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Now what happened was that, you know, people

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book their they book their vacation,

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they don't get the itinerary for whatever reason,

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and they call in. Well, everyone is siloed

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out. Right? The web guys are saying, well,

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our web system is working perfectly. The reservations

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are going through here, the numbers that we

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have. The customer service team is looking at

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it saying everything that we're doing is great.

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You know, this is our call volume. This

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is our average handle time. This is how

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quickly that we're resolving issues. So on and

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so on and so on. And so everyone

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in their silos

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is perfectly doing their job. And in fact,

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they're hitting their metrics.

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They're hitting their targets. They're doing a good

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job.

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But it required someone in this particular case

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whose job it wasn't their job. And they

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looked at it and said why are we

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getting so many calls from people that want

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an itinerary?

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And when he tallied up the cost per

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call to the company and the number of

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people that were calling in, this ended up

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being a $100,000,000

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problem that no one was paying attention to

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and there were no metrics or targets to

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indicate that anything was amiss, that anything was

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wrong. It took someone to just look at

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it and think about it in that way

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and interpret the data in that way, in

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that human way, and understand that this is

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a problem. And he said, well look,

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can we cut down on the number of

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people needing an itinerary? Why aren't they getting

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it? Are their emails going to spam? Is

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there something else? Is there some other reason?

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And when they're able to remedy that, the

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number of calls go down. See, to actually

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assess and say why are people calling and

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how do we decrease that volume, that's an

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upstream problem.

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The downstream problem is the calls group saying,

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well, here's the number of calls that we're

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getting. Here's how we're optimizing.

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Here's our scripts. Here's our customer satisfaction scores.

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We're doing great. We're gonna optimize this further.

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If we have an increase in volume, here's

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how we're gonna handle it. And they're all

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celebrating their success,

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almost not realizing that there's actually a bigger

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problem at play. And so up stream thinking,

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and if we wanna call it strategic thinking,

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I think that's a really good analogy,

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it requires that type of strategic thinking

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in order to approach the issues, assess the

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landscape, and think more deeply about

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what's going on and why things are happening,

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and in many cases identifying a problem

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that many people don't even know exist,

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and in fact is often a bigger problem

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than the ones that we actually see and

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interact with on a day to day basis.

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The third thing I learned from the book

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Upstream

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is the idea of the COBRA effect. Now

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I've talked about this a little bit in

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a previous video about second order consequences, but

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this is taking that to the next level.

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The term COBRA effect was coined during the

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British colonization of India.

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And what happened was that there was, you

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know, all these cobras and they wanted to

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get rid of them. So essentially,

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Britain put a bounty

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on cobras. So if you bring in a

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dead cobra, we'll give you a certain amount

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of money. Well, okay, that starts happening and

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then people start to realize, like, well, hey,

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this is a good way of getting money.

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So they started to breed cobras and then

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kill them and go and get the money.

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Well, when Britain figured out that that's what

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was happening,

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they said, well, this is not what we

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wanted so they cut the bounty, right? They

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stopped paying people for the cobras and now

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what happens is you have all of these

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cobras that people have bred for the purpose

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of getting this bounty, the bounty goes away,

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and now you actually have more cobras than

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you started out with in the very beginning.

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And so when we tackle a problem,

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we have to look at the behavior that

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we end up incentivizing. And not just the

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immediate consequence,

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but the consequence of the consequence.

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One example that they share is the idea

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of the open office. Right? This is a

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new trend that we see in workplaces where,

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well, the goal that we're trying to achieve

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is collaboration,

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synergy, right? The accidental

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collision and informal learning that happens when you

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interact with coworkers

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physically in the same space. Now, the open

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offices that we get rid of the cubicle

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walls, we, you know, tear down all those

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barriers, we put everyone together in that open

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format.

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And this will somehow increase that collaboration.

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But what they ended up finding in places

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that had the open office format

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was

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now that people were so close together, they

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were actually

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hesitant

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to have open conversation because,

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one, they didn't want to be loud and

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disturb others, but also

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there was no privacy. And so they didn't

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know who was listening to their conversation, so

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they just didn't talk. On the flip side,

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people that, you know, had a personality of

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saying, like, well, I don't care who's around

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me, I'm gonna speak loudly, take my meetings,

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all of this,

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They would go full force and, you know,

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be like, you know, have their meeting and

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talk loudly and all those things and other

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people around them would get annoyed. And so

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then when

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someone else says, you know, I don't wanna

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be like that, right, and so they then

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hesitate to

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speak up properly when they're on a video

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call or they're at their desk. And so

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now what ends up happening is instead of

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having people co located

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and working in that open office concept, all

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the meeting rooms start to get booked because

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everyone's running away to try to get some

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sense of privacy, some sense of separation.

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And so,

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theoretically, yes, there should have been an increase

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in collaboration,

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but stopping and assessing the consequence of the

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consequence, right? That second order thinking,

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you start to see that what you incentivize

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might not align with the problem that you're

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trying to solve. That requires, again, that level

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of upstream thinking and how we're going to

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approach

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this problem that we're dealing with. Alright. So

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that's 3 things I learned from the book

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Upstream by Dan Heath. Got the link to

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the book in the show notes below. And,

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as always, if you enjoyed this video, if

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you found it useful, beneficial,

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please hit the Like and Subscribe button and

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share it with a friend. And see you

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guys in the next video.

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