Hatem al-Haj – QWD016 Coherence of Sharia – Subsidiary Maxims Under Maxim 1
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So where are we?
What are we doing?
We're doing the first comprehensive major legal maximum.
Which one is this?
Matters are judged by the intentions, by their
intentions.
Matters are judged by their intentions.
And then we talked about Al-Qaeda itself.
We're now up to the branches of the
Al-Qaeda.
And we've covered two of the branches of
Al-Qaeda.
Which is the first one?
There is no reward or punishment without an
intention.
What is the second one?
Consideration and contracts is given to intents and
meanings, not words and forms.
Intents and meanings, not words and forms.
And how many subsidiary maxims did we say
we will cover under the five?
So we have three more to cover.
One of them is the second one is
which means the intention of the speaker is
given consideration in interpreting the speech.
And the last one that we will cover
is which is written communication takes the same
ruling as verbal communication.
Written communication takes the same ruling as verbal
communication.
Today we will try to cover and we
will not cover the whole thing because we
will leave out two subsidiary maxims under this.
Not subsidiary under the main one but subsidiary
under this.
We will cover them next time inshallah.
But let's address Al-Wasa'il is the
plural of waseela.
And waseela would be the singular form of
Al-Wasa'il.
And waseela means what?
The path to a desired goal.
A path to a desired goal is a
waseela.
Or you know, simply in English a means
to a goal.
A means to a goal.
Al-Maqasad would be the plural of hukma.
Hukma is ruling.
Al-Maqasad the plural of maqsad.
Maqsad means that which is intended, objective or
that which is intended.
So these are the two words that you
will hear often.
Waseela, that is singular of wasa'il.
It means a means.
And maqsad, that singular of maqasad.
And it means an objective or an end.
So Al-Wasa'il laha ahkam al-maqasad
could, if you want to bring it closer
to Machiavellian, the ends justify the means, you
would say here the means take the same
rulings as the ends.
But if you want to push it a
little bit farther, you would say the means,
what?
You'll say the means would take on the
rulings of the objectives or something just to
make it look different.
But anyway, it is different as we will
come to see.
So Al-Sadi, rahimahullah, said wasa'il al
-umurika al-maqasadi wahkum bi hadha al-hukmi
li al-zawa'idi.
Wasa'il al-umur, the means of different
things, are like the ends or the objectives.
Wahkum bi hadha al-hukma, give the same
ruling to al-zawa'id.
Al-zawa'id are the complements, give the
same ruling to the complements.
So the complements are called the mutammimat al
-ashya.
Mutammimat al-ashya, you know, the things that
complete different matters or zawa'id.
Zawa'id means additions, add-ons, additions, things
that are complete.
Let us basically, just to make things a
little bit clearer, let's give an example that
I give in the book a little bit
later than this.
But the example is congregation prayer, jummah, jummah,
so that we avoid the controversy over the
other prayer, the obligation of the other prayers.
Jummah, wajib on you or not, as men.
Wajib, okay.
What about taking the bus or walking or
driving to the masjid?
What is this?
Wasila, to the maqsad.
The maqsad is to pray jummah in the
masjid.
That is wajib.
Wasila, so is it wajib on you to
drive, to walk, to take the bus?
Yes, it is wajib.
Okay.
What about going back home from the masjid?
That's called the zawa'id.
Because likely you need to go back home,
right?
So you came to the masjid, that's the
objective.
Coming to the masjid is the means.
Returning from the masjid is the zawa'id,
the additions, the compliments, compliments, not compliments, because
it's not a means to salat al-jummah.
You already prayed jummah, so what is this?
Why do we have to address this?
Because should you be rewarded for this or
not?
Like should you be rewarded for the trip
back home or not?
That's an important question.
Is this like a reward-worthy trip?
It should be.
Give the same ruling to a zawa'id.
It should be, but this is in terms
of reward and punishment, but we will come
to talk about the ruling.
The ruling.
Is the ruling here wajib also?
Like do you have to go back home?
You don't have to go back home.
Do you have to leave the masjid?
You don't have to necessarily leave the masjid,
but in terms of reward and punishment, you
know, if it is a compliment to something
haram or it is a compliment to something
good or wajib, then in terms of reward
and punishment, they'll take the same ruling as
what they complimented.
But in terms of the ruling itself, no,
it's different.
So compliments are not the same, although the
wording, the phrasing of Sheikh al-Saadi in
this poetry, may say that compliments take the
same ruling as the objectives and the means,
but not all the time.
You know, when it comes to reward and
punishment, yes, but not all the time when
it comes to the rulings.
Okay, so they had in the madhhab different
expressions of this.
That is Ibn al-Qayyim's expression.
Ibn al-Qayyim said the means to the
objective follow the ruling of the objective.
Ibn al-Rajab said, the means to a
prohibited act are forbidden.
The means to a prohibited act are forbidden.
This is a little bit narrower in scope
than the expression of Ibn al-Qayyim.
The means to a prohibited act are forbidden
because this does not address the means to
an obligatory act, a mandatory act, or the
means to a recommended act.
But the expression of Ibn al-Qayyim addresses
all of them.
You know, means to an objective take the
same ruling as the objective.
This objective could be halal, haram, wajib, mustahabb,
makrook, whatever it is.
The means to it take the ruling of
that objective.
Now, so I want you now to ask
yourself, how is this different from the ends
justify the means?
How is that different from the ends justify
the means?
If the means take on the same rulings
as the ends, how is that different from
the ends justify the mean?
Is that a different phrasing for the ends
justify the means?
No, it's not.
Two factors here.
Two factors that would separate this from the
ends justify the means.
Keep in mind, Machiavelli may be innocent of
the popular understanding of this particular notion.
Yes, certainly he said that, but, you know,
how did he understand that may not be
the way it is, you know, in public
consciousness, the same, you know, understanding in public
consciousness.
So he may be innocent.
The man himself, Machiavelli, may be innocent of
the like the very bad understanding of the
ends justify the means.
So we're not bashing Machiavelli here.
This is not our subject of discussion, but
the popular understanding, popular understanding of the ends
justify the means, is it like our rule
here, or the means take on the rulings
of the ends?
No.
Two things that are extremely important here.
One, which objectives are we talking about?
Two, which means are we talking about?
Which means, which objectives?
So the objectives in Islam are basically designated,
known, well delineated.
So the ends justify the means.
The ends are themselves the Islamic objectives that
are driven by the Islamic value system.
Therefore, the ends do not necessarily mean they
stay in control.
You know, like Machiavelli, he wrote The Prince
or his famous book, The Prince or the
Amir.
And he was trying to give advice to
people in charge, to good people in charge.
How could you stay in control?
How could you stay in control?
So the ends justify the means, it's not
the ends for us are the ones that
are designated by the Sharia.
They are not basically whatever ends you have
in your mind, not your ends, the Sharia's
ends, not your objectives, the Sharia's objectives.
That's the first distinction between this and the
Machiavellian notion of the ends justify the means.
Now, what is the second difference between the
means take on the rulings of the ends
and the ends justify the means?
The second is the means that we're talking
about here are which means?
The means that do not have a legal
value assigned to them by the Sharia.
The means that have a legal value assigned
to them by the Sharia.
Independently, they don't need to follow the ends
here because they have an independent legal value
assigned to it by the Sharia.
So theft for charitable causes, theft for charitable
causes.
The ends justify the means would say, yes,
no problem.
Or the means take on the rulings of
the ends will say no.
Theft has an independent ruling in the Sharia.
Theft has an independent ruling in the Sharia.
So here, the Ka'idah does not apply.
The Ka'idah applies when the means do
not have a ruling designated to them by
the Sharia or they fall under the Mubah
in general.
So that's another important distinction of the objectives
of the Sharia, not the ends, your personal
ends or objectives.
And the means are the actions that do
not have a value assigned to them, a
legal value assigned to them by the Sharia.
These are the actions that will take on
the ruling of, these are the means that
will take on the rulings of the ends.
Now, you may say, so theft for charitable
causes is not acceptable in the Sharia.
But you may say that sometimes we can
tolerate some evil for a greater good.
Does that, so am I saying that we
can't tolerate any evil for a greater good
by saying that the means that we're talking
about here are the ones that don't have
a value assigned to them by the Sharia?
No, I'm not saying this, but this will
be a different discussion, a different discussion.
The discussion there will be, you know, the
idea of the lesser of the two evils
that the Sharia does consider, that the Sharia
does consider.
If you have to choose between two evils,
you choose the lesser of the two evils.
And Imam Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah, you
know, has a chapter called And
this
is something that, which means what?
It means a sort of a chapter, a
comprehensive chapter on the conflict between hasanat, good
and evil, the conflict between good and evil.
When they are intermixed, intertwined, good and evil,
and you can't separate them, how, what you
do in this case, the lesser of the
two evils, and certainly you've been hearing the
lesser of the two evils for quite some
time nowadays, and you will continue until the
election day.
But so that's the concept of the lesser
of the two evils.
So we're not addressing this concept now, we
will address it later.
Now, so which means, so the means that
we're talking about, one, are the means that
have not been assigned a legal value.
The means that we're talking about here in
this Qaeda are the means that lead to
the ends predominantly, not rarely, and not consistently.
The means that lead to the ends predominantly,
not rarely, because rarely you will apply So
no consideration is given to that which is
rare, no consideration is given to that which
is rare.
Consistently, if the means lead to the ends
consistently, that is not this Qaeda either.
Although it's related, although it is related, but
what are the Qaedas that will be invoked
if the means consistently lead to the ends,
like its cause and effect?
Okay, that which, you know, yatem means completed,
al-wajib is that which is mandatory, accepted
by it is wajib.
That which the mandatory cannot be completed except
through it or by it is mandatory.
That which is necessary for the fulfillment of
an obligation is in itself obligatory.
That which is necessary for the fulfillment of
an obligation is in itself obligatory.
So when the means lead to the ends
rarely, we dismiss that, we disregard that.
When the means lead to the ends consistently,
we invoke this Qaeda.
So the means here become part of the,
like, they can, like, clearly and totally take
the ruling of the ends because they are
necessary for the fulfillment of the obligation.
And the other Qaeda is ma la yatemmu
ijtinaab al-haram illa bijtinaabihi.
I hope you guys can read my handwriting,
you know, I've always had a problem with
this.
No, like, I never, I never had good
handwriting in any language.
So anyway, but ma la yatemmu ijtinaab al
-haram illa bijtinaabihi huwa haram, which is the
opposite of this.
So if something is necessary, whatever is necessary
for the fulfillment of an obligation is an
obligatory, whatever a haram cannot be avoided except
by avoiding it, haram.
If haram cannot be avoided except by avoiding
this, this is haram.
You know, the opposite of this one.
So these, then, which means are we talking
about?
The means take on the rulings of the
ends, the means that have not been assigned
the value by the sharia, and the means
that predominantly lead to the ends.
The means that rarely lead to the ends
are dismissed.
The means that consistently lead to the ends
belong to different Qaeda that are related to
this Qaeda.
Okay.
These two Qaeda that we just mentioned, by
the way, are widely accepted by all people,
even the people who don't necessarily uphold the
concept of sada dharaya or blocking the means
to evil and opening the means to good.
So sada dharaya, blocking the means to evil,
which madhhab take this to heart more?
Malikis and Hanbalis.
Hanafis and Shafais a little bit less than
the Malikis and Hanbalis.
Does any madhhab completely dismiss and disregard this
in application?
No.
Even if they say in theory that they
don't uphold this Qaeda, which is sada dharaya,
blocking the means to evil, they will still
application to some extent, but not all the
way like the Malikis and Hanbalis who uphold
it in theory and therefore will certainly reflect
on their applications a little bit more than
the the Hanafis and Shafais.
Yet the Hanafis and Shafais do not contest
the ruling of or because these are no
brainers, you know, these are no brainers.
If, you know, so malayatim ajtihab al-wajib
illa bihi fahu wajib would be invoked when,
like when you wash your face, you wash
your face, you have to wash your face
from, you know, that line between the hair
and the forehead.
So from that line, you will need to
basically wash some of the hair that are
in the front, unless you like you, but,
you know, for most people who have, you
know, so you will by necessity wash some
of the hair in the front to make
sure that you have thoroughly washed your face,
to make sure that you've covered all the
face.
That is malayatim al-wajib illa bihi fahu
wajib.
If it is wajib for you to wash
the entire face, then washing a little bit
of the hair with that is wajib, because
you need to do that to basically ascertain
that you have washed your face completely, the
entire face, okay.
So the Hanafis and Shafahis who contested the
blocking the means or said the dhara'a
in theory would accept these qawa'at.
So these qawa'at are widely accepted, that
which is necessary from the filament of a
wajib is wajib, okay.
Ibn al-Qayyim has a detailed investigation on
the subject under said dhara'a, and he
says, and you will notice Ibn al-Qayyim
certainly is, you know, Imam Shamsuddin was to
a great extent influenced by Imam Taqiyyuddin in
this.
You will find that Imam Taqiyyuddin was concerned
about, you know, the religiosity that is prohibitive
only, a religiosity that basically, you know, provides
restraints only, not motivation, not mobility.
So he emphasized the importance of opening the
means to good.
He wanted to say that this goes two
ways.
It is not only that the means to
haram should be prohibited.
We should also emphasize that the means to
a wajib should be wajib.
The means to something recommended should be recommended
because religion provides guidelines, guardrails, restraints.
That's one of the functions of religion, and
it's important, an important function, that structure, you
know, and basically the guardrails.
But if religion only provides guardrails without energy,
without, you know, mobilizing, evading the people, then
the rails will just, you'll just stay where
you are, like there are guardrails, but you're
not moving.
So it is important for religion to provide
the guardrails and the energy that motivates and
mobilizes people.
So when you focus on wasa'il al
-muharramat mamnu'ah, which is the means to
haram are prohibited, and you don't bring into
the picture that the means to obligations are
obligatory, the means to, you know, sunan and
mustahabbat are mustahabb themselves, then you're basically accentuating
that restrictive function of the deen and sidelining
the motivating function of the deen.
So Ibn al-Qayyim further categorizes the types
of means into four categories.
He said, what are the four categories, the
means?
So means that are designed to lead to
haram, to hasad or qur'an, such as
drinking wine.
Drinking wine in and of itself is not
a problem.
Like, what's the problem with drinking wine?
It leads to intoxication.
It leads to intoxication.
That's the problem, intoxication.
The act of drinking itself, you know, seems
very, like, innocuous.
Okay.
Two, three, four.
On the opposite side, opposite side, you have
means that predominantly lead to certain
objectives and their benefit outweighs the harm, predominantly
lead to certain objectives.
They are mubah themselves.
They are permissible.
They lead to certain objectives and the benefit
outweighs the harm.
And number three, the harm outweighs the benefit.
And number two, they were intended to cause
corruption.
So intended, they may not be haram in
and of themselves, but intended to cause corruption.
Here, the harm outweighs the benefit.
Give examples.
Designed to lead to haram, they just lead
to haram by necessity.
Drinking wine and intoxication.
Intended to lead to something haram, zawaj al
-tahlil.
Zawaj to make a woman halal for the
previous wife.
This is zawaj.
You know, you could do it.
You could do it perfectly right.
You bring in the two witnesses.
You bring in, you know, you do the
ijab al-qabool, everything, the wali, everything.
Perfectly right.
But it's intended to lead to corruption, tahlil.
It's not meant to be a true marriage.
And certain types of bay'ah that lead
to riba and things of that nature.
What is a means that the harm outweighs
the benefit?
The means here, the means would be haram
by agreement.
Here, the means would be halal by agreement.
The difference is on these two.
You know, that example here is tahlil.
What is a good example on number three?
Number three, the harm outweighs the benefit.
To basically, to curse the gods or to
insult the gods of the polytheists and disbelievers.
Certainly, there are certain gods that we want
to insult by nature, like Jesus, peace be
upon him.
Some people consider him a god, but Jesus
is a great prophet and messenger.
So we don't stay away from, but let
us say, someone who worships whatever, like stones
and anything.
You don't insult their gods in front of
them so that they, lest they would insult
our god.
So don't basically insult those they invoke besides
Allah, lest they insult Allah in hostility and
without knowledge.
So that would be here, something permissible in
and of itself.
Because, you know, if you talk about these
stones and like, yeah, they are, you know,
you can insult them, stones.
Something permissible in and of itself, but the
harm outweighs the benefit.
Therefore, Imam ibn al-Qayyim will conclude that
these two should be haram as well.
These two should be haram as well.
This is haram, this is haram.
Certainly, it depends on, it depends on, or
maybe we should say that they are on
the side of avoidance, because it depends on
the, how much the harm outweighs the benefit
here, and how certain the harm is.
So it may be makruh, it may be
haram, based on the amount of the harm,
the degree of the harm that may ensue
from this wasilah, the degree of the harm
that may ensue from this wasilah.
So what is he trying to tell you
here?
He's trying to tell you that a wasilah
that is intended to lead to haram is
haram.
A wasilah that leads to haram all the
time, of course, is haram.
That's number one.
A wasilah that is intended, that's number two,
that is intended to lead to haram is
haram.
A wasilah that predominantly leads to haram, predominantly
leads to haram, and the harm outweighs the
benefit, then that is number three, just like,
you know, insulting the gods of the polytheists,
and that should be haram as well, or
should be avoided as well.
The only wasilah that we're talking about is
a wasilah that predominantly lead to a good
outcome, where the benefit outweighs the harm.
A wasilah that predominantly leads to a good
outcome, where the benefit outweighs the harm.
So he concludes by saying, the sharia has
come with the allowance, recommendation, or obligation of
this fourth category, the fourth category, predominantly leads
to a good outcome, where the benefit outweighs
the harm, the fourth category, depending on the
degree of its benefit.
So it may be wajib, it may be
mustahab, depending on the degree of its benefit.
It has prohibited the first category.
First was prohibited either by dislike or outright
prohibition, either by dislike or outright prohibition.
It depends on whether at least something makruh
leads to something haram, depending on the degree
of its harm.
The debate remains regarding the second and the
third categories.
Has the sharia permitted them or has it
prohibited them?
So he ultimately considers or concludes that the
sharia prohibits the second and third categories, and
he basically cites, which
means that they shouldn't stamp their feet so
that their concealed adornments become apparent or, you
know, yeah, you know, where they used to
wear the bracelets, the ankle bracelets, and then
they stamped their feet because they used to
wear many of them.
So when they stamped their feet, they would
bang against each other and make a sound
so people would know that they are wearing
many ankle bracelets.
They used to be made of gold, so
show it off, you know, in like the
gold ankle bracelets that you're wearing.
So Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala said that
they shouldn't stamp their feet so that whatever
adornment they have conceived does not become apparent.
Okay, so here stamping their feet is not
in and of itself a problem, right?
You know, you can walk whichever way you
want, like, so it's mubah to walk like
this, like if I want to walk like
this, it's up to me.
I mean, it's ridiculous, but it's up to
me.
But if you're doing this basically to let
people know you're, like, what you're wearing that's
covered, then that's a problem.
Now, so know that this issue extends beyond
merely blocking the means to evil because it
includes also opening the means to that which
is good.
Whatever is necessary for the fulfillment of an
obligation is itself obligatory.
So regarding the compliments, we said, you know,
give the same rulings to the compliments.
So jama'ah is
the compliment.
So here al-maqsad, the objective or the
end, here driving to the masjid, going back
from the masjid is mutammim.
We said that there is a difference between
reward and punishment and the ruling.
When it comes to reward and punishment, tammim
or the za'at will take on the
same basically as the end.
So you will be rewarded for, you know,
your walk back from the masjid.
But is that walk back from the masjid
obligatory?
No.
And there are several examples that I give
there.
Someone who's in a state of ihram, for
instance, and he's wearing, you know, like fitted
clothing.
If he takes off the clothes, that very
act itself involves, you know, it is a
means to avoidance of haram.
But while he's doing this act, is he
mutalabbis bil haram?
As he does this act, is he still
involved in haram or not?
But there are other issues that may be
a little bit more confusing.
So I'm not going to discuss them here.
You read them and, you know, whatever the
writings that I have sent you.
That could be a little bit more confusing,
whether they are part of the haram or
necessary for the avoidance of the haram.
Okay, so some applications.
Some applications from the madhhab for this or
the means take on the rulings of the
ends or objectives.
From the book al-iqna'a, legal stratagems,
legal stratagems.
So legal stratagems are all forbidden.
So one who lends something to another and
then sells him a commodity for more than
its value or buys a commodity from him
for less than its value.
So I basically, and keep in mind, this
is not two aqds and one aqd.
These are separate aqud.
But we like have this aqd and that
aqd.
One aqd is a loan contract, a loan
contract.
I lend you money and then I tell
you, why don't you sell me your iPhone
for $10?
Then that's a stratagem, a legal stratagem.
That's a heela for me to benefit from
loaning you money by buying an item from
you for less.
So now, is this aqd halal?
Halal.
You know, why don't you give me your
iPhone for $100?
Let's say the value of the iPhone is
$160.
Why don't you give me your iPhone for
$100?
Is this aqd halal?
Of course, it's halal.
But in light of the other transaction between
us, which is a loan transaction, it becomes
a haram because there comes a heela, a
deceptive trick or a legal stratagem to get
around the prohibition of benefiting from loans.
Okay.
And so in Rawd al-Nadai, it says
if a group of rebels, this is how
we should have a good understanding of the
qa'ida.
If a group of rebels against the imam
with a valid interpretation, a group of rebels,
they go against the imam, they rebel against
the imam with a valid interpretation.
Keep in mind that they always had this
distinction between rebelling with a valid interpretation and
rebelling without a valid interpretation.
They will be treated differently.
But because things are complicated in life and
the rebels who are forbidden from rebelling, they
are forbidden from rebelling, they may have a
valid interpretation.
They may have a point.
They may have a point.
They're still prohibited from rebelling, but they may
have a point.
So it says if a group of rebels
or if a group rebels against the imam
with a valid interpretation, the imam is obligated
to communicate with them, asking about their grievances.
He's also obligated to remove their misapprehensions or
shubuhat so that they may return to the
truth, and he's obligated to address any injustice
they claim as this is a means to
the reconciliation commanded by the sharia.
So here, what is the objective?
The objective is to end this fitna.
So all the means to end the fitna
must be sought, must be sought.
The imam, which is imam al-adl, which
is the rightful rightful ruler, is obligated to
reach out to them to try to address
their grievances, to try to basically address any
form of injustice they claim that is that
is true, to try to answer their misapprehensions
or clarify their misapprehensions.
All of this is wajib on the rightful
ruler, imam al-adl.
Why?
Because if the end is or the objective
is to end the fitna and the seventh
strife or the rebellion, then these are all
means to ending the fitna.
Certainly, you know, some room is given to
the imam to decide what is best, you
know, so it's not like a cleric will
be standing by the imam directing him.
No, the imam will have room to, you
know, judge what is best in different circumstances
and times.
But in general, he's basically required to do
all the above.
In Daqa'i Qawli Nuha, which is a
book, Sharh al-Muntaha, it says, it talks
about al-hammam, it talks about al-hammam,
and it's a complicated issue.
The bathhouse, al-hammam, the bathhouse.
Al-hammam is not the restroom, is not,
you know, lavatory.
It's the bathhouse.
So what is, what's the deal with al
-hammam?
Because al-hammam is confusing.
You have lots of reports about, you know,
al-hammam being terrible, al-hammam being good.
What are good places of al-hammam?
What are terrible places of al-hammam?
So what is the deal with al-hammam?
So someone like Ibn al-Qayyim said, there
are no reports whatsoever, there are no good
reports, sound reports whatsoever about al-hammam, and
it is very unlikely that the Prophet has
ever seen one.
Very unlikely that the Prophet has ever seen
one with his own eyes.
There used to be no bathhouses there.
So, and keep in mind that here is
what what you may say.
You may say, you know, that the Prophet
ﷺ allowed salah in the entire, all the
land, this masjid, except al-maqbura and al
-hammam, except the graveyard and al-hammam, the
bathhouse.
And this hadith has been authenticated by many.
You may say that, you know, the Prophet
ﷺ said, he who believes in Allah and
the hereafter could not allow his wife to
enter al-hammam.
So the bathhouse, and this has been authenticated
by several scholars, but keep in mind that
the fact that it's authenticated does not necessarily
mean that the discussion is over, you know,
because it could be authenticated by some scholars
and not considered authentic by other scholars.
And there is a difference between, you know,
the ways of the mutaqadameen and the ways
of the mutaqakhireen in authentication of reports.
The ways of the mutaqakhireen or the authentication
of reports is more basically mechanical than the
ways of the mutaqadameen.
Mechanical in the sense of they have certain
rules and principles that they apply like a
little bit more rigidly than a mutaqadameen.
Because for the mutaqadameen, the earlier generations, they
are in the midst of it.
So like someone like al-Bukhari can accept
a certain hadith from one person and not
others from the same person, because he would
know that he would be entrusted with these,
not these.
He would be entrusted reporting from this scholar,
not from this scholar.
So it is more sort of nuanced.
But for the latter generations, you know, it
is, you know, the checks, you know, the
check this box, check this box, check this
box.
So it's a little bit different.
Anyway, that's not taken away from the other
scholars whatsoever.
We need them.
We love them.
We appreciate them.
We're so grateful to have them.
But that is a big difference between earlier
and latter scholars.
The earlier ones, they had more sort of
nuanced approach to the process of authentication than
the latter ones.
We need both.
May Allah grant them all mercy.
So the hammam issue is complicated.
The hammam issue is complicated.
However, for people who like synthesis and reconciliation,
and they don't get frazzled by the conflicting
reports, they can make something out of it.
So what do you make out of it?
Here is what we made in the Madhhab
out of it.
So in terms of men in particular, he
would say that it is permissible according to
an explicit narration to enter a hammam with
two conditions.
He's covered and there is no fear of
falling into something prohibited.
Now, no fear of falling into something prohibited.
No fear of falling into something prohibited.
Some fear of falling into something prohibited.
He knows he will fall into something prohibited,
permissible, disliked, prohibited,
prohibited.
So if there is no fear, some fear,
he knows he will fall into something prohibited,
like that's certainty that he will fall into
something prohibited.
So that would be prohibited.
If there is fear, concern, but it's not
certainty, that would be disliked.
If there is no fear, that would be
permissible.
And that's according to the Daqa'i Qulinnuha
here.
Now, the issue of hammam for sisters.
If the issue here at the end of
the day is what?
Is knowing whether you will fall into something
forbidden or not.
For sisters, because the covering of the awrah
has like a greater importance, then it would
be more emphatically observed these guidelines.
They would be more emphatically observed.
But let us assume that there is a
hammam for the sisters where it is all
that's run by sisters only.
And there is no way, like they have
every arrangement to avoid basically in kishaf al
-awrah and things of that nature.
The awrah being shown or uncovered in front
of men or the awrah that is to
be hidden from women is uncovered in front
of women.
And the awrah that is to be hidden
from women is a long discussion that we
don't need to get into now, but it
may be very minimal in many of the
madhhab.
So then in this case, if we're not
using the hadith, that would prohibit women from
going to the bathroom.
Or if you want to use this hadith
and reconcile it with other hadiths that encourage
going to bathhouses, I'm sorry, not bathroom, bathhouses.
So what do you do out of this?
You say that it is all based on
al-wasa'illah ahkam al-maqasid.
And if I don't have a fear at
the end of the day that there will
be in kishaf al-awrah, then a group
of women gathering inside the bathhouse that is
monitored and observed by women only and covering
their awrah in front of each other, there
is no reason there to prohibit it.
Except that you may invoke that a woman
should not take her clothes off outside of
her house.
Is this still contingent upon in kishaf al
-awrah in front of ajnabi?
What if a woman is visiting a friend
of hers and wanted to breastfeed?
Can she do this in a private room
in front of her?
In front of the host or another of
the host, but can she do that?
I think that there is room for her
to do that.
Next, in kishaf al-qana, it says, and
hunting for mere amusement is disliked because it's
frivolous.
However, if hunting involves injustice towards others, such
as encroaching on their crops or property, then
it is haram.
Then it is haram.
Finally, legal stratagems used to obtain rightful claims
are permissible.
Allah mentioned the stratagem of Yusuf to bring
his brother to him.
So Yusuf alaihi salam put the measuring cup
into the matah of his, or whatever the
stuff, his brother's stuff, or matah, and then
searched for it and found it.
So is this a hila or not?
Is this tricking or not?
It is a hila, it's a trick that
Yusuf alaihi salam employed.
Was that permissible or not?
Yeah, it was permissible.
Does it apply to us?
Would it be permissible to us?
It depends on if you believe shara'a
man qabla'na is shara'a lana, or
the legislations for those before us applies to
us.
And in our madhhab, and according to majority,
they apply.
Shafi'is don't consider it applicable.
But in our madhhab, if shara'a man
qabla'na was reported to us through our
book, in a context of thana, not in
a context of condemnation, but in a context
of thana, in a context of approval, in
a context of approval, then it applies to
us.
The legislations before us, for the Yahud and
the Nasara and so on, apply to us
if they were reported to us within a
context of thana or approval, and there is
nothing in our deen to contravene that or
to oppose that.
Okay.
Okay.
So he says here, he mentions here that
legal stratagems used to obtain rightful claims are
permissible, and he talks about Yusuf alaihi salam
and what he did.
And then, so I will basically share with
you something in the madhhab, that I will
trust your religiosity to understand it properly and
to not abuse it.
In our madhhab, lying is always permissible if
it leads to a good objective.
So, you know, the issue here is, the,
that we've talked about before, is that a
good objective, we said that there are two
differences between wasa'illah and hakam al-maqasid,
may the means take on the rulings of
the ends, and the ends justify the means.
What are these two?
Our objectives are the sharia objectives, and the
means should not be assigned a legal value.
Now, we will basically make an exception here.
The idea of lying itself, is not in
and of itself inherently forbidden.
But it depends on why you're lying.
Lying by default is forbidden, by default is
forbidden.
But if the lying will get you out,
let us take this Kantian, sort of, you
know, the categorical imperatives of Kant, or Kant,
whichever way they say it, I hear it
both ways.
But Immanuel Kant, the kind of categorical imperatives
of Immanuel Kant, so if someone is hiding
in your house, like a fugitive, or not
a fugitive, like an innocent man is hiding
in your house, and a tyrant comes after
them, and you come out from the house,
and you speak to the tyrant, the tyrant
tells you, is X, Y, or Z hiding
in your house?
Is X, Y, Z inside?
Then what do you say to the tyrant?
What does Kant say here?
You have to say the truth according to
Kant, because he believes in CI, CI, categorical
imperatives.
So his ethics, you know, is the ethics
of categorical imperatives.
Now, whether it's categorical imperatives, or utilitarian ethics,
if it is not anchored in the divine
law giver, then they are meaningless.
But let us basically address the issue in
terms of utilitarian versus categorical imperatives.
Utilitarian ethics will tell you, no, lie.
You know, this is, you know, this tyrant,
if he basically is able to catch that
innocent man, will kill him.
So you're saying the truth here would lead
to a great evil, so lie.
Okay, does Islam tell you lie?
You know, according to our, yes, of course,
Islam will tell you a lie here.
But according to our madhhab, is lying always
permissible in something like this, or lying is
permissible only if ambiguity and equivocation will not
work?
So lying is permissible if ambiguity and equivocation
will not work, according to the dominant view,
even though Abu al-Khattab, a great Hanbali
scholar, said that in this case, lying would
be permissible even if equivocation and ambiguity would
work, even if equivocation and ambiguity would work.
Because here you're lying to save us a
life.
You're lying to save a life.
So the end here clearly justifies the means.
So it says here, Ibn al-Jawzi said,
every praiseworthy and good objective that can only
be attained through lying is permissible.
It's also mentioned in al-Hadiyah that it
is permissible for a person to lie about
themselves or others if no harm is caused,
and if the lie is necessary to attain
the right, if the lie is necessary to
attain their right.
Like, you know, so you are arrested by
like a tyrannical sort of law enforcement, whatever
agency.
We have this, you know, like state security
agencies in our countries that use basically torture
to interrogate people and basically to tell on
other people that their acquaintances and stuff like
this.
In this case, they may ask you about
your family members.
Are you allowed to lie?
You will say, yes, you're allowed to lie.
To avoid injustice or to attain your right.
And then he mentioned that Suleyman deceived one
of the two women, you know, so the
Suleyman said, let's split the child between the
both of you.
When two women disputed over one child, Suleyman
said, let us split the child.
That's a deceptive trick.
You know, Yusuf used a deceptive trick, Suleyman
is using a deceptive trick.
He would never split the child, but he
deceived one of the two women by proposing
to split the child in half, which led
him to discovering the true mother.
So it includes that in Al-Adhaab Al
-Adhaab Al-Sharia by Ibn Muflih, it states
that whenever it's possible to use ambiguity or
equivocation instead of lying or outright lying, lying
becomes prohibited.
Lying becomes prohibited.
This is actually explicitly stated by many scholars
in the Madhhab that lying becomes prohibited when
equivocation and ambiguity work, when equivocation and ambiguity
work.
So when will lying be allowed?
He does mention that Abu'l-Khattab would
permit lying even in a condition like this.
So in certain cases, if you feel equivocation
will lead to evil, you know, or ambiguity
will lead to evil, then lying would be
permissible.
But if you're not afraid and you can
use equivocation or the matter itself is not,
does not warrant lying, does not warrant lying.
Like you have like a guest who's so
like sa'il, like a guest who like
so annoying that comes at, you know, bad
times, knocks on your door, you know, and
at bad times.
If your daughter or son are able to
send them away without lying, they should do
that.
They, like they are allowed to use equivocation
or ambiguity basically to hint to him, infer
to him that you're not present without lying.
So here the issue is how necessary is
lying to avoid something evil or to bring
about something necessary or something that is obligatory.
If it is necessary, then go ahead.
If it is not necessary, or you can
use equivocation or ambiguity, then you should, you
should not, you must not lie.
You must avoid lying because, you know, in
our deen, that
truthfulness, truthfulness leads to goodness.
Goodness leads to paradise and a man would
continue to uphold truthfulness or to be truthful
until he is written, you know, with Allah
Subh'anaHu Wa Ta-A'la in Allah's
records.
He will be written as something that is
consistently truthful and a man would continue to
lie.
And he said, lying leads to wickedness.
Wickedness leads to the hellfire and a man
would continue to lie and pursue like untruths
until he is written in with Allah, you
know, or in his records as gathab or
someone who's a consistent liar, a consistent liar.
So, you know, you avoid lying at all
costs.
However, it may be permissible in certain circumstances
where a clear right cannot be attained without
it or a clear evil cannot be avoided
without it.
And whenever you can use ambiguity and equivocation,
you must use ambiguity and equivocation to avoid
lying.
That brings us to the end of this
discussion.
Wa min Allahi t-tawfiq, al-Fatiha.