Dilly Hussain – History of the Ottoman Dynasty University of Sheffield
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Now
or dynasty? Yeah. That's one message. I'm just
I'm fire.
Let me think in by saying that
there is in no shape or form can
I deliver
a history of the Ottoman dynasty
in any serious depth,
with the time that I have?
In fact, if I was given 4 or
5 hours, I still wouldn't be able to
deliver any justice to the depth that's really
required
to understand the Ottoman dynasty or any dynasty
for that matter.
Entire
books,
lectures,
series,
podcasts
have been dedicated to certain periods of Ottoman
of Ottoman history.
But what I will try my best today
is to give you all an overview
of the history of the Ottoman Empire,
with key events, key incidents,
and some key discussion points. And, inshallah, it
should be a starter
for any of you who want to pursue
further research
into the Ottomans.
Now
the history of the Ottoman
dynasty can't has to begin
with the dream of Osman.
In front of you, you should have a
hand up.
And the first thing that's on the hand
in italics
should be the dream of Osman.
Now let me tell you about the dream
of Usman. Usman the first,
he was the first Ottoman ruler, the first
Ottoman Sultan.
And one night, when he was a young
man,
he was
spending the night with a very prominent scholar
of Anatolia
called Sheikh Edebali, Rahim
who later became his father-in-law.
And he spent a night at the Sheikh's
house
and that night he had a
dream. And the dream was
that a full moon
left the chest of the Sheikh and entered
Osman's chest.
And when that full moon entered his chest,
a tree began to grow from
the go on to,
rule. For example, in his dream, he saw,
Mount Atlas,
Mount Taurus,
the Mount Caucasus.
He also saw a number of, iconic rivers,
the river Nile, the river Danube, the Euphrates,
the Tigris.
And this tree continued to grow
and it continued to grow under the light
of a crescent.
And
as it was growing towards the end of
the dream,
there was a one thing who made the
Adar.
This was Osman's dream.
When he awoke,
he conveyed this dream to Sheikh Adar who
interpreted it as follows.
He said, my son,
I, in this dream,
represented knowledge.
The full moon which left my chest
to yours would be the knowledge that will
be passed
from myself
and generally the Ulema, the scholars over to
your household.
That tree which spread from your navel
will be the great state
that your progeny
will go on to establish.
And those rivers and those mountainous regions that
you saw,
you will or your progeny will go on
to conquer these lands.
And the crescent
upon which
the light shone upon the tree
is Islam.
And the one thing who made the Adar
means that there will come a point where
this state of yours
will be
the only
legitimate Islamic authority on this earth.
That's
how the dream was interpreted by Sheikh Edebali.
From this point onward,
every single Ottoman ruler
had this vision.
In fact, it became the underlying philosophy
of the Ottoman Empire and its state
that
they were going to continue
to expand,
that they perceive themselves
as a legitimate Islamic authority,
and
that
so long as the justice of Islam was
upheld in the land in which they ruled,
the state will continue to expand.
That is in basically
where most books and literature
about the Ottomans begins. It begins with a
smart degree.
However,
for those of you who perhaps may be
watching a hit Turkish show called Deriric Epirum,
you know that, okay,
maybe,
the history of the Ottomans actually began before
Usman, and you'd be correct.
So Usman's father was Ghazi Etrul, Rahim Allah.
A very great leader.
And he initially built
the blueprint
to what was going to become
the Ottoman state.
And for those of you who are watching
the Jewish, you know that before they became
known as the
The Kani tribe
was one of many
Turkic tribes
who began
in the steppes of Central Asia.
Asia. They were one of many,
and they all trace their lineage back to
an individual Uyghurs Khan.
Now, those of you attended the Uyghur lecture,
I also mentioned that the Uyghurs
did trace their lineage back to Oguzhan.
Oguzhan is not Muslim, by the way. So
this was he was considered as the founding
father of the Turkic race.
So the were one of many of these
tribes that made up a
nomadic confederation.
And due to nomadic lifestyle,
they migrated to different parts of the world.
For example, the Uyghurs, they migrated,
eastwards towards Eastern Palestine or China or Xinjiang,
however you wanna
pronounce it.
Others,
headed southwards towards Central Asia and Iran, whereas
other Turkic tribes, they, migrated westwards towards Anatolia
for different reasons.
And eventually, when the Peis
arrived in Anatolia,
Anatolia was under the control of the Seljuks
Sultanate of Rum. Now the Seljuks
were another
powerful and prominent
Turkic,
Muslim Sultanate.
And the Seljuks Sultanate or Rome basically just
means the Seljuks state of Rome or Europe.
And the
had settled in the borders of the Seljuq
state, which bordered the Byzantine Empire,
and they were under the protection of the
Seljuq Empire.
Now
we're talking here,
late late 12th century, early 13th century.
Now as the Seljuk Empire
was rapidly declining
as a result of internal disputes and warfare
as well as, the Mongol onslaught that came
from the east,
after the Seljuk Empire eventually,
was abolished,
what was left in the remnants of Anatolia
was small little Beyliks.
Yeah.
Again, for those of you who are watching
Beyliks, as you know some of this land,
Beylik. Beylik. Yeah. It means a small principality
state.
In in in essence, these Beyliks was what
the salduc had essentially given
many of the the Turkic tribes
as a kind of semi autonomous
towns,
perhaps cities, where they would essentially run both
respective areas in alignment with Seljuq policy.
So after the Seljuqs,
has,
essentially demised,
the the the Kais established
their Vedic,
which then went on to or evolved into
the Ottoman
Sultanate.
Now
as I mentioned in the beginning of the
lecture,
I really, really cannot
give any serious justice or depth
to this topic
because, you know, historians literally
of
Western secular Muslim
scholars and academics literally have dedicated
entire books in just
small periods of Ottoman history.
Some, scholars have dedicated entire literature just for
one ruler.
So I will try my best to essentially
give you guys an overview of the most
important events.
Right? And that's not to say that the
events or the timeline that you got in
front of you, that slide,
is all the important events had had taken
place,
within the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman, dynasty. You
have to keep in mind that the Ottomans
were around from 12/29
to 1924.
That's a huge,
period of history.
However,
I have identified
the following events
to be something,
of importance.
So if I go in order so 12/99.
12/99
was when,
Sultan Osman,
he made the
into an official state. A state which was
not dependent on any other,
superpower
empire of the time.
That was in 12/99.
In 1402
to 14 13,
we have the Ottoman interregnum
which is basically the Ottoman civil war.
That is when the three sons of Murad
the first, who I will touch upon who
is in the next slide.
Murad the first was the grandson of Osman,
and he was a very powerful,
Ottoman ruler.
He got into a war with,
a leader called Timur Lane.
Timur Lane
is, someone who is of Mongol Turkic, ethnicity,
and the Mughal dynasty of India trace their
lineage back to Timur Lane. Anyway, the Ottomans
were defeated
by,
Timur, the the the the the Timur Empire.
And
in the aftermath of that war,
the 3 sons of,
they began a civil war and a power
struggle
as to who would assume power,
after the capture of their father.
And the reason why this period is so
important
is because
it was in these 11 years
that the Ottoman state nearly self imploded.
It was in this period that the Ottoman
state
literally ceased to exist because of the civil
war.
How many,
Muslims, I'm not Muslims that were killed in
the civil war.
The fact that the 3 brothers had allied
themselves
with European
entities that traditionally were their rivals.
It was a very, very * period. It
was a period which,
as I mentioned, really destroyed the state.
And it was
out of this period
that there was a policy called
the
factory site whereby
Ottoman princes
known as they
would
kill their brothers.
There was it was a it was a
state policy
that to avoid civil war, to avoid the
state from self imploding,
to protect the unity of the state,
that we would kill our brothers,
to not have a repetition
of this incident
which nearly destroyed
what our forefathers had built.
1453
is perhaps
the most
important event, not only in Ottoman,
history, perhaps one of the most important events
in Islamic history.
And that was when
the Ottomans under the leadership of Sultan
Mehmed the second, Rahim O'Hollaha,
they conquered Constantinople.
And that is because
that conquest was prophesied by beloved prophet in
a hadith which is narrated by Abu Ayuba
and Ansari
who's actually buried
in Istanbul today.
And to paraphrase this hadith, our beloved prophet
said
that indeed the Muslims will conquer Constantinople.
And the ruler
and the leader who takes Constantinople would be
a great leader,
and those who fight under him will be
a great army.
And you'll find that sahaba even at that
time,
raised and competed with one another to fulfill
this prophecy.
But it was Mehmed the second
who fulfill
that prophecy.
In 15/17,
Sultan Selim the first became the first Khalifa
of the Ottoman dynasty.
When he defeated the Mamluks
in the battle of
in Syria today.
And he and he forcibly made the last
Abbasid Khalif, Mu'tawakkil the 3rd abdicate,
and he declared the ultimate state as the
Khalifa.
So as you see on top of that
timeline,
1299
to 1517,
the Ottoman state was known as a Sultanate.
From 1517
to 1924,
the Ottoman state
was the Khalaf.
And there were no other competing caliphates,
during that period.
So when I
mentioned Sultanate or caliphate from the period 15/17
onwards, I'm using them interchangeably.
The Sultanate was the kind of imperial term
used to describe the Ottoman state whereas the
Hilafet or the Hilafa
was the kind of religious
term
used to describe the same way. Essentially, it
was the same thing, and I will use
them interchangeably
from the period 15/17
onward.
17/40/17/68
was very interesting period, not
in the Ottoman issue because there was this
period of peace
for 28 years,
for the first time since 12/99,
the Ottomans were not in a state of
war.
I want you guys to think about that
for a moment. From 12 99
to 17 40,
the Ottoman state was in a constant state
of warfare.
Maybe offensive, but also defensive,
but it was literally all fronts
never ending.
But there was this period of peace,
and the reason why this period is very
interesting, there are a number of historians,
and I also hold this position
that it was this period of peace
where the decline of the Ottomans began, at
least from a military perspective.
1839
to 1876
or the period of the Tanzimat reforms.
The Tanzimat reform was a set of,
liberal reforms,
which were aggressively sought to be implemented within
the Ottoman state. It was the first time
in Ottoman history whereby elements of the Ottoman
elite
sought,
solutions, ideas
from Western Europe, namely France.
And so there was,
an aggressive and growing movement which are known
as the Young Turks,
that sought to implement these changes.
And
2 sultans were actually supportive
of the Tanzimat reforms, and we can discuss
this, in a later slide.
1914,
when Germany,
declared war with its neighbors, the Ottomans
sided with Germany.
I mean, it also needs to be made
clear that the decision for the Ottomans to
go to war and side with the Germans
was not that of the Sultan of the
hadith at the time.
By that time, the ultimate state was being
run by 3 individuals. They were known as
the 3 Pashas,
and they were part of the Young Turks
Movement.
And it was they who made the decision
essentially to enter World War 1 to side
with Germany. And of course, they lost.
They were defeated.
And in 1922,
we saw the sultanic, the Ottoman sultanic, the
imperial institution
dissolved.
In 1923, we saw the Treaty of Lausanne,
which basically was,
the partitioning
of 4 Ottoman territories that were then handed
over to Britain and France that became British
and French mandates.
And last but not least, in 1924,
we saw the abolishment
of the Ottoman Caliphate.
And that was the last
event
in Ottoman history.
Notable rulers.
All in all, there were 36 sultans.
Out of 36 sultans,
28 of them were Khalifa.
So from Osman the first to the 8th
Sultan, they were also found. They were never
hadiths.
So we know when we talk about the
Ottomans, I've heard it in some circles. We
the way we talk about the Ottomans,
there's a mistake there, you know, the Ottoman
Caliphate. When you say the Ottoman Caliphate, you
need to be specifically talking about the period
of 15/17 onward.
Because 12/99
to 15/16,
there was no Ottoman Caliphate. It was the
Ottoman Sultanate.
And so from the 36 rulers, there were
28 hadiths,
and they
all were known for something or another.
But I identified the following 10
for a number of important reasons.
Usman the first,
the founding father of the state.
Murad the first.
Murad the first was the 3rd Sultan
and the grandson of Usman.
Now if,
after al Hazi, was
regarded as
the person who
created the blueprint,
the basic of what was going to become
the Ottoman state.
And Usman the first was the one who
established
the,
the Ottoman state. It was Murad the first
who essentially identified
the state
by building its institutions, by building its structures,
by winning key strategic battles,
by expanding the state rapidly, especially in the
Balkans. Because state rapidly, especially in the Balkans.
There's under Murad the first where
Kosovo,
Bosnia,
Serbia,
Albania,
as well as a number of key byzantine
cities were taken.
It was also under Murad the first that
he created and established the Janissaries.
Now I will discuss who the Janissaries were
later on, but just to let you guys
know what they were, they were an elite
fighting course
within the Ottoman military.
Of course, Mehmed the second known as the
conqueror,
the person who fulfilled the prophecy,
but also the individual who implemented and began
the policy of
a beloved prophet had prophesied, that
was also the Sultan
who introduced
the policy of fratricide.
Khalif Salim the first, the first Khalifa
of the Ottoman dynasty.
Soleiman the first known as Al Qarnuni,
known as the magnificent in European discourse.
It was he who took the Ottoman state
to its absolute
in terms of expansion. But he it was
also Khalif Soleiman because he known as Al
Anuni
or in Turkey the law giver, translated. It
was he
who codified
law. It was he who got rid of
certain nomadic and tribal, rituals and practices and
norms. He got rid of them,
which he felt were in contradiction to Islam.
He got rid of those
Turkic practices which influenced, Ottoman law.
He codified
Hanafiq,
as an integral part of how the Ottoman
state would make laws,
and he also
distinguished between different courts.
Now, in European discourse,
you know, he's described as,
the Sultan who secularized
Ottoman law, and that's incorrect.
It's incorrect because
the vast majority
of, European academia,
they apply a, a kind of secular liberal
paradigm or framework,
usually on the notion of of of the
of the nation state in understanding how,
law making and and and and legislation
worked in in in the Ottoman Empire.
When in fact, what,
Khalil ul Iqbal actually did
was that
he basically
gathered all the ulama,
he gathered all the judges,
and he basically said, those aspects of our
religion
and those laws which are clear cut
beyond deniability,
where is clear in text and clear in
meaning,
these will make up the Sharia Court, and
this will be the highest court in the
land.
And then, we will have the Mila Courts.
These are the courts for the Jews and
Christians
who can who they can resolve their disputes
Ottoman courts.
And then, he had a 3rd court,
which the European described as the civil courts.
But essentially, this was a court with with
Muhammad,
and other civil issues. But the the the
the judges will still have to refer back
to Islamic source text
in trying to ascertain a ruling for particular
matters. This is something that's usually omitted when
discussing
the role of, Khalif ul Iman. And
it's also under Khalif ul Iman
that he
prioritized,
huge budgets
for the renovation,
for the
Jerusalem.
For those of you who have been to,
Umrah or Hajj or been to Jerusalem, you'll
see that there's a lot of architecture that's
still,
there from, Khalifa Islam's time.
Who's been Istanbul here?
What is the name of the famous mosque
in the square? The Sultan Ahmed. Yes. So
that's the name of the Sultan Ahmed the
first.
And it was Sultan Ahmed the first who
abolished the policy of fratricide.
He ended that he ended that kind of
policy whereby brothers would kill brothers. Because he
said and he was also
overthinking
that there must be a better way to
deal with
internal disputes and civil wars and the risk
of brothers fighting one another than having to
kill them.
And once he appreciated
the reason why his forefathers had implemented this
policy
because of the unity of the state, because
the unity of Ummah, to prevent civil war,
to prevent outsiders
from interfering into the offensive Ottoman state, he
said there must be a better way. So
his policy was
that if brothers could not be reasoned with
one another,
the one who was naturally going to assume
power with the support of Ahl al Hayri
wal Aq, which basically means the powerful elements
of the Ottoman state.
If they were not going to back some
of the princes, they would be given an
influential position in the frontiers,
not within the inner parts of the state,
within the frontiers. So communication was very minimal
between the key players within the Ottoman state
and the prospect, and the and the princes
who could potentially pollute and create problems,
or they were going to exile.
However, Sultan, Sultan Ahmed, he ended the policy
of fratricide.
Khalifa Murad the 4th,
very interesting,
Ottoman ruler.
He was the last Ottoman ruler to have
led
an army in battle in person.
Prior to this, this was a norm that
the Khalifa of the Sultan would lead the
armies in battle.
He was the last one to have done
this. After that,
that practice was kind of abandoned.
He was known as the Puritan.
And the reason why he was known as
the Puritan is because he had,
during those times,
regard as as some strict and conservative views.
For example,
he banned public hams.
Public hams are basically public bathing places
whereby you can go and clean yourself,
potentially get some massages, etcetera.
He banned that. He said, look,
this can't be happening because there's no clear
segregation between the different sexes.
And even if there was, these kind of
environments
could potentially,
you know, start indecent behavior.
So he banned hamams.
The hamams,
at those times, were essentially used for those
who could not bathe and clean themselves regularly,
usually for the poor. That when they had
to make or they had to clean themselves,
they had access to the the public hamams,
but he banned those.
He also banned the playing of instruments and
music in the markets.
He also banned
the production and the sale of alcohol
in the Jewish and Christian quarters.
Now whilst,
you know, even on the Islamic law, there
is some room
for Jews and Christians and people of the
book
to consume alcohol, buy and sell alcohol.
There is some grounds for that. He banned
that.
He said, it's not happening. There's gonna be
no alcohol in my state. So he was
known as the Puritan.
Many of these policies were then overturned very
shortly after his his passing.
Salim the 3rd.
Khalif Salim the 3rd was known as the
reformer because it was he who actually began
the kind of thinking
of
seeking
reform,
and ideas and solutions from Europe.
He was the one that actually inspired the
Tanzimat reforms,
but he was assassinated.
He was killed,
and one of the reasons why it is
believed he was killed by the Janissaries
because one of the reforms he wanted to
implement
was to get rid of and abolish the
Janusimik course.
But it was his son,
Mahmud the second, who was known as the
modernist.
It was he who started
actualizing and implementing
some of the Tanzimat reforms. Not all of
them, but he began he got that ball
rolling.
And some of the reforms that he implemented
was,
changes to the Ottoman,
military uniform,
the prohibition of soldiers keeping beards, but instead
keeping just moustaches.
In terms of,
headwear, he got rid of what was generally
more like a like a Turkish type of
a turban. He got rid of that and
incorporated
more European style,
dress code.
He got he began the discussions of finishing,
the middle Aid system
and instead having 1,
centralized,
legal court for all citizens.
And it was he
who eventually,
ultimately vanished
and and destroyed and killed
the Janissimiports.
Now we have to understand, brothers and sisters,
that when the Ottoman
state was entering a period of decline,
that some of the individuals
that we can now look at in hindsight
and refer to as our European agents or
secularists and set ups and all that kind
of stuff.
These are individuals
who
were well meaning.
They wanted to revive this state. They wanted
to
have the state state in which their forefathers
had built and created
to have further longevity,
for it to survive,
for it to modernize, for it to be
with it
alongside its European counterparts.
However, they sought answers and solutions
from Europe,
and it was problematic
because
there was a number of cultural
and religious
clashes.
That's why the Tanzimax reforms
never really fully got implemented.
So when we talk about even the Young
Turks,
the Young Turk movement,
which if you speak to certain elements within
Turkish society
or even those who are Islamic scholars or
thinkers, you know, they'll speak very badly of
the Young Turks and rightfully so to some
degree.
But the movement began as an attempt
as an attempt
to keep the state alive.
It's just that they sought
the answers in the wrong place.
And for sure,
many of them were many of them were
later on in collusion
with European powers.
And last but not least,
Khalif Abdulhamid
who is known as the last great khalifa,
period in Islamic history. Why?
Because it was Khalif Abdulhamid
and his radical reforms
and his,
risk approach
which actually there's a there's like a unanimous
agreement
amongst
all Ottoman historians
that Sultan Abdul Hamid's policies
literally allowed the Ottoman state to survive for
another 40 years.
During his reign, he
nearly cleared the internal debt of the Ottoman
State.
But what made Khalifa Al Hamid
more unique
was that he reexerted
the importance of the role of the Khalifa.
He understood that the Ottoman state was in
a state of decline,
that the nationalist fervor was spreading out wildfire
in different parts of the empire,
and he thought to himself,
how do I unify and keep the state
intact?
So he re exerted the importance of the
Khalifa.
And
for every citizen of the Ottoman state to
be known as Ottoman citizens,
to not see themselves as Jews and Christians
or Bosniak or Kosovan or Greek or Armenian.
Everyone was an Ottoman citizen, a citizen of
the Ottoman state.
But beyond that,
Abdulhamid also built key strategic relationship
with different parts of the Muslim world.
It was known that he
gave money and supported
many of the resistance movements in India
that fought the British.
It has been recorded
that many of the very early Donald Ullums
and many of the, the movement as known
as the Diovanis in India, that he supported
them with wealth and and and
weapons. It is known that he sent weapons
and money to the who
are fighting the Manchu empire.
He tried rebuilding relations with the Muslims of
Sudan
and Somalia
and Yemen
because these these lands had either broken away
from the Ottoman state or
they had essentially didn't want to be ruled
by the Ottomans no longer.
But he reexerted that importance.
He reminded
not just his own state but the Muslims
Muslims beyond
that there is a religious obligation
to not only pledge allegiance to the Khalifa,
but to obey him and support him.
And this was a problem for the European
powers
Khalifa Abdu Hamid was very smart. He used
these key strategic relationships
to cause problems for the Europeans who are
making advances in other parts of the world.
Should also be noted that Khalifa Abdu Hamid,
he
had a number of assassination attempts and coup
attempts
against his reign.
And after his reign ended,
there was no longer any executive
authority that any of the Ottoman rulers had
over the state.
There were 4 capitals,
the Ottoman state is debates for whether Soled
is regarded as a capital,
but it was the first established city of
the Baylid and the Sultanate.
Osman the first,
he founded Bursa.
Bursa is where he is buried,
and Sudd is where
his father is buried.
It was Osman's grandson, Murad the first,
who then moved the capital to Edir or
Agri Nepalis
in 13/63.
And of course, the last capital city of
the Ottoman state was Istanbul.
All of these cities are in modern day
Turkey.
Characteristics
of the ultimate state.
As I mentioned at the beginning of this
lecture,
Osman's dream
was very clear.
If that incident
happened and that dream happened, which
I hope I'm sure it did,
but if it happens and that's how it
was interpreted by chef,
that is how that was the the
that was the philosophy which identified,
I mean, defined the ultimate state. It was
without a shadow of a doubt,
a religious Islamic
state. There's a whole discourse around
whether the Ottomans were a legitimate Islamic state
or a legitimate
Khalifa or whether they were just another kingship
rule. There's there's many of these discussions
that that happening
and are happening not just within,
Western European academic, but even within,
Islamic discourse, not Uleman and activist. There's a
whole discussion about how Islamic were the Ottomans.
Let me tell you guys something.
You know, in hindsight,
it's very easy
to look back at historical events and say,
you know what? That wasn't Islamic. That doesn't
seem Islamic. That's not orthodox.
In the same way, a 100, a 100
and 50, 200 years on from our time
now,
there may be Muslims that look back to
some of the rulings
that we follow today.
And we look back and that's in, woah,
woah, those were some crazy rulings they followed.
They had no Islamic basis.
The point I'm trying to make here is
that the Ottomans,
they govern their state according to their interpretation
of Sharia.
And it is unequivocally
documented
of the key role that Olamah played
in the Ottoman state.
You all in your handout is a, recommended
reading list. There's one very interesting book, one
of my favorites.
It was written by
an Ottoman historian called Musayil Mas,
and he wrote a book called The Caliphate
Redefined,
a a turn in Ottoman political thought. In
this book, he defined
and discusses
by referring to primary sources,
how the Ottoman state perceived itself.
And he spoke about how the Ottoman state
was uniquely and distinctly different to other dynasties
before it. Why?
Because no other state
had codified
Hanafiq
or any fiq of any mad hub. Previously,
you'd had you had,
empires and and caliphates who had adopted
certain or
certain schools of thought,
but none codified it into state law.
The Ottomans did that.
They were also followers of the
Theology or the school
of creed.
And they were unashamedly and unapologetically,
because the soul.
And a number of Sufi tariqas flourished
under the Ottoman state, and they played a
key role
in defining
Ottoman statehood.
In fact, one of the description which the
Ottomans had described their state was the eternal
state.
Just like that tree in Osman's dream which
never actually stopped growing, they perceive their state
as the eternal state.
So without a shadow of a doubt, however
you want to argue it, however you want
to strip, you know, stretch the argument
with the advantage of hindsight,
the Ottomans,
they govern their state according to their interpretation
of Sharia law.
And
you'd find
that
it was in European
discourse that the Ottomans were very common referred
to as sorry, as the Turks, the Turks,
the Turks.
The Ottomans themselves may not refer to themselves
as Turks.
Maybe in some poetry they did,
but in state documents
and in,
you know, official,
you know, documents from one state to another
one, they they perceive themselves as the rulers
of the Islamic world,
as the only legitimate rulers
of the Islamic world.
And
whilst they were proud of their Turkic lineage,
they were,
they were always
pan Islamic in their mindset,
and that reflected in the language. For example,
the Seljuks,
the previous great Turkish empire, Turkic empire,
then the official language of the courts was
Persian,
Whereas the language of the Ottoman courts was,
initially was Arabic, and then it became Ottoman,
Turkish, which is a mix of Arabic
and,
the Turkic lang language.
It was also an expansionist state.
State. You know, the fact that that tree
in Osman's dream just carried on,
growing and spreading,
you know, it did have a world view
to take on the whole world.
The Ottoman rulers rulers did. They
wrote about it in their poetry, they wanted
they perceived themselves as the upholders of justice
and they wanted they saw themselves as the
domains of Islam, God al Islam, and they
wanted to spread it and spread it and
spread it.
Hence, why they were in a state move
only for 116
years non
stop. And naturally, any state which is is
expansionist and by the way, expansionist is a
very I don't like using the term because
expansionist has a
it is a word that has its
meaning and branding in colonial terms.
Right?
But what I mean by expansionist in this
sense is that the Ottomans perceive themselves
as a domain which had to be spread
by religious obligation.
That it wasn't a case
of we're going to go and colonize and
loot.
We we need to spread this domain
because it's something which we feel is better
for humanity.
And actually, they were a militaristic
state. Now the Janissaries,
who I mentioned previous slides, was established by
Murad the first.
The Janissaries
were made up of
Slavs,
Bosniaks,
Serbs, Greeks, Armenians,
Kurds, Turks,
and they were an elite fighting force
who were
unique because
they were ideologically
grounded on 2 premises.
Premise number 1,
our first duty, 1st and foremost, is to
protect and defend the Sultan,
the Hadith.
Number 2,
we need to make sure
that Osman's dream is being fulfilled.
We need to make sure that the frontiers
of the Ottoman state is not just being
defended,
that it is being
expanded
everyday.
So whenever certain Ottoman rulers
slow down the war pace a little bit,
the janissaries will be up in arms,
and then hold the Ottoman rulers to account.
Reminding them of Osman's dream.
Remind them of the religious obligation
of carrying
the message of Islam and removing any obstacles
to it.
So the were
very,
very
ideologically driven.
Very.
And other
it's also been argued
that they were the 1st pre modern elite
courts.
So the modern equipment would probably be, I
don't know, the Navy SEALs
or the SAS.
No. No. But they were regarded as the
1st pre modern navy courts.
And other empires and states at the time
wanted to replicate
the
the Janissary model, but they couldn't.
They tried. Yeah. For example, the Safavids and
the had the,
and and and other European empires had their
own version of what the Jannes were.
Jannes were
known as
warriors in the day and monks in the
night,
and
they needed to be in a state
of warfare
and expansion
and jihad
as understood by the Ottomans constantly around the
clock.
But it can also be argued that the
reason why they were so aggressive in this
mindset
was essentially they were paid.
It was their salary, it was their livelihood.
And eventually,
the Janissaries became too powerful.
They became too powerful, they became,
a state within a state. They became they
literally held so much power
that they would essentially choose
who would be Sultan, who wouldn't.
And there were many times when they rebelled,
there were many times where there was civil
unrest
led by the Janissaries,
and of course, it was Mahmud the second
who felt that they were no longer an
essential part of the Ottoman state, and he
killed the remaining,
numbers of
the Janissaries.
And the Ottomans also
stressed the importance
of conscription
as a religious obligation.
I guess that's nothing really that different to
any competing empires or states at the time,
Christian, Muslim,
whether, you know, there was a strong emphasis
on conscription.
But they
had implemented
another unique system that was a devi shim
system. The devi shim system was basically where
the Ottomans would take
1 Christian
boy
from each household.
So if there's more than one son,
the Christian household would have to give one
of their sons,
away towards
the, the Ottoman
military.
And that was justified
from the Ottoman perspective,
and it was only applied to those regions
of lands
which had to be fought to be conquered.
So they the Ottoman understanding for this policy
was that we lost men,
we lost soldiers
in taking this region.
So therefore, there has to be a form
of compensation
back from those
who fought us.
It must also be added, noted
that many
of those who went on
to join,
the Ottoman military
became the sole breadwinners and financial providers of
their families.
It is also documented,
especially in Bosnia and Kosovo and in Serbia,
that there were many, many Christian villages that
actually gave and offered more than one son
because they went on to become
some of them went on to become some
of them went on to become governors, Some
of them went on to become very powerful
and wealthy men.
The Ottoman state
was a very tolerant and pluralistic state.
I would go as far as to say
that there was none, no other state or
empire politic
like the ultimate state,
period.
Why?
Because it was perhaps the most religiously diverse,
the most ethnically diverse,
and culturally diverse state of its time for
centuries.
And it managed to maintain a system
of relative co existence
and a harmonious relationship between
the different religions and races
that existed within the state.
And one of the,
indicators of this was the middle of system.
Middle is Arabic Arabic court. They call them
Millet system. The Millet system was whereby
the Jews and the Christians
would be allowed to establish their own courts
and would refer to these courts for their
disputes. And if they were unhappy with the
decision, they'd refer back to the Ottoman Sharia
cause.
Now
it can be argued that this system is
actually
predates
the Ottomans.
But in fact, this is a system which
was implemented by the Khalifa Arashidin
and in fact, there is
lot of basis for it in, Islamic source
text. However, it was the Ottomans
that actually centralized these courts,
but they weren't just like,
I wouldn't say rogue courts, but kind of
like quasi autonomous independent courts in their respective
areas, and that was it. No. He's they
they were documented.
They were centralized.
All the rulings were document you know, you
know, documented.
There was a representative from each system, from
each region.
But it's also the fact that it was
actually the Ottomans
who actually had to,
you know, implement this system in a reality
and an environment which was really religiously diverse.
Yes. Okay. The Armenians, the Abbasid,
the Seljuks,
you know,
even to some degree the the Khalafar Rashidin.
Yeah. They may have had a similar middle
system, middle system,
but the vast majority of the lands which
they controlled were Muslim.
Although the region which they took, whether it
be Egypt or the Levant
or Persia or Central Asia,
they eventually became predominantly Muslim.
But the Ottomans
had the real challenge
of actually keeping together a society
which in many parts of this empire
was predominantly a majority demographically Christian.
And it was a very administratively
strong state.
I posted a status on Facebook yesterday, but,
also, I must say, can you post something
which we can share to hack the event
up? Yeah.
I said, there's no need. But did upholster
the status and it was,
from it was a it was it was
a quote from Hussein Yilmaz's book.
And Hussein Yilmaz, he described the Ottoman state.
And he basically said that if the Abbasids,
who were the legitimacy of the caliphate before
the Ottomans,
if their legitimacy in the Islamic world was
literally based on just some contractual
acceptance.
Now the Abbasids, without getting into it, you
know,
they became very weak very quickly.
The reason why that is because they promised
so many different entities and powers, Persian, Turkic,
Sunni, Shia, they they promised so much things
to different elements who helped them overthrow the
Umayyads
that they lost a lot of power in
influence very quick.
However, they justified their legitimacy
of being the caliphate
based on certain contract duties. For example, the
Abbasid would be the ones who announce when
Ramadan is. The Abbasid would be the ones
who went announce when the aid is. It'll
be the Abbasid
that will give the verbal go ahead before
any military campaign.
Most you know, like, just think about it,
like, a call which has many documents
and there's just a kind of print of
the Abbasid signature there. But really,
you know, the the competing and neighboring empires
were
significantly
stronger militarily and economically.
And one of the contractual,
conditions of the Abbasid was that no other
competing empire, Muslim, would announce declare themselves as
the Caliphate. So Hussein said that if that
was the basis, the legitimacy
of
the Abbasid Caliphate, the Ottomans were diametrically the
opposite. They were completely different.
They were grounded upon the fact that we
were sovereign,
we are the religious authority,
and we are the lawmakers,
which is starkly different to the Abbasid.
And as a result of having that kind
of
worldview ideology with regards to how they shaped
their state,
they had to be administratively
strong.
It was a very centralized state. Hussein Gilmaz
went as far as to say
that the Ottoman state from 15/17
to the late,
to the early 19th century actually reflected and
resembled that of the Khalifa of Omar
in the way that it was so centralized,
you you know, it was so brutal tight
in the way taxes were collected, Zakkar was
collected, jizya was collected, the way it was
redistributed,
the way certain,
budgets for the Bayt ul Ma'am was allocated.
These things
made the Ottomans a very, very strong state
administratively.
Things changed,
of course,
as I will mention here, I think in
the next slide that as the state was
expanding,
certain level of autonomy was granted to certain
governors.
And again,
it began corruption and nepotism,
which also contribute to the decline. These were
ultimately
the characteristics
of the state as ultimate the Ottoman state.
Achievements,
many achievements,
far too many to mention, but just a
few that I,
felt actually mentioned.
They were the Ottomans were one of the
first gunpowder empires,
along with the Safavids of Persia and the
Mughals of India.
They were the first gunpowder empires
before the Europeans. They had the first muskets.
They had the first cannons in their ships
and so forth, which made them an effective
fighting force for the best part of a
150 years.
As I mentioned about the Janissary Corps, they
were the first to create a modern elite
corps,
that did not exist anywhere else. Other empires
and other states had, you
know, specific,
fighting elements or or military elements within their
army, but none were ideologically
driven and defined as the Janissaries were.
And as I also mentioned in the previous
state that the Ottoman Empire really, really was
a cosmopolitan,
multi ethnic, and religiously pluralistic state. Forget what
Daniel Hussein tells you. Forget what the the
Ottomanist historians may tell you. Go read the
accounts of European writers and historians.
Those who went and visited,
Istanbul and other parts of the empire as
late as the 18 eighties and 18 nineties
who said that we have not seen
people of the Abrahamic faith, live in such
harmony.
Was it not the case
was it not the case I'm just jumping
some of the points.
That when the Spanish Inquisition took place in
Spain,
after 14/92,
when the Catholic Castellians,
basically forced Muslim and Jews to become Christian
or they were killed,
nowhere else in Europe welcomed
the Jewish people.
Nowhere
else. It was the Ottomans
and they didn't accept them as refugees.
No.
They welcome them, open arms to say, come
and settle here and flourish.
Contribute to the Ottoman state, and they did.
And there's Jewish poetry out there
which testifies
to the treatment in which the Jews had
within the Ottoman state
for many, many centuries.
It was the autonomous who with the permission
of Islam brought Islam to Eastern and Central
Europe.
There was no Islam in Bosnia,
or Kosovo,
or Serbia, or Hungary, or Romania,
or Bulgaria.
Islam have not reached these parts.
It was the permission of Allah that it
was through the Ottomans
that Islam entered these lands and is still
there today.
There are so many, many Muslims in these
countries, in these regions till today.
For those of you who have been Istanbul
and have been to the burial place of
Abu Ayub Al Ansari,
it's known as Ayub Sultan,
you'll see that there's Muslims from the Caucus,
there's Muslims from the Balkans, there's Muslims from
Europe. These people would not be Muslim if
the Ottomans did not bring Islam.
It was not like
and and it's a point that has to
be made.
It was not like how
when the Europeans
entered entered and colonized many lands
in Asia, Middle East, and Africa,
that
they wholeheartedly
accepted
the mission we work as the Christians, and
then as soon as they left, they abandoned.
No. The Ottomans finished, but Islam remained.
And you find that in many parts of
the Islamic world today.
They protected the Mediterranean Sea against pirates. Again,
another huge major misconception,
a myth, is that pirates were Arabs and
Berbers
and black Africans.
Untrue.
Untrue.
The first currency movements
began in Europe.
The first currency movements
began in Europe. Why? Because
the Ottomans
had a very strict monitoring system of the
Mediterranean Sea,
and they did not allow
they did not allow
European powers to do as they wish in
the Mediterranean.
So they would so the Europeans, namely,
the British and the Spanish and the Portuguese
would commission
mercenaries
to try sabotage
trade routes.
It was they it's the Ottomans who protected
the Mediterranean for many centuries.
As I mentioned earlier as well, many of
the Ottoman Khalifa, they're allocated from the Waqf,
from the religious endowment,
a lot of money and resources to the
preservation and renovation and infrastructure
of the Hejaz and Hashem,
Mecca, Medina,
Jerusalem.
But even for those of you who've been,
to Mecca, you will find that there is
a gate, I believe, is called the Ottoman
Gate,
an entrance. There's certain work that's been done
to the Calabar which was done by,
the Ottoman rulers as with Masjid al Nabawi,
as with Masjid al Aqsa.
There's Ottoman work that's carried out, that still
remains in Cairo,
in Syria,
in Jordan.
Another funny one is, under Khalifa Abu Hamid,
he also commissioned
the creation of the first robot.
A bit random, I know.
There is. It has passed an official,
Ottoman,
newspaper.
He commissioned Japan to start building the first
robot. It never happened.
Who knows? Maybe Japan's fixation with robots and
AI and all that stuff may have been
inspired by the.
I don't know.
And,
it was another policy of Khalifa
to have built,
that a train line which went from
Istanbul
to Cairo
to Damascus to Jerusalem to Mecca to Medina.
And this was part of Abdulhamid's
pan Islamic world view that he wanted to
connect all these key Islamic cities
that had a lot of history in them,
that meant a lot to the Muslims
to build
this train line
to reconnect
the key parts of the Ottoman state
and make it easier to travel, to go
pilgrimage,
to do trade. Sadly,
that project never materialized.
Naturally, any state or empire of polity,
which
span across 3 continents,
would have had to have a number of
relations
with competing and neighboring empires.
The Ottoman state at its zenith and at
its pinnacle, even towards the decline, it was
still, covered Middle East,
Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.
As a result of that, the Ottomans for
centuries had different relationships with different competing empires
of its time. So just to quickly
speed through it,
the Byzantines
or the Eastern Holy Roman Empire,
the relationship with them was always hostile.
Again, for those of you watching
this, this beef takes back to Ethel Hazi.
And,
so
the
the relation with the Byzantines
was always hostile. And it's ultimate, the ultimate
that delivered the final blow which ended the
the Byzantine Empire.
France, surprisingly, was the traditional European ally of
the Ottomans for these 200 years.
The Austrian Habsburg
Empire, the relation with them
was also very hostile.
There were 2 famous sieges of Vienna
where under Soleiman the first
literally,
they had besieged Vienna
and had Vienna fell,
the Ottomans would have entered Western Europe,
but it didn't.
And also, the Austrian Hapsburg Empire Empire
led a lot of the campaigns against the
Ottomans because Hungary
fell
to the Ottomans under
the first.
So the relationship with the Austrian Habsburg
was very hostile
until World War 1 where
the Ottomans and
by extension, they were allies of the Austrians.
Russia was regarded as the ark enemy
for 50 years. It would make major incursions,
towards the Balkans,
and it is also believed that it was
the Russian empire
who inspired a lot of the nationalist further,
in,
the Balkan area
because the Russians were Greek Orthodox.
Many of the Balkan countries that were formerly
Christian, they were made mainly Greek Orthodox as
well as Catholic.
And in the late 19th century and early
20th century, the Russians played a key role
along with Britain and France in inspiring,
separatist
agitation within the Ottoman state.
Germany
was relatively a new state.
Right? When Ottoman Bismarck unifies the state, I
believe it was in the 18 sixties, 18
seventies. Don't quote me. So Germany was a
relatively new state, but they were the final
allies of the Ottomans in World War 1.
But it was Britain and France, all the
annihilators.
They were the ones who, as a result
of World War 1
and as a result of their own geopolitical
interests in the region of North Africa and
the Middle East, were the ones that Africa
and the Middle East were the ones that
essentially
defeated,
the Ottoman Empire,
namely
through
inspiring and leading and supporting
what was known as the Arab revolt.
But the Ottomans also had relationship with Muslim
powers,
with the Safavids
who,
theologically told the Shias.
The relationship with them was hostile
because the Safavids would always
attack
the Ottomans,
Eastern Flank when they were on European campaigns.
And that was something that was always went
to and fro, to and fro, to and
fro. That whenever the Ottomans were on,
a a European campaign,
rest assured the Safavids would probably attack Iraq
or Armenia or Azerbaijan
or something like that. So the relationship with
them was hostile for political reasons,
for religious reasons, for sectarian reasons.
The Mamluks
also a hostile
relationship. The Mamluks,
let's not forget, they were to a very
noble,
prominent Muslim dynasty.
It was the Mamluks who defeated the Mongols
in the battle of Ain Jalut.
It was the Mamluks
who fought the Mongols.
It was the Mamluks
who
preserved
the seat of the Abbasid Khilassa.
Though, the Abbasid held very little power, it
was they who felt the religious importance to
preserve
that dynasty.
But they had very hostile relation with the
Ottomans and eventually, they were defeated. However, a
number
of very influential Mamluk,
tribal leaders did existed within Egypt,
but they were sadly,
exterminated
by an individual called Muhammad Ali Pasha
who was a kind of semi autonomous governor
of Egypt. He rounded all the remaining
elders in Cairo and killed them. This was
in the 1900,
19th century.
Last but not least,
the Mughals.
Those of you who are from modern day
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan,
the Ottomans had a very warm relation with
the Mughals.
In fact, there are
documents
in,
I believe you've seen a number of museums
in Pakistan,
but it's being documented that when the Mughal
emperors
Mughal emperor emperors, you should write to the
Ottomans, they used to refer to them as
Amir Muqmini,
as the Khalifa, the Ummah. They should write
in their letters. This is this is stored
in the Turkish historical archives. In fact, there's
a specific letter, a
Islamic
Ottoman ruler. I think it was Khalif Suleiman
the first and Murad IV. And in these
letters which are preserved today,
they refer to the Ottoman rulers as Amir
al Muqini,
as the blessed Khalifa of the Umbr.
It has also been documented that it was
a very common practice in key cities within
the rebel empire that every jum'ah
as part of the khutma,
after praising the beloved prophet salallahu alayhi wasalam,
his family, his companions,
they will also send salutations
to the Ottoman rulers.
It's documented. So their relationship was more with
the Mughals generally,
but there's also a theological,
an affinity with the Mughals. Why?
Both states were Hanafi.
Both states
were generally very Sufi,
and they they followed either the Ash Erid
or Mataridi
School of Creed. So there's a lot of
similarities
in that regard.
There were little periods of of,
disagreements.
For example, when the Ottomans
required
the Mughals
to militarily act to counter the British and
the Portuguese, sometimes the Mughals were unable to
do so. And likewise, when the Mughals required
the Ottomans to militarily act to counter the
Safavids, sometimes the Ottomans were unable to do
so. So that created tensions during some period.
But generally,
Ottoman and Mughal relations
were warm,
and the Mughals then as far as to
ceremoniously,
at least, acknowledge,
the Islamic authority of the Ottomans. Islamic authority
of the Ottomans.
Reasons for decline.
There's many, many reasons for decline.
Right? And it would be incorrect
to identify one reason. It never really is
one reason.
There's usually exception of reason which contribute towards
decline.
And the following are some of them. I
have my personal views with regards to
which were key reasons, but the following all
played a role. Excessive autonomy and corruption. Now
when I said to you that the Ottomans
grounded themselves in having a very centralized
and tight knit state,
in order for taxes,
and levies to be collected properly,
they had to grant
governors a certain level of power and autonomy.
And for those of you who have read
a bit about the life of O'un al
Nalan,
one of his was that he would regularly
change governors.
He didn't allow governors
to stay in power for too long in
case of corruption.
In case that this governor will start building
relations with the the the indigenous people, and
therefore, this will create,
nepotism and corruption. Omar Khafar made sure that
he changed governors very regularly.
The Ottomans,
once they realized that certain governors were doing
a good job in collecting levies, in collecting
taxes, and redistributing
it, that sadly began
nepotism and corruption
and too much autonomy.
Maybe all this is a problem
for any,
traditional empire or state of that time.
There was an intellectual stagnation.
The fact that a number of Ottoman,
they kind of closed the gates of Ijtihad
and they felt that the the laws and
the and and that they had qualified and
the canals that they had created, it was
sufficient until the end of times.
And this was very problematic.
It's very problematic because when it came to
a case of advancing technologically,
when it came to things which
had new reality, which had to be studied.
That generally speaking,
the Ottoman scholars or the or the leading
scholars, the religious establishment generally had abandoned,
each jihad in dealing with new realities. At
a
time, when Europe at least was moving at
a rapid
pace with the industrial revolution
in terms of armaments and weaponry,
the printing press and so forth, the Ottomans
in this regard of the ulama who made
a lot of these, just felt that, you
know what? What we've got in hand is
enough for us to last until the end
of times. That was a big problem.
Also, and and and and what was indicative
of this problem was the fact that
when that time came,
the early to mid 19th century,
that is why you had
elements of the Ottoman ruling,
ruling elite
seeking
answers and solutions for their own state from
Europe.
So it can be argued to some degree
in the defense of those who are regarded
today as secularists and reformists and set outs.
They felt that there was not a robust
approach internally to deal with new realities.
So therefore, we have to seek
answers and solutions from another civilization or state
which appear to be moving with the times.
A decrease in military campaigns. Remember that period
I spoke about 17/40 to 17/68,
about 28 years of peace, that time where
the optimists basically went to neutral, put their
feet up, kick back inside, relaxing from the
spoils of war.
That period
was a huge contributor to military decline. I
wanna quote
2 very well known Ottomanist historians.
I will highly recommend for you guys to
get their book if you're interested in Ottoman
history.
Doctor Virginia Aksa,
in her book, Ottoman Walls, 1700 to 18/60,
an empire besieged, page 130. She said,
the Ottoman Empire continue to maintain a flexible
and strong economy, society,
and military throughout 17th
and much of 18th century.
However,
during a long period of peace from 17/40
to 17/68,
the Ottoman military system fell behind that of
the European rivals.
And her colleague,
doctor Soraya Foroughi,
who studied in Durham University, in her book,
she echoed the same sentiment.
She said, moreover,
in the 18th century when expansion definitely had
ended,
Ottoman military effectiveness
and satanic concern for army reform were not
totally at an end. So while she acknowledged
that military expansion was certainly came to an
end, it was still a level of importance
that was given to the military army. Hence,
by a number of reforms under Tanzimat
sought,
a solution from the Europeans.
Nationalism.
Nationalism
was massive blow, massive contributor to the decline
of the of the Ottoman state
because nationalism
essentially was a European idea.
It was an idea which was born out
of
the post enlightenment.
It was born out of the Christian reformation.
It was born out of the treaty of
Westphalia,
and it was nationalism which essentially
was used
in the Balkans
by Russia.
It was national which was used by the
British in the Arabian Peninsula,
and it was nationalism,
which is was a strong part of the
Young Turk Young Turk,
the Young Turks Movement.
For those of you who have
read or come across some of the statements,
the beloved prophet,
and how he describes Asabia,
whether you take it as tribalism, nationalism, or
racism, highly uninterpreted.
It was something which he saw in the
world, he was sort of described as rotten,
something which he spoke very, very negatively of.
So it's no surprise that nationalism essentially
was one of the contributors
towards
the decline of the Ottoman
State.
But it can also be counter argued
that did the Ottomans do enough.
Once they may have claimed inclusivity
or pluralistic society, did they do enough
for the people of the Balkans,
for people of Central Europe, for the people
of the, of the Arabian Peninsula?
Did they do enough to make them feel
that they were part of this?
Did did they do enough?
Because if they did,
why did nationalism
why was nationalism so easy
to essentially implement and fracture the state as
a counterargument on what you ought to perhaps
think about.
And the young type of movement,
generally, the Western Secular Liberals and the kind
of the kind of new world order that
was emerging or had emerged by the 19th
century naturally influenced, elements of the
Ottoman elite.
The fact that,
you know,
Europe who, for the best part of 2,
300 years, were always behind
the Ottomans.
And now all of a sudden,
were miles ahead
in nearly every aspect
of
of statehood, whether that be economically,
militarily.
And so the Young Turks, to begin with,
were fed up.
They just felt that the Ottoman state was
and and and and and and the different,
power power holders within the state were were
not doing enough.
But
as time progressed,
the collusion with European powers was borderlining
treachery and treason.
And last but not least, which kind of
reiterates the above,
there was basically
a stronger, more advanced European
enemies of the Ottoman state.
Now
whilst I would not say that the that
the Ottomans were the sick man of Europe,
a A derogatory term that was coined by
the Russian czar to describe Khalifa Abd al
Hamid specifically, but the ultimate that was an
ailing and outdated and regressive
state amongst other European empires that were had
had embraced modernity,
had embraced
a new world.
It's untrue.
It's untrue because the Ottoman is truly,
a sick man. It doesn't take much to
destroy a sick man.
It doesn't.
But yet, this sick man,
it it survived for 100 to a 120
years.
And even in World War 1, it put
up a great battle in Gallipi,
in Cook, in Iraq, as well as other
parts, it put up
brave efforts
towards armies which were
militarily and technologically more advanced.
But if you ask me
okay, for all these reasons, for all these,
contributors,
what are the key ones?
Definitely intellectual decline.
A decline
which basically
meant that the Ottoman state and
I will across the world,
the Safavids, the Mughals
as well,
that they were just failing
to deal new realities.
That the gates of Istihad really had closed,
that they just weren't in where there was
a robust and flourishing approach of Ula Ma
to deal with
flourishing approach of to deal with new realities
in the way in which science and and
and and and other arts and humanities and
other things flourished for the best part of
a 1000 years. Whether it's a, whether it's
a, whether it's a, whether it's a, whether
it's a, whether
it's
a, whether it was,
whichever whichever part whichever civilization you wanna choose.
There was never a case
never a case
where Islamic civilization
was behind any other civilization. The best part
for a 1000 years, it was ahead.
And that's because the Ulam at the time
had such a pragmatic
and open approach
to new realities.
There was never a conflict between
Islam
and
exploration of new things. Never. Whether that be
science or maths or philosophy or astronomy or
or or or or the make the weapons
or whatever it may be.
But for some reason,
towards
the 19th century,
for sure, that these things, this kind of
robustness is not happening. This kind of creativity,
this kind of very open approach to new
things just wasn't taking place.
And I also believe that this 28 years
of peace, as harsh as it may sound,
as harsh as you may think, oh my
god.
How can peace ever be a contributor to
a decline? It was.
It was.
28 years
of no military campaigns
meant that for 28 years,
those empires and states that essentially are your
enemies and you're competing with, they were doing
very well.
They
were given nearly 30 years of a breather
breather of not having to deal with the
hostile Ottoman Empire,
and that contribute towards their decline. Because within
even if you look at European history from
the period of,
17/40 to 17/68, there were huge
huge achievements made by Spain and Portugal, Britain
and France, and Russia in that period, whilst
the Ottomans were chilly 20 years.
It could be argued that they were tired.
They deserved a break, but
why is that break contribute towards the decline?
The last one would be nationalism.
There is no way that we cannot
negate or downplay
the role of nationalism.
Nationalism, I would go first say, is one
of the biggest obstacles toward the Ummah's unity
today.
It's the biggest obstacles towards the unity of
the Ummah today.
It was which
prevented from
accepting the message of Islam, that the prophet
was from Bani
Hashim. It was which
caused a number of,
arguments and frictions even in Medina amongst the
Ansar.
It was
which was used
to spark the Arab revolt.
To say that Mohammed
was an Arab, half of the Turks have
an over lordship of Islamic authority.
So these these things put together
certainly contribute towards the Ottoman
decline.
Look, Islamic history
was not a Utopian society.
There has never been a Utopian society.
Even when our beloved prophet sallallahu alaihi wa
sallam, who was the greatest of mankind to
have lived on this earth,
when he established the first community in Medina,
that was not in talking state. There were
still problems. There were still disputes. There were
still crimes being committed.
So when we discuss Islamic civilization history, be
mindful.
Be mindful not to present it in such
a romanticized
way
where literally
nothing could have gone wrong or nothing did
go wrong. Many things we had our faults
and many problems, many cases of,
civil war,
oppression, injustice,
and many of these things.
But we should not also fall into the
other extreme,
and that is whereby we start adopting certain
narratives,
a certain frameworks
to basically
we start uttering some unsubstantiated
propaganda about Islamic civilization.
And the Ottomans are perhaps after
yeah. So I would say they are perhaps
they're most
dehumanizing,
demonized
Muslim dynasty Islamic history.
And the number of things
which within the Ottoman period, did take place
which were problematic,
which in hindsight, you can say was un
Islamic,
but things that you can also say that
was part of propaganda. Let's go through some
of these things. Rule of fracture
site. The practice of brothers killing brothers.
Islamically, in hindsight, in 2019, we can turn
around and say,
how do you how do you justify,
from the Islamic perspective, a brother?
A Muslim killing a Muslim, a brother killing
his brother.
How do you justify that? Well, the Ottomans
at the time
and the scholars at the time, they said,
hold on.
What's worse?
A brother killing a brother? 1 or 2
lives taken?
Or the risk of civil war,
where thousands of people will be killed?
Where we give our enemies an opportunity to
enter our states and our affairs and cause
disunity?
That's how they assessed it. That's how they
assessed the harm and benefit
based on a previous track record,
the Ottoman and Terengnus, the priestesses of Saddam
Rol the first, who literally need that they
invited
the threesong. They're allied with European powers that
had always been the enemies of the Ottomans
just so they could compete for power.
Ottomans
just so they can compete for power. 1000
upon 1,000 of people died, Muslims and non
Muslims. To avoid that, it's just better for
brother killing a brother. However, facturicide
is not
a policy which is restricted or limited to
the Ottomans.
Many European powers and monarchies had this policy.
The Romans had this policy.
The ancient Greeks had such a policy.
The ancient Egyptians had such a policy. Factricide
is not something that's limited or exclusive
to the Ottomans. However, the Ottomans had,
to their understanding, an Islamic justification for it.
And that is the unity
of the state, unity of the
and the preservation of religion and life and
security was greater than a brother killing a
brother.
Eunuchs
were basically,
individuals,
men
who were castrated,
and they were kept in the royal palaces.
I can't stand in any kind of religious
basis for such,
policy, but the Ottomans did. They had,
men who basically had
parts of the sexual organs slipped,
and they used to basically
guard the world palaces.
Because the understanding was that those who can't
procreate
or those who had been slipped off, they
were no longer deemed as men. So therefore,
our women folk was safe around them.
It happened. It was real. I don't know
why. I don't know how it was justified.
I tried to do my research. There was
no research behind it except that many
this is the only thing I read.
Many
had offered to become eunuchs because of the
lavish lifestyle that they were promised.
But I can't see no justification for use
of eunuchs.
Slave trade. Were they slaves?
Pardon? Were they slaves?
Those who were Eunuchs. Yes. Many of them
were not all of them. Many of them
were not all of them. Some of them
were free men who offered themselves, but made
them
were slaves.
But still, even if they were slaves,
that act
I can see how could be how could
be justified.
I've I've not heard any Islamic explanation for
many schools of thought to justify such a
cause for such a man.
The slave trade.
The Ottomans were involved in slave trade, but
they were not involved in the transatlantic
slave trade.
The global
order
whereby
100 and thousands of free
men and women and children in Africa
were captured,
sold, enslaved,
and treated in horrific ways.
The Ottomans were not involved in that.
That was predominantly a West African,
American,
British, and Dutch thing.
The slave trade which the Ottomans were involved
in was slave trade that was generally
procured from war. So prisoners of war were
taken as slaves and they will be sold
in the markets. If there were certain regions
that were taken by battle, it was a
normal practice that
before you went to war with a particular
state or empire or region,
the practice of the Ottomans like it was
with previous Muslim empires
was
that white flag us say and accept
Islam. Number 2,
if you're not gonna accept Islam. Number 3
is
war. Number 3 is if he is war,
then that means whatever we do when we
come into that city is ours.
Again, I don't want you all to think
that, oh my god, that sounds so barbaric.
It was something which, brothers and sisters and
friends,
again, was not exclusive or limited to the
Ottomans or Muslim empires or states.
Now, when a city or a country or
a region or a land was taken by
force,
sadly, it was the norm of that time
that men and women and children would be
taken as slaves and sold off in markets.
However, the Ottomans were not involved in the
transatlantic
slave trade. They were involved in this in
in a slave trade, which was essentially
born out of warfare.
The system,
the system which I spoke about where we
come to an end. Don't worry. Be patient.
The
system whereby,
a Christian household would have to get one
of their sons to join the military, the
arsenal military by law. It was mandatory.
There was a lot of controversy
without
saying that Muslims committed a genocide against the
Armenians.
It's become an assumed truth, at least in
Western European discourse. But let me explain to
you the
explain to you the Ottoman perspective.
The Ottoman perspective was this. Obviously, there were
a number of incidents whereby
there was nationalist agitation within modern day Armenia,
which is part of the Ottoman state.
But the
Armenian genocide is usually referred to an incident
which took place in 1915,
in the 1st year of war, World War
1,
where
the Ottomans
demanded from their Armenian citizens
that we need a certain amount of men
to fight for the Ottomans as part of
our war effort.
Keep in mind that Armenia
was part of the Ottoman state,
and Armenians were Ottoman citizens.
And the Ottomans,
in 1915,
requested,
if not requested, demanded
by law
that we want a certain number of Armenian
men to fight for us.
The Armenian leaders
refused to give any men towards the war
effort.
In the eyes of the Ottoman State, that
was treason.
Secondly
secondly,
there was, according to
the state at the time, evidence of collusion
between
the Russian Empire and the Armenians.
In that, the Russians would supply money and
weapons
for the Armenians to break away from the
Ottoman state.
Based on 2 these two things,
which was deemed as an act of treason,
the Ottomans had expelled
and exiled
the Armenians
and pushed them out towards the deserts of
Syria, Deir ezul, in eastern Syria. In that
journey, many, many, many Armenians did indeed die.
They died from malnutrition, from hunger, and I'm
sure
some were killed unjustly
on the way there. We can't deny that.
But from the Ottoman perspective,
they saw it as an act of treason.
And it goes without saying also
that whilst in their journey towards that perilous
journey towards Deir Ezzor, the deserts of Syria,
that when that opportunity arose,
elements of the Ottoman army may have,
in fact, did act unjustly.
We shouldn't be shy about admitting this.
However,
was it a systematic genocide?
Was
were the Ottoman state were the Ottoman were
they even in a position
to carry out a systematic genocide
given that they were in a state of
war from all fronts?
It should also be noted
that whether you accept what happened to the
Armenians was an intentional
and systemic genocide
or that it was an act of treason
which resulted in them being expelled and therefore,
many many Armenians died. However, you wanna see
it, the point is the Khalifa or the
Sultan
did not make this decision because by 1915,
the 3
were running the Ottoman state. The Khalifa had
the Sultan had no
executive power over these kind of policies.
And last but not least,
which I touched upon a previous slide,
were the optimists the sick man of Europe?
No.
Was it a state or a policy
which seemed to have been behind its European
counterparts in many areas? Yes.
Yes.
There was a war.
I believe it was 1857
that could be wrong. The Crimean War.
Britain and France allied with the Ottomans to
fight the Russians. Britain and France used
to use the Ottomans
to counter,
Russian geopolitics. It's quite very normal.
And the Crimean War was the first time
that the Ottomans fell into debt,
interest based debt
with Britain and France.
And
this debt continued to increase
and it crippled the Ottoman state until the
time of Abdul Hamid, who tried his utmost
best with radical fiscal policies
to eradicate his debt.
But was it a sick man of Europe?
No. Because as we all know, if you
take the analogy of a sick man,
you can pretty much kill off a sick
man. It doesn't take a 100, a 150
years to kill off a sick man.
But was it an ailing empire?
Was it an empire or a state that
did have problems,
that was not as
militarily,
economically,
and politically
astute and capable as its counterparts? There is
truth to this.
But the but the very fact that in
World War 1,
even with
weaponry
that was less advanced
to Britain, France, and Russia,
the Ottomans didn't put up a fight and
were successful in a number of key battles.
They were the same men of Europe that
would be
defeated very easily.
They won't. In fact, it was the Arab
revolt. It was a revolt. It was an
internal strife
that essentially drew delivered the final blow to
the Ottomans. It wasn't an actual battle
or war.
It was
the rebellion from the Arabian Peninsula.
So problems insisted both of the negatives.
From this stuff is factual.
From this stuff
is Islamically
indefensible. You cannot defend it.
And some of this stuff is just propaganda.
And we need to be smart enough
when understanding Islamic history to have an objective
approach.
Yes. We accept
that not everything within Islamic history and civilization
was hunky dory. Of course, it wasn't.
But at the same time,
it wasn't all bad.
Wasn't all bad.
And
has to be said. It has to be
said. These these these little disclaims of things
have to be said. And the reason why
it has to be said is because there's
this kind of there's this there's this,
mindset that, you know what? Nobody's talking about
the Islamic great days. It's because a lot
of stuff was great.
All the stuff was great.
Again, forget what David Hussein is telling you.
Forget about what any Muslim was doing. There's
European thinkers. You know, the vast majority,
at least some of the the very well
known enlightenment thinkers, they spoke about it.
Rousseau,
amongst others, spoke about Islamic civilization as being
the kind of precursor, the intellectual precursor to
their,
their awakening.
So we shouldn't be shy
about talking by some civilization in a positive
manner, in a manner in which we, inshallah,
want to see
the return of replication of.
All I'm saying
is, just pipe you down a little because
a lot of it wasn't all perfect.
Some of the some of the things that
I experienced is that it was all good
and not bad. And that's not true because
what end up happening, if you have this
approach to Islamic history, you're gonna have someone
who's just done a simple Google or Wiki
checks and put their hands up and present
you some things from the same edition. You're
gonna be stuck.
We have to appreciate
and accept
that there were many issues within Islamic civilization.
Not issue there was.
And how are we gonna learn
how are we gonna move forward as an
onman who don't learn from the mistakes,
who don't acknowledge these mistakes, who don't replicate
these mistakes?
Just be
smart and vigilant
and be objective
in not falling into extremes.
To conclude,
why are the Ottomans
so important to Muslims?
It was the last central Islamic authority.
You know, when
we read the sealer,
I mean, the life of the prophet
and all these, you know, these great leaders
and armies and empires and polities. I believe
sometimes
okay. Maybe the and the and the and
the companions are different because there's a different
kind of affinity.
With the beyond that, there is a disconnect.
There is a disconnect in terms of time.
There's a disconnect in terms of space.
There's a disconnect because you can't really link
back to the Abbasids or the Umayyads
and the and and these previous classical policies.
But with the Ottomans, you can because they
existed
just 95 years ago.
There are still great great grandchildren of Sultan
Abdul Hamid that exist today.
They exist.
You can you can those of you who
are from North Africa and from the Arabian
Peninsula,
your forefathers or maybe your families right now
are living
the outcome
of the destruction of the Ottoman state.
There's a very interesting article in The Economist.
I forgot the title. Just Google Ottoman Empire
Economist.
But they said that,
would the the author questioned
that would we really be seeing the destabilization
and the carnage and the unrest that we're
seeing in Middle East and North Africa
had Sykes Picot not happened?
When lines were drawn
over a bottle of shandy,
glass,
and a ruler and a pencil, and if
you're drawing lines sorry, drawing lines
in regions and countries where people and different
races have lived for centuries. Melting pots
melting pots. Let's just draw lines. France, this
is yours, this
ringing. That's normal.
Okay?
So
we are living
we are living.
For those of you who follow events in
Middle East and North Africa, we are living
the aftermath
of what happened after the destruction of both
Mahdi Khalifa.
They were the last
Islamic authority. I know there's a whole debate
around,
oh, you know, after the Khalifa Rashidin,
was any other entity or dynasty account? Were
they really a Khalifa? Were they king? Yes.
You know, there's a hadith in Muslim Ahmed
which describes that after Khalifa Rashidun, they'll be
king ship
and they'll be tyranny, etcetera, etcetera.
And the true khilafa
only lasted for 30 years. Yes. These arguments
exist.
Some of them have
legitimacy and truth in them, but the point
is that for 14th century, 13th centuries,
accepted these dynasties as
as.
And
for all their faults and all their mistakes,
they were the last embodiment.
They were the last embodiment of any
Islamic authority
or polity which transcended
borders and races as we understand it today.
And they are the most closest to us
in time.
And in the UK, they are the most
closest to us in time of distance.
And the reason why many revivalist organizations and
movements and groups speak very fondly about the
Ottomans,
dare I say, even
romanticizing Ottoman history
is because they do it, because they see
within the Ottomans.
It's hope and source of revival.
For those of you who are big supporters
of Erdogan,
for those of you who follow Turkish politics
very closely,
it is not uncommon to see that in
pro AKP,
rallies
and just generally rallies of that kind of
spectrum, you'll see that flag there.
That green flag with the 3 crescents
or the flag of the of Mani Gilefits,
and those 3 crescents represented Asia,
Africa, and Europe.
This green flag is now reemerging in Turkey,
not the possible Muslim world.
This is why discussing the Ottomans,
not just the Ottomans, generally Islamic history,
is important for us
because how do we move forward as an
Ummah if we do not reflect upon our
past, if we do not reflect upon our
history,
take from the good,
learn from the bad,
and try our best to never repeat the
ugly.
There's nothing lacking for your patience.